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We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that 
standard accounts of intentional action can't explain the whole of agency. Causalist 
accounts such as Davidson's and Bratman's, according to which an action can be 
intentional only if it is caused by a particular mental state of the agent, don't work for 
every kind of action. So-called automatic actions, effortless performances over 
which the agent doesn't deliberate, and to which she doesn't need to pay attention, 
constitute exceptions to the causalist framework, or so I argue in this thesis.  
 
Not all actions are the result of a mental struggle, painful hesitation, or the weighting 
of evidence. Through practice, many performances become second nature. Think of 
familiar cases such as one's morning routines and habits: turning on the radio, 
brushing your teeth. Think of the highly skilled performances involved in sport and 
music: Jarrett's improvised piano playing, the footballer's touch. Think of agents' 
spontaneous reactions to their environment: ducking a blow, smiling. Psychological 
research has long acknowledged the distinctiveness and importance of automatic 
actions, while philosophy has so far explained them together with the rest of agency.  
 
Intuition tells us that automatic actions are intentional actions of ours all the same (I 
have run a survey which shows that this intuition is widely shared): not only our own 
autonomous deeds for which we are held responsible, but also necessary components 
in the execution and satisfaction of our general plans and goals. But do standard 
causal accounts deliver on the intentionality of automatic actions? I think not. 
 iv
Because, in automatic cases, standard appeals to intentions, beliefs, desires, and 
psychological states in general ring hollow. We just act: we don't think, either 
consciously or unconsciously.  
 
On the reductive side, Davidson's view can't but appeal to, at best, unconscious 
psychological states, the presence and causal role of which is, I argue, inferred from 
the needs of a theory, rather than from evidence in the world. On the non-reductive 
side, Bratman agrees, with his refutation of the Simple View, that we can't just attach 
an intention to every action that we want to explain. But Bratman’s own Single 
Phenomenon View, appealing to the mysterious notion of 'motivational potential', 
merely acknowledges the need for refinement without actually providing one.  
 
So I propose my own account of intentional action, the 'guidance view', according to 
which automatic actions are intentional: differently from Davidson and Bratman, 
who only offer necessary conditions in order to avoid the problem of causal 
deviance, I offer a full-blown account: E's φ-ing is intentional if and only If φ-ing is 
under E's guidance. This account resembles one developed by Frankfurt, with the 
crucial difference that Frankfurt – taking 'acting with an intention' and 'acting 
intentionally' to be synonymous – thinks that guidance is sufficient only for some 
movement being an action, but not for some movement being an intentional action. I 
argue that, on the other hand, Frankfurt's concept of guidance can be developed so 
that it is sufficient for intentional action too.  
 
 v
In Chapter One I present and defend my definition of ‘automatic action’. In Chapter 
Two I show that such understanding of automatic actions finds confirmation in 
empirical psychology. In Chapter Three I show that Davidson's reductive account of 
intentional action does not work for automatic actions. In Chapter Four I show that 
the two most influential non-reductive accounts of intentional action, the Simple 
View and Bratman's Single Phenomenon View, don't work either. And in Chapter 
Five I put forward and defend my positive thesis, the 'guidance view'. Also, in the 
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We think less than we think. Or, anyhow, we think less than philosophers of action 
think we think. This thesis shows that some prevailing philosophical explanations of 
human action wrongly appeal to the mind. Those appeals, I argue, are often 
unjustified and unnecessary. I do so by focusing on what I call automatic actions: 
performances we can effortlessly and successfully complete without paying attention 
to or becoming aware of them: turning a door handle, skills like downshifting to 4
th
 
gear, or habits like lighting up a cigarette. When we act automatically we don’t 
appear to, consciously or unconsciously, think, nor do we need to think. Through 
practice, we become confident enough with our automatic performances that we can 
spare much of the cognitive resources which are normally required by novel or 
unfamiliar activities.  
 
In Chapter 1 I define automatic actions as performances that we do not nor need to, 
perceptually or intellectually, attend to; but that are nevertheless within our control. 
It appears obvious from the examples above that when we act automatically we, 
normally at least, act intentionally. Firstly, what we do can be attributed to us: it is 
not just that our body moves; it is rather that we move our body. Also, what happens 
                                                 
1
Anscombe and von Wright leave the passage in German in the English translation (by Anscombe and 
Paul) of On Certainty (1969), translating it only in a footnote: “… and write with confidence ‘In the 




is, normally, neither an accident nor a mistake: it is not, therefore, an unintentional 
action.  
 
When we act automatically, we don’t deliberate in advance over whether to act in 
that way. Nevertheless, we act deliberately. When we act automatically we don’t first 
formulate in our mind a goal that our action is supposed to achieve. Nevertheless, 
what we do automatically is often goal-directed. When we act automatically we don’t 
reason to decide what we do. Nevertheless, we normally act both rationally and 
reasonably.  
 
Automatic actions are rational and reasonable all the more because we successfully 
complete those performances while at the same time resting many of our cognitive 
faculties (such as, for example, consciousness, attention, control, thought): they are 
therefore more cost-effective, on average, than the rest of agency. But this is not the 
only sense in which automatic actions are more effective than non-automatic ones: it 
is also that we, as agents, are better at our automatic tasks than at our non-automatic 
tasks. That’s part of what it means for a task to become automatic: that we become so 
good at it that we no longer need to monitor it.
2
 The task smoothly runs to 
completion without bothering our higher faculties (empirical psychology, as I show 
in Chapter 2, often refers to this as dual control).  
                                                 
2
 Just a point of clarification on the fact that we no longer need to monitor automatic performances. It 
might be argued that in cases such as ‘lighting up a cigarette’ it is in our best interest to monitor what 
we do, so that we can hopefully stop ourselves. This would not be a case, then, in which we no longer 
need to monitor our performance. But here we should distinguish between a sense in which we no 
longer need to monitor our performance in order to bring it to completion – and this applies to 
‘lighting up a cigarette’ too, since we can successfully light up without monitoring – and a sense in 
which it is in our best interest to monitor what we are doing. There might be automatic actions which 
we can successfully execute without having to monitor them, but that nevertheless it was in our best 
interest to monitor so that we might have been less likely to execute them. ‘Lighting up a cigarette’ is 





This process of familiarizing oneself with a practice is an essential part of our 
upbringing. We learn to do things: we learn how to tie our shoe-laces, so that we can 
soon do so quickly, and without having to first wonder which end goes where. We 
learn how to button up a shirt, so that we can soon do so without looking at every 
single button. We learn to swim, and soon enough our four limbs are coordinated, 
while in the beginning we could only move either legs or arms. This process of 
learning (which I call automatization - a close relative of McDowell’s (1994) 
Bildung) can itself be automatic, but need not be.  
 
Acting automatically should be clearly distinguished from other automatic 
movements of the agent. Our heartbeat might be called automatic, and it is certainly 
movement: but it is our body that moves rather than us moving our body. It isn’t 
acting. The same goes for other biological functions, but also for unconscious 
activities like sleepwalking, and for many reflexes. There will be borderline cases, 
but here I trust that no one will be tempted into arguing that my heartbeat is an action 
of mine; and that similarly no one will be tempted into arguing that, in normal 
circumstances, my automatic flipping of a light-switch is not an action of mine. 
 
But automatic actions must also be distinguished from all those activities that require 
care, effort, attention, monitoring: driving for the first time, walking on ice. And 
from actions that are the result of much hesitation, deliberation, rational weighting of 
alternative options: signing a big cheque, finally quitting your job. All those actions 





I shall leave the task of precisely defining automatic actions, and of distinguishing 
them from other kinds of movements and actions, to Chapter 1; for the time being, I 
trust that it is roughly clear to what kind of performances I am referring.  
 
What it is more important to clarify in this Introduction is what this thesis argues for, 
and what it does not argue for. I shall not argue that automatic actions are intentional 
actions. I take it to be a crucial intuition of the thesis that when I automatically 
flipped the switch of the lamp on my desk I intentionally did so.  
 
Given how important this intuition is as a starting point for the thesis I thought it 
would be worth testing, so I conducted two different surveys. The results of which, 
presented in the Appendix, show that my intuition that automatic actions are 
intentional is widely shared. My surveys show that an overwhelming majority of 
people – above 80% in both surveys - takes humans to act intentionally even when 
they act automatically. It shows, furthermore, that people don’t tend to distinguish 
between automatic and non-automatic actions in terms of their intentionality: that is 
to say, people aren’t more likely to attribute intentionality to a non-automatic action 
than to an automatic one.  
 
Notwithstanding the survey, I will leave the thesis that automatic actions are 
intentional as an intuitive assumption, without arguing for it. What I am interested in 
is, rather, a view of intentional action that can account for the intuition that automatic 





Current accounts, I will argue, fail. They fail because of their commitment to relying 
on the agent’s mind to explain action. When we act automatically our mind is at rest, 
and it ought not to be artificially ‘woken up’ at the request of philosophical theories 
which do not acknowledge the distinctive importance of automatic actions. 
 
The prevailing views of intentional action account for all kinds of actions in terms of 
causal relations to the agent’s mental states. These views divide into two: reductive 
and non-reductive. Reductive causal views, such as for example Davidson’s (1963), 
take both beliefs and pro attitudes (such as desires) to be necessary for intentional 
action. While non-reductive views, such as for example Bratman’s (1987), appeal to 
a state of intention which they take to be irreducible to the belief-desire pair put 
forward by reductionists.  
 
I will show that both the reductive and non-reductive streams of the causalist 
approach, according to which intentional actions are caused by the mental states 
(either a belief-desire pair or an intention) that rationalize them, fail to account for 
the intentionality of automatic action. In Chapter 3 I analyse Davidson’s reductive 
view of intentional action, while in Chapter 4 I analyse two non-reductive views: the 
Simple View and Bratman’s Single Phenomenon View. 
 
The problem for the philosophical theories that I shall analyse is quickly stated: on 
these accounts, an action can be intentional only if it is caused by a mental state 




with the intention to kill JFK, where my intention to ‘kill JKF’ causes my action of 
‘killing JFK’. But when we act automatically there appear to be no such preceding 
mental states: we just act. And any attempt to superimpose mental states onto the 
picture will inevitably misrepresent the automatic nature of such behaviours.  
 
Sometimes philosophers have acknowledged this anomaly (in chronological order): 
 
- Whitehead: “It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by 
eminent people making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking of 
what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by 
extending the number of operations which we can perform without thinking about 
them. Operations of thought are like cavalry charges in a battle – they are strictly 
limited in number, they require fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive 
moments” (1911, quoted in Bargh&Chartrand 1999, p. 464). 
 
- Ryle makes an explicit reference to automaticity: “When we describe someone by 
doing something by pure or blind habit, we mean that he does it automatically and 
without having to mind what he is doing. He does not exercise care, vigilance, or 
criticism. After the toddling-age we walk on pavements without minding our steps” 
(1949, p. 42 – emphasis mine).  
  
- Searle speaks of “actions one performs… quite spontaneously, without forming, 
consciously or unconsciously, any prior intention to do those things” (1983, p. 84). 





- Bratman too uses the term ‘automatic’: “Suppose you unexpectedly throw a ball to 
me and I spontaneously reach up and catch it. On the one hand, it may seem that I 
catch it intentionally; after all, my behaviour is under my control and is not mere 
reflex behaviour, as when I blink at the oncoming ball. On the other hand, it may 
seem that, given how automatic and unreflective my action is, I may well not have 
any present-directed intention that I am executing in catching the ball” (1987, p. 126 
– emphasis mine). In Chapter 4 I show that Bratman’s Single Phenomenon View fails 
to account for automatic actions.  
 
- Dreyfus says that “expertise does not normally involve thinking at all” (1988, p. 
99); and elsewhere he clarifies that what that means is not just the absence of 
conscious thinking, but also of unconscious thinking: “While infants acquire skills by 
imitation and trial and error, in our formal instruction we start with rules. The rules, 
however, seem to give way to more flexible responses as we become skilled. We 
should therefore be suspicious of the cognitivist assumption that, as we become 
experts, our rules become unconscious. Indeed, our experience suggests that rules are 
like training wheels. We may need such aids when learning to ride a bicycle, but we 
must eventually set them aside if we are to become skilled cyclists. To assume that 
the rules we once consciously followed become unconscious is like assuming that, 
when we finally learn to ride a bike, the training wheels that were required for us to 






- Dennett: “Although we are occasionally conscious of performing elaborate 
practical reasoning, leading to a conclusion about what, all things considered, we 
ought to do, followed by a conscious decision to do that very thing, and culminating 
finally in actually doing it, these are relatively rare experiences. Most of our 
intentional actions are performed without any such preamble, and a good thing, too, 
because there wouldn’t be time. The standard trap is to suppose that the relatively 
rare cases of conscious practical reasoning are a good model for the rest, the cases in 
which our intentional actions emerge from processes into which we have no access” 
(1991, p. 252). 
 
- McDowell makes a similar point to Dreyfus’s: “When one follows an ordinary 
sign-post, one is not acting on an interpretation. This gives an overly cerebral cast to 
such routine behaviour. Ordinary cases of following a sign-post involve simply 
acting in the way that comes naturally to one in such circumstances, in consequence 
of some training that one underwent in one’s upbringing” (1992, p. 50). McDowell’s 
point can be traced back to a remark of Wittgenstein from Philosophical 





- And even beyond philosophy, here is what Darwin had to say: “It is notorious how 
powerful it is the force of habit. The most complex and difficult movements can in 
time be performed without the least effort or consciousness” (1872, p. 35).  
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What I do in this thesis is best summarized by Dennett’s words: I challenge the 
assumption that a model developed around rare cases of deliberated action – the 
causal model of Davidson and Bratman - can be applied to all cases, showing that 
cases such as automatic actions cannot be accommodated by such a model. And then 
I develop my own account of intentional action, the ‘guidance view’; my account 
does not rely on the agent’s conscious or unconscious psychological states causing 
action.  
 
My ‘guidance view’ borrows an idea of Harry Frankfurt, guidance. Frankfurt, in The 
Problem of Action (1978), criticizes causal views for focusing on the antecedents of 
action, psychological states, and he proposes to understand actions not in terms of 
their causal history – whether they have been caused by relevant mental states – but 
in terms of the relationship between the agent and her actions at the time of action. If 
this relationship is such that the agent, at the time of action, has guidance over her 
movements then, argues Frankfurt, those movements are intentional – and they 
therefore constitute instances of action.  
 
On Frankfurt’s view, then, some movement is an action only if it is under the agent’s 
guidance. Frankfurt understands guidance itself in terms of the interventions and 
corrections that the agent is able to perform over her behaviour, as in the famous car 
scenario, in which the agent is driving her car down the hill even though she is not 
touching either wheel or pedals just because she is able to directly intervene to 
correct the direction of the car. That ability, according to Frankfurt, is enough for 





In presenting my ‘guidance view’ in Chapter 5 I argue that Frankfurt’s guidance is 
both necessary and sufficient for intentional action. Therefore I go further than 
Frankfurt, who took guidance to be sufficient only for some movement being an 
action. On the ‘guidance view’, then, E ϕ-s intentionally iff ϕ-ing is under E’s 
guidance. 
 
My view has three basic advantages over causal views such as Davidson’s, 
Bratman’s and the Simple View: 
 




- the ‘guidance view’ is a full-blown account of intentional action, offering 




- on the ‘guidance view’, as I argue in my Conclusion, the relationship between 
intentionality and responsibility is much simplified, so that an agent is 
responsible for all and only her intentional actions. 
 
Why is intentional action important? Why, particularly, is the intentionality of 
automatic actions important? In short, why have I written this thesis? The concept of 
intentional action is important: if we weren’t able to act intentionally, we probably 
wouldn’t be responsible for our actions. And then, it might be argued, we wouldn’t 
                                                 
4
 As I will show in Chapter 5, my view can also account for the intentionality of Hoursthouse’s (1991) 
‘arational actions’, which Hursthouse had proposed as a counterexample to the Davidsonian picture. 
5




even be moral agents: therefore it is crucial to have an understanding of what it is to 
act intentionally. Automatic actions show, I think, that our understanding of 
intentional action needs refinement. And to such purpose I have written this thesis.  
 
An Introduction is no place for arguments, but there is at least one objection that I 
must deal with here, because it challenges my motives for working on the 
intentionality of automatic actions. Automatic actions, it might be argued, are not 
central to our understanding of agency.  
 
The idea would be that the important actions – and the actions that are, for example, 
more relevant from a moral point of view – are not going to be automatic, exactly 
because, given their importance and moral relevance, an agent will put much 
thought, attention, and care into them. Automatic actions, in short, are unimportant – 
they are the little things of agency: why did you bother? 
 
Indeed, support to this objection appears to come from Velleman’s work on action. 
Velleman (1992, p. 124) has argued that there is an important difference between 
half-hearted actions and full-blooded actions: the difference being exactly in the 
agent’s involvement.  
 
To be sure, a person often performs an action, in some sense, 
without taking an active part in it… the standard story describes an 
action from which the distinctively human feature is missing, and 
that it therefore tells us, not what happens when someone acts, but 
what happens when someone acts halfheartedly, or unwittingly, or 
in some equally defective way. What it describes is not a human 





Since I have defined automatic actions exactly in terms of the agent’s lack of 
psychological involvement in them, then it looks as though my automatic actions will 
be cases of Velleman’s half-hearted actions; or, anyhow, actions for which it can also 
be said that they are not cases of action par excellence. The name itself speaks of 
what Velleman’s opinion of them is: they are not central to the agent, they matter 
little, and philosophy should focus, primarily, on what he calls ‘full-blooded’ actions. 
Indeed, Velleman’s charge on standard accounts in the philosophy of action is 
exactly that they can account only for half-hearted actions; but that they therefore fail 
to account for the crucial cases, the full-blooded ones: action par excellence 
(interestingly enough, if one accepts both Velleman’s argument according to which 
standard causal views cannot account for full-blooded actions, and my argument 
according to which standard causal views cannot account for automatic actions, then 
there aren’t many actions left for which standard causal views would be able to 
account). 
 
So here I must reply to the potential objection that automatic actions don’t matter 
much. Support for the claim that automatic actions are important comes from 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Book II): there Aristotle’s idea is that the virtuous 
person is the one who naturally opts for the good deed; the one who doesn’t have to 
decide or deliberate over which is the good deed. The virtuous deed is, in short, the 
one that the agent does not need to think about: it is only when virtue becomes 
second nature that the agent becomes virtuous. The agent, in a slogan, can’t choose 






…but if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a 
certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or 
temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does 
them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must 
choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his 
action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character 
(Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, 4 – Ross’s translation). 
 
The last sentence is the crucial one: the agent might perform an act that is in 
accordance with virtue, but if that act does not spring directly out of the agent’s 
“unchangeable character” (her second nature), then her action won’t be virtuous. The 
intuition behind this is, I think, that actions that the agent performs naturally, 
effortlessly, without hesitation, spontaneously, are truer to the agent’s self – and 
many of those actions will probably be automatic ones. Only if the agent’s adherence 
to virtue is true, spontaneous, and genuine can her actions be virtuous and the agent 
virtuous. Otherwise, according to Aristotle, the agent is merely continent.  
 
This is what it means for automatic actions to be truer to the agent’s self: they don’t 
tell us who the agent aspires to be; they don’t tell us what the agent’s ideal self is 
(see Smith 1996). They tell us who the agent actually is; who she has become 
through the years; whom she has made herself into.  
 
This is easy to understand: because those actions spring from the agent without the 
medium of thought, then it is only natural to conclude that they are more the agent’s 
own actions than those that have been thought through. The less does an agent think 
about ϕ-ing, the more is ϕ-ing the agent’s own: a truer expression of who the agent 





To understand this it helps to go back to the process of Bildung (or automatization): 
it is a process of internalisation; it is a process of appropriating particular 
performances that the agent has grown comfortable, and confident, with. Those 
performances the agent can now make her own: because they represent her 
particularly well, because she is particularly good at them, or because she 
particularly likes or enjoys them. This is what it means for something to become 
second nature: the agent makes it part of who she is.  
 
So the agent develops a particular, special, relationship with some actions rather than 
others. The idea of familiarity comes in handy here: the agent extends her self and 
personhood to some of her performances but not to others. And what marks those 
performances as part of the agent’s extended self is not that she thinks about them, 
that she ponders over them, but the very opposite – that she need not think about 
them.  
 
So automatic actions, half-hearted (or, somewhat more appropriately, ‘half-minded’) 
as they might be, are the true heart of one’s agency. Here I don’t pretend to have 
developed a conclusive argument against that century-long anti-Aristotelian attitude 
towards moral behaviour that is often identified with Kantian morality. I just wanted 
to show that automatic actions are particularly important, especially for someone 





Here’s the structure of the thesis: in Chapter 1 I present automatic actions, 
distinguishing them from non-automatic actions and from automatic movements that 
are not actions. In Chapter 2  I show that there is plenty of discussion of automatic 
actions in empirical psychology; and that what empirical psychologists talk of is 
precisely automatic actions as I define them in Chapter 1. In Chapters 3 and 4 I argue 
that standard causal theories of intentional action fail to deliver a satisfactory account 
of the intentionality of automatic actions: in Chapter 3 I discuss Davidson’s view, 
and in Chapter 4 I discuss the Simple View and Bratman’s Single Phenomenon 
View. Finally, in Chapter 5 I present my own view, the ‘guidance view’. Then in the 
Conclusion I discuss an important consequence of the ‘guidance view’, that agents 
are responsible for all and only their intentional actions. The Appendix presents the 
two surveys I have conducted which show that the intuition that automatic actions 





Chapter 1: Automatic Actions 
 
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated 
by all copy-books and by eminent people 
making speeches, that we should cultivate the 
habit of thinking of what we are doing. The 
precise opposite is the case. Civilization 
advances by extending the number of 
operations which we can perform without 
thinking about them. Operations of thought are 
like cavalry charges in a battle – they are 
strictly limited in number, they require fresh 
horses, and must only be made at decisive 
moments (Withehead 1911, quoted in 
Bargh&Chartrand 1999, p. 464). 
 
In this chapter I present the subject matter of the thesis: automatic action. I do so in two 
phases: firstly, I individuate the concept of automaticity; then I distinguish, through the 
concept of guidance, automatic actions from other automatic movements. 
 
1. Automaticity 
An awful lot of what we do either is automatic or it involves automatic performances 
and processes. Think of what you have done so far today: getting out of bed, going to the 
toilet, putting the kettle on, turning on the radio, brushing your teeth, getting dressed, 
walking to your office. These, in turn, involved a lot of turning handles, taking steps, 
raising arms, pushing buttons.  
 
What all those sets of movements have in common is what one could call mindlessness: 
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distinguishes these movements from others: finally confessing to a wrong-doing; 
holding on to the rope from which your best friend is hanging; driving through a snow-
storm on a mountain road, at night. Those actions are not automatic: they require an 
awful lot of thinking, wondering, pondering, deliberating, hesitating; an awful lot of 
attention, care, controlling, making sure. They require both mental and physical effort 
and strain. Also, those actions, differently from many of our automatic performances, 
will not be easily forgotten. 
 
But the things that we do automatically described above also appear to differ from other 
kinds of movements: 
- reflexes like eye-blinking; 
- tics; 
- nervous reactions like sweating; 
- biological processes like digestion and heart-beat; 
- bodily changes like hair-growth; 
- unconscious movements like sleep-walking; 
- O’Shaughnessy’s (1980, Ch. 10) ‘sub-intentional acts’, such as the movements of 
one’s tongue. 
 
Even though some of those latter movements seem to be automatic, they don’t look like 
things we do – they don’t seem to be actions of ours.1  
                                                 
1
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The aim of this chapter is to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for 
automaticity, and then to show how automatic actions differ from all these other kinds of 
automatic movements listed above.  
 
The phenomenon of automatic action has not received much attention from recent 
philosophy; but when the boundaries between philosophy and psychology were still 
blurred, there was much talk of automaticity.
2
 Here is an excellent example: 
 
If an act became no easier after being done several times, if the careful 
direction of consciousness were necessary to its accomplishment on 
each occasion, it is evident that the whole activity of a lifetime might be 
confined to one or two deeds – that no progress could take place in 
development. A man might be occupied all day in dressing and 
undressing himself; the attitude of his body would absorb all his 
attention and energy... For while secondarily automatic acts are 
accomplished with comparatively little weariness – in this regard 
approaching the organic movements, or the original reflex movements – 
the conscious effort of the will soon produces exhaustion... It is 
impossible for an individual to realize how much he owes to its 
automatic agency until disease has impaired its functions (Maudsley 
1873, quoted in James 1890, pp. 113-114).  
 
 
Maudsley here seems to refer to just the same distinction I drew between automatic and 
non-automatic actions, when he talks of well-learned practices that have become 
                                                 
2
 My distinction between automatic actions and non-automatic actions might also remind the reader of 
Collins and Kusch’s (1998) sociological theory of action, where they distinguish between polimorphic 
actions and mimeomorphic actions. Admittedly, mimeomorphic actions – when agents “intentionally act 
like machines” (p. 1) – bear some similarities with automatic actions. But my distinction has otherwise 
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automatic and tasks that still require the exhaustive contribution of “the conscious effort 
of the will”. His “secondarily automatic acts” would, then, be what I have been calling 
automatic actions. Furthermore, Maudsley also accepts that there is a difference between 
“automatic agency” on the one hand and “organic” and “original reflex” movements on 
the other, which seems to be just my distinction between automatic performances that 
appear to be actions and ones that we wouldn’t intuitively call actions. 
 
Contemporary psychology has retained Maudsley’s interest and terminology. Pashler 
gives us a “widely agreed upon” definition of automaticity: 
 
At least two changes are widely agreed upon and constitute the core of 
the concept of automaticity. The first is that practiced operations no 
longer impose capacity demands, so they can operate without 
experiencing interference from, or generating interference with, other 
ongoing mental activities. The second change is that practiced 
operations are not subject to voluntary control: if the appropriate inputs 
are present, processing commences and runs to completion whether or 
not the individual intends or desires this (Pashler 1998, p. 357). 
 
 
Pashler identifies two features of automaticity on which the literature agrees: lack of 
capacity demands and lack of voluntary control. Pashler then also lists other features that 
are often associated with automaticity: 
 
In addition to these two core elements, many theorists propose that 
automatic processes have certain additional properties. One of this is 
functioning without the accompaniment of conscious awareness. 









So there are two more features that “many theorists” agree upon: lack of conscious 
awareness, and lack of mental effort. I should also say that Pashler often refers to lack of 
capacity demands as “lack of attention demands” (Pashler 1998, p. 377), which gives us 
a clue as to what those capacity demands that automaticity no longer imposes are.  
 
Pashler here is not only saying that the empirical literature agrees that some features, 
such as attention, voluntary control, awareness, and effort, are missing from 
automaticity. He is also suggesting that those features are no longer required when an 
action becomes automatic. So there are at least three distinct points made here: things 
like attention are not present in automatic phenomena; they are not required in automatic 
phenomena (anymore); and they stop being required as the agent, through practice, 
becomes more comfortable with the task, which suggests that actions become automatic 
(or: actions are automatized). This notion of ‘becoming automatic’ is found in Maudsley 
too: “If an act became no easier after being done several times” (Maudsley 1873, quoted 
in James 1890, pp. 113 (emphasis mine)). 
 
 The features individuated by Pashler find confirmation elsewhere. Here is a very good 
example: 
 
To start, examine the term automatic… it refers to the way that certain 
tasks can be executed without awareness of their performance (as in 
walking along a short stretch of flat, safe ground). Second, it refers to 
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awareness (as in beginning to drink from a glass when in conversation) 
(Norman and Shallice 1986, pp. 1-2). 
 
Here, again, we find lack of attention and awareness as the mark of automaticity. 
Whenever we find the concept of automaticity applied to other behavioural phenomena, 
those very features are often mentioned. There are two kinds of behaviours that seem to 
be often associated with automaticity in the literature: skills  - playing an instrument, 
sport, or learning a craft - and habits: turning on the radio in the morning, driving home 




Hubert Dreyfus has done much work on skill (1984 - where he and his brother develop a 
five stages model for skill acquisition - 1988, and 2005). Dreyfus’s remarks suggest that 
his skilled behaviors could be automatic: “expertise does not normally involve thinking 
at all” (Dreyfus 1988, p. 99). Also: 
 
While infants acquire skills by imitation and trial and error, in our 
formal instruction we start with rules. The rules, however, seem to give 
way to more flexible responses as we become skilled. We should 
therefore be suspicious of the cognitivist assumption that, as we become 
experts, our rules become unconscious. Indeed, our experience suggests 
that rules are like training wheels. We may need such aids when 
learning to ride a bicycle, but we must eventually set them aside if we 
are to become skilled cyclists. To assume that the rules we once 
consciously followed become unconscious is like assuming that, when 
we finally learn to ride a bike, the training wheels that were required for 
                                                 
3
 Expressions of emotions might also be said to be something we do automatically: crying, smiling, 
blushing, biting one’s nails, or shaking one’s leg. Those are things we do without thinking; they aren’t 
deliberate; and also it does not look like we pay attention to these performances. Indeed we say of actors, 
which pay much attention to their facial expressions, that they don’t actually or genuinely express 
emotion, but that they just pretend (they act). In order to keep the examples as simple and uncontroversial 
as possible, I will not be employing any cases of expressions of emotions throughout the chapter, and I 
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us to be able to ride in the first place must have become invisible 




Acquiring a skill means, then, becoming able to do something without thinking about it 
(without following internalized instructions or rules). Dreyfus’s idea that we set aside 
the rules once we have become skilled resembles the empirical psychology suggestion 
“that practiced operations no longer impose capacity demands” (Pashler 1998, p. 357). 
Because there is no longer the need to think about how to do something, the agent’s 
attentional resources are spared – and can, importantly, be deployed elsewhere. 
 
But Dreyfus makes another very important point here: that once we have accepted the 
phenomenological difference of those kinds of practices, we shouldn’t just assume that 
what used to be conscious (or what in other practices is conscious) is here just 
unconscious. That itself is part of what Dreyfus calls our “cognitive assumption” (p. 7): 
it might be that in automatic cases, rather than doing unconsciously what we used to do 
consciously, we don’t think or follow rules at all, consciously or unconsciously 
(challenging this “cognitive assumption”, importantly, will be part of my argument 
against Davidson in Chapter 3).  
 
With regards to habits, Pollard (2003) actually lists automaticity as one of three features 
of habitual action: 
                                                 
4
 On this point, see also McDowell: “When one follows an ordinary sign-post, one is not acting on an 
interpretation. This gives an overly cerebral cast to such routine behaviour. Ordinary cases of following a 
sign-post involve simply acting in the way that comes naturally to one in such circumstances, in 
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What I propose is that a habitual action is a behaviour which has three 
features. It is (i) repeated, that is, the agent has a history of similar 
behaviours in similar contexts; (ii) automatic, that is, it does not involve 
the agent in deliberation about whether to act; and (iii) responsible, that 
is, something the agent does, rather than something that merely happens 
to her” (Pollard 2003, p. 415). 
 
Pollard’s definition of automaticity points to the absence of deliberation. William James 
says something similar about habits: “habit diminishes the conscious attention with 
which our acts are performed” (James 1890, p. 114). And Ryle too associates habits with 
automaticity: “When we describe someone as doing something by pure or blind habit, 
we mean that he does it automatically and without having to mind what he is doing” 
(Ryle 1949, p. 42). Ryle’s “without having to mind” seems again to suggest that 
automaticity implies lack of attention or awareness. So we have so far seen automaticity 
associated with the absence of attention and awareness (Pashler, James, Ryle, Norman 
and Shallice), thought (Dreyfus), deliberation (Pollard). 
 
Before I analyse the above proposals in order to decide which concepts suit the purpose 
of defining automatic behaviour so as to distinguish it from non-automatic behaviour, I 
want to rule out one kind of concept that could be thought to be the mark of 
automaticity. One might want to propose lack of intention as the mark of automaticity. 
This seems, indeed, a pretty intuitive idea (and our everyday language seems to support 
it too).5 But whatever interpretation of intention one gives, it would not be wise to set 
lack of intention as a necessary condition for automaticity. If lack of intention is taken to 
                                                 
5
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mean that automatic actions are those that the agent doesn’t perform intentionally (the 
so-called Simple View, see Chapter 4), then lack of intention, as a criterion for 
automaticity, would clash with the original intuition with which the thesis started, that 
things like turning a door handle or downshifting are intentional despite being automatic.  
 
If, on the other hand, one thought that lack of intention did not imply that an action was 
not intentional, and proposed lack of intention as a criterion for automaticity, then this 
definition would settle too early the question discussed in Chapters 3 and 4: whether, on 
influential theories of action like Davidson’s or Bratman’s, automatic actions are 
intentional. Those theories rely on intention (‘primary reason’ in Davidson’s 
terminology) as a necessary condition for intentional action. If I set lack of intention as 
the mark of automaticity then, by definition, Davidson and Bratman could not say that 
automatic actions are intentional. I want to find out whether on Davidson’s and 
Bratman’s views automatic actions are intentional; I don’t want to establish, by 
definition, and before looking at their accounts, that they aren’t. For the same reasons I 
will not discuss the possibility of the lack of other psychological states (pro attitudes, 
beliefs) as the mark of automaticity.  
 
One final point for this section. There are different kinds of actions that might turn out to 
be automatic actions. There are at least two good candidates in the philosophy of action 
literature6: sudden or spontaneous actions on the one side (Malcolm 1968, Davis 1979, 
                                                 
6
 Also, as anticipated in the Introduction, my distinction between automatic actions and non-automatic 
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Searle 1983, Bratman 1987, Wilson 1989, Hursthouse 1991, Mele&Moser 1994), and 
subsidiary actions on the other (Searle 1983, Brand 1984, Mele&Moser 1994). For the 
latter kind, Mele and Moser (1994) even talk of automaticity: “In driving to work, an 
experienced driver shifts gears, checks his mirrors, and the like, with a kind of 
automaticity suggesting that he lacks specific intentions for the specific deeds. When so 
acting, he moves his limbs and eyes in various ways, even more ‘automatically’” 
(Mele&Moser 1994, pp. 231-232). It is important to distinguish between those different 
kinds because they might pose different problems to standard causal views of action like 
Bratman's and Davidson's.  
 
Subsidiary automatic actions would be those that are part of some wider action-
sequence. So that, for example, if driving is an action-sequence, that will comprise of 
many subsidiary actions, one of which may be, say, downshifting. Many such actions 
will be involved in the execution of our habits.  
 
But those are different from sudden actions (or reactions), such as catching a fast 
approaching ball; or spontaneous actions, such as caressing – or striking - someone. 
These needn’t be part of any action-sequence (supposing that I am not playing baseball, 
for example). It needn’t be something that I could reasonably have been expected to 
                                                                                                                                                
hearted action: automatic actions, then, would be half-hearted in that, for example, the agent does not even 
pay attention to them; she doesn't even deliberate before embarking in such deeds – they are not, in short, 
even worth some thought. Velleman (1992) argues that the standard causal view of action might be able to 
account for half-hearted actions; but it fails to account for full-blooded actions because it fails to include 
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anticipate, like downshifting while you are driving. Sudden actions will typically be 
involved in skilled behaviour (think of reaction times in sport). 
 
Both kinds of actions appear to have some, if not all, the features of automaticity 
individuated in this section: lack of planning, lack of attention, lack of deliberation, and 
more generally lack of thought. But there seems to be a difference: while subsidiary 
actions might be easily made to fit into some wider plan of the agent, spontaneous and 
sudden actions do not necessarily fit into such framework (as Bratman (1987, pp. 126-
127) himself admits; more on this in Chapter 4).  
 
This difference might mean that the subsidiary kind of automatic action is easier to deal 
with for causal views such as Bratman's and Davidson's than the spontaneous and 
sudden kind, and that’s why I shall keep those two kinds of automatic actions distinct. 
 
Now I shall analyze the different proposals found in the literature to establish which 
criteria best individuate automaticity.  
 
2. Deliberation 
Let us start with deliberation. It could be supposed that what distinguishes automatic 
actions from non-automatic ones is that the former lack deliberation. When an agent acts 
automatically, then, she does not deliberate. I think that, by looking at the examples, we 
can see that this is true. Many, if not most, of our daily activities are undertaken without 
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breakfast, whether to get dressed, whether to go to my classes. But does that mean that I 
automatically had my breakfast, got dressed, and went to class?  
 
It looks as though many things could have happened while I had breakfast, got dressed, 
or went to class, as to prevent those activities from being automatic. Suppose, for 
example, that I found out that there was no milk left; or that I couldn’t find my trousers; 
or that I met an old friend on my way to school. If any of those things had happened, that 
would not have changed the fact that I had not deliberated whether to have breakfast, get 
dressed, or go to school. But, given those interferences which spoiled my daily routines, 
it is difficult to suppose that I have automatically had breakfast, got dressed, and went to 
school.  
 
This is because there are two distinct levels at play here: lack of deliberation refers to the 
level of planning, rather than to the level of acting. There is a common attempted 
solution for this gap: to distinguish between deliberating whether to do something, and 
deliberating how to do something (Pollard (2003), for example, draws this distinction for 
the case of habitual action). Indeed, it might be said that in the cases of interference 
supposed above, it will remain true that the agent did not deliberate whether to have 
breakfast or get dressed; but that, given the interference, she will have had to rethink 
how to go about having breakfast and getting dressed (for example: “There is no milk, 
so I can’t have porridge; I’ll have toast instead”; or “I can’t find my trousers; so I’ll just 
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even though she did not need to deliberate whether. And that would explain why the 
agent did not act automatically: because she had to deliberate how to go about things. 
 
Therefore, it might be proposed that even though lack of deliberation whether to φ is not 
a good enough criterion for automaticity, lack of deliberation how to φ is. And so that an 
action is automatic only if the agent does not deliberate whether to φ nor how to φ. But 
there is an easy objection to this: that ‘deliberation how’ is just a kind of ‘deliberation 
whether’ that refers to a narrower action-description
7
. So, for example, it might be that 
an agent does not deliberate whether to have breakfast, but she has to deliberate how to 
do it, given that there is no milk. Now, this just means that she has to deliberate whether 
to have, say, coffee (given that she always takes milk with it), or whether to have toast 
(given that she can’t have porridge). But now the argument just used against deliberating 
whether to have breakfast can be used against deliberating whether to have toast. And 
the regress continues.  
 
A way to reply to this objection is to give a different interpretation of ‘deliberating how’; 
one that cannot be reduced back to ‘deliberating whether’. This alternative interpretation 
is, I think, offered by one of the other candidates for defining automaticity: attention. 
One may say that deliberation how is just attention to the details of action: my attention 
will be caught by the absence of milk; my attention will be required in order to find my 
                                                 
7
 At this stage it's important that I clarify my position on the action individuation issue. I accept the 
minimizers' (in the terminology of Ginet 1990) position, according to which different action-descriptions 
can belong to the same action (position famously held by Anscombe (1957), Davidson (1971), and 
Hornsby (1980). There are other two main approaches in the literature: maximizers like Goldman (1970, 
1971) have it that each action-description individuates a different action. And middlers such as Ginet 
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trousers; I’ll suddenly realize that the person in front of me is an old friend. If those 
things happen, one might say, then your behaviour is no longer automatic. Because 
automaticity requires lack of attention, then those performances are not automatic, 
because, for one reason or other, I attend to them. So might lack of attention be what 




Here is the way in which attention might distinguish between automatic actions and non-
automatic actions: take an intuitive case of automatic task such as downshifting when 
driving. You don’t need to look at the gear-stick; you don’t need to think which gear you 
want; you don’t need to pay any attention to the whole process: moving your arm and 
hand down to the left (to the right in my car, actually), grabbing the gear-stick, pulling it 
down, and then bringing your hand back onto the wheel; those are all things you do 
without paying attention to them. Contrast this with, say, looking for something. 
Suppose you are looking for your wallet. You will have to think where you have seen it 
last; you’ll have to think where you usually leave it. But you will also have to go look 
around for it: on the desk, under the desk, through your clothes, in the kitchen.  
 
Here I have actually spoken of two things that appear to be quite different: looking and 
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Attention may be divided into kinds... It is either to (a) Objects of sense 
(sensorial attention); or to (b) Ideal or represented objects (intellectual 
attention) (James 1890, p. 416). 
 
Ideal or represented objects are, it seems fair to suppose, the objects of thought. This is 
confirmed by a contemporary version of James’s distinction: 
 
But thinking is not experiencing. There are objects of thought, but an 
object of thought is not thereby an experienced object, and is not an object 
of attention in the sense in question (Peacocke 1995, p. 65). 
 
According to James and Peacocke, then, thought is a kind of attention. This means that, 
in assessing the possibility that lack of attention is the mark of automaticity, we are also 
discussing thought, which in Section 1 had been individuated as another possible 
candidate. So the proposal would then be that downshifting is automatic only if the 
agent does not attend to it. And that would imply that the agent mustn’t look at her 
performance, nor think about her performance.  
 
Let me rule out a first objection: it might be said that, if intellectual attention (thought) is 
defined by having as its content “ideal or represented objects”, as James says, then 
intellectual attention cannot be about behaviour, because behaviour is not ideal or 
represented, but real – as in, actual physical movements. So, the objection would go, 
intellectual attention cannot be part of my definition of automaticity, because physical 
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The idea seems to be that the content of perceptual attention is the world itself, as in 'I 
see that there is a pen on my desk'; while the content of intellectual attention, on the 
other hand (and this would be the difference between the two kinds of attention), must 
be ideal or represented objects. So perceptual attention and intellectual attention cannot 
share the same content: if something, as for example an action, can be the content of 
perceptual attention then it cannot be the content of intellectual attention. But this is just 
false: 'typing the letter p' can be both the content of my perceptual attention, as in 'I see 
that I am typing the letter p', and the content of my intellectual attention, as in 'I typed 
the letter p, but I should have typed q instead'. And in both cases we are referring to the 
same act-token. So, even though it might be that the same act-token can be differently 
represented in perceptual and intellectual attention, it looks like it will be the very same 
act-token which is both the content of our perceptual attention and intellectual attention. 
So intellectual attention can indeed be about actions. 
 
4. Awareness  
So lack of attention looks like a good candidate. But how does it compare with the last 
criterion that emerged from the literature, lack of awareness? Could lack of awareness 
be a better criterion for automaticity? Intuitively, attention seems to be the vehicle of 
awareness: by paying attention (or just attending) one becomes aware. This should not 
be understood as necessarily active: one’s attention might be caught, and then one 
becomes aware. By looking out of my window (perceptual attention) I become aware 
that night has fallen. Alternatively a sound catches my attention and I become aware that 
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date, or have an idea, and then we’ll say that she is (or has become) aware of the date or 
idea.  
 
These intuitions match what philosophers seem to think. Here is what Roessler says of 
the relation between awareness and attention: 
 
A further ingredient in this common-sense understanding of attention is 
the idea of a connection between attention and awareness. You might 
tap your fingers on the table, say, without being aware of doing so; and 
we associate this lack of awareness with the fact that your attention was 
engaged with other things. But what should we make of this idea? On 
what might be called a constitutive reading, paying attention to one’s 
action simply is to be aware, in some sense, of what one is doing. 
Alternatively, on an explanatory reading, the fact that someone pays 
attention to her action explains that she knows what she is doing 
(Roessler 2003, p. 389).  
 
On both readings, it seems, one can’t have awareness without attention. On the 
constitutive reading this is because attention just is awareness; and on the explanatory 
reading because without attention there would be no explanation for awareness. This is 
not to say that one must have been deliberately paying attention; but it is to say that the 
agent’s attention must at least have been drawn to the object of awareness. This, as we 
have already clarified, could have happened because the agent drew her attention to it, or 
because the agent’s attention was caught by it.  
 
So it seems fair to conclude that lack of attention either just is or it implies lack of 
awareness; and that therefore, when we say that an agent who acts automatically does 
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her performance – and that therefore automatic actions are unaware (unattended 
(constitutive reading) or because unattended (explanatory reading)).  
 
Still there seems to be a solid intuition that one can be aware of something without 
paying attention to it. I think it is fair to say that I have been aware all afternoon that 
there is a door behind me, even though I hadn’t paid any attention to it until now. So ten 
minutes ago it was true that I was aware of the door even though I wasn’t paying 
attention to it. This could be said to be true of both perceptual attention and intellectual 
attention: ten minutes ago I was not thinking about the door, nor was I looking at it; still 
I was aware that there was a door behind me. And this seems to contradict the 
conclusion of the previous paragraph.  
 
This might depend on the fact that perceptual and intellectual attention do not capture 
the whole of awareness, because they do not capture ‘epistemic awareness’. There is a 
difference (drawn by Dretske (1969, Ch. 2); see also Davis (1982)) between being 
aware, perceptually or intellectually, of the door behind me, and being aware that there 
is a door behind me. This latter kind of awareness we call epistemic awareness. We can 
clearly be epistemically aware that such and such book has a blue cover without being 
aware, perceptually or intellectually, of the book’s blue cover; and therefore without 
attending, perceptually or intellectually, to the book’s blue cover. This might be the 
intuitive sense in which we can be aware that something is the case without paying 
attention to it. Below I will show that this difference, in the case of action, still does not 
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The problem can be easily solved if we accept Roessler’s explanatory reading: it was not 
true, even ten minutes ago, that I had never paid attention to the door – sometimes I must 
have noticed it; either because I attended to it, or because it caught my attention. And the 
attention that the door received explains the fact that I am aware of the door even now 
that I am not paying attention to it. But we don’t even need to be so strict: there might be 
facts that I have never actually attended to, but of which I am aware just because I have 
sometime attended to another fact which implies it.  
 
One might want to say, for example, that at this moment I am aware of the fact that there 
are fewer than 100 people in the room; even though, clearly, until now I never really 
formulated that thought. The reason why I am aware of it is simply something else that I 
will have noticed or thought about: that I was alone, for example (or that there was no 
one else, or some such thing). If no content relevant to there being fewer than 100 
people in the room had ever come to my attention, then we would be lacking an 
explanation of how I came to be aware of there being fewer than 100 people in the room. 
 
So my commitment to Roessler’s explanatory reading means that I am committed to the 
claim that one cannot be aware of x if one has not attended to (or if one’s attention has 
not been caught by) x or some other fact which implies x. This commitment, in the case 
of action, does indeed mean that awareness requires attention, because actions are not 
like doors: when I act, there is no previous attention that can give me awareness of my 
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can only be aware of my acting, at the time of action, if I am paying attention to it, at 
that time. So we can maintain, for actions, that awareness of action requires attention. 
And that therefore, if automatic actions are characterised by lack of attention, then they 
are implicitly characterized by lack of awareness too – and that this also applies to 
epistemic awareness. 
 
So lack of attention implies lack of awareness. Does it also imply, the reader will ask, 
lack of knowledge? If I haven’t paid any attention to my turning the door handle, then I 
am not aware of turning the door handle. Given that this lack of awareness implies lack 
of epistemic awareness, it would appear natural to think that it also implied lack of 
knowledge. But it seems implausible that I don’t know that I am turning the door handle: 
if you ask me what I am doing while I automatically turn a door handle, I can easily tell 
you that I am turning the handle. I might, at first, just describe myself as “opening the 
door”; and so you might need to point to those other activities (exactly because I was 
unaware of them); but once you have pointed to the fact that I was (also) turning the 
handle, I will readily admit to it. “Sure, I was (also) turning the handle”.  
 
So it looks as though agents know what they are doing despite being unaware of what 
they are doing. How can this be? Lucy O’Brien has a possible explanation: 
 
Let us count absent-minded finger tappings as non-intentional 
actions of mine. Am I epistemologically disassociated from such 
actions to a degree that makes the claim that I could be totally self-
blind with respect to them look plausible? It is clearly true that I can 
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is plausible that there is genuine agency in such cases, by which I 
mean that I can be said to be controlling the action, I must normally 
be able to come to know what I am doing (O’Brien 2003, p. 365). 
 
This idea of being “able to come to know what I am doing” might well describe the 
sense in which, when we act automatically, we know what we are doing despite being 
unaware of it. Should O’Brien’s ability to come to know count as genuine knowledge? It 
doesn’t look like reflective knowledge, and this fits both our intuitions about 
automaticity and the fact that agents are unaware of their automatisms. But I suspect it 
should still count as knowledge, because to claim that the agent, while automatically 
turning the door handle, does not know that she is turning it, appears to be plain false.  
 
But I shall leave this epistemological issue to the epistemologist, and so I will not 
commit myself to the further claim that lack of attention and awareness implies lack of 
knowledge, even though it probably implies at least lack of reflective knowledge: that is, 
even if I can be said to know that I am turning the door handle, if I am doing it 
automatically I am not reflecting upon the fact that I am turning the door handle.  
 
In conclusion, lack of awareness is not a better criterion than lack of attention simply 
because the latter criterion actually implies the former. 
 
5. Proprioception  
One might object to my claim that lack of attention implies lack of awareness on the 
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proprioceptive awareness. And that, therefore, I have not shown that lack of attention 
implies lack of awareness because I have not shown that all kinds of awareness will be 
lacking: an agent might be proprioceptively aware of what she is doing, the objection 
goes, even though she is not paying attention to what she is doing. 
 
Proprioception is the subject’s awareness of her own body from the inside. The idea is 
that one is aware of one’s own hand independently of one’s five senses: “one mode of 
sense-perceptual access is reserved for the agent’s alone, namely the proprioceptive 
mode” (O’Shaughnessy 2003, p. 348). While I can see my hand, just like someone else 
can see it, the way in which I can be proprioceptively aware that ‘I have a hand’ is not 
available to anyone else. Proprioception depends, as Marcel puts it, on “receptors 
sensitive to both the interior and the periphery of the body, as opposed to… receptors 
sensitive to distal stimulation” (Marcel 2003, p. 52). Supposedly, then, when my 
awareness of my hand depends on the former kind of receptors, we have proprioceptive 
awareness. When it depends on the latter kind, we have, for example, visual awareness.  
 
So even though it is a form of perception, proprioception appears to be independent from 
perceptual (as of the five senses) and intellectual attention; and therefore, proposing that 
automatic actions lack (perceptual and intellectual) attention might imply that they lack 
perceptual and intellectual awareness, but it does not also imply that they lack 
proprioceptive awareness. I accept this point, and the clarification it calls for: that when 
I propose lack of attention as the mark for automaticity, and I say that lack of attention 
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perceptual awareness; I don’t mean to claim that, from lack of attention, it also follows 
lack of proprioceptive awareness. Now, the reader will want to know what the 
relationship between automatisms and proprioceptive awareness is: does an agent who 
acts automatically have proprioceptive awareness of what she is doing? 
 
The idea of being proprioceptively aware of what one is doing must be clarified: agents 
might be proprioceptively aware of the presence and position of their body (see 
O’Shaughnessy 2003, p. 348), but they can hardly be proprioceptively aware of what 
they are doing, of their actions. For that they need the aid of perceptual and intellectual 
attention. Proprioception, as we have emphasized, is of the body and of the body only.  
 
Take our intuitive example of automatic action: turning a door handle. It looks as though 
an agent can be proprioceptively aware of the forward movement of her hand; she can be 
proprioceptively aware of her hand being level with her stomach; and she can be 
proprioceptively aware of the contraction of her fingers. But it is only with the aid of 
perception (sight, touch) that she can be aware of her hand touching the door handle, 
turning the door handle, and so on. The action description ‘E turns the door handle’ 
involves E’s body, but it also involves the door handle. And proprioception can only be 
about E’s body. Awareness of the door handle will depend on perceptual attention. So 
we cannot actually say that agents can be proprioceptively aware of their actions.  
 
Here one might want to object that, in ruling out proprioception, I am assuming a 
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movements. I disagree: firstly, I have not spoken of the agent’s movements as opposed 
to her actions, but of the agent’s body as opposed to her actions. Secondly, what I have 
been employing throughout is just an intuitive idea according to which turning the door 
handle is both automatic and an action, not the distinction between automatic actions 
and other automatic movements that I draw in the last section of this chapter. But even if 
it were true that I had been helping myself to that distinction too early, the distinction 
itself is not doing any work: the problem with proprioception is that it cannot be said 
that an agent is proprioceptively aware of ‘turning a door handle’, but that does not 
depend on ‘turning a door handle’ being an action rather than a mere movement; it 
depends on ‘turning a door handle’ involving a door handle. Also, for this very reason, 
proprioception cannot distinguish between automatic actions and non-automatic actions: 
because in neither case can one say that the agent is proprioceptively aware of her 
actions. So we can safely rule out proprioception as a criterion for automaticity.   
 
One clarification: here I am not making the controversial claim that actions are 
constituted by something more than just the agent’s movements (Davidson (1971), for 
example, would deny that). I am just saying that, in most cases, an agent, in order to 
become aware, or come to know, what she is doing, cannot rely solely on 
proprioception. Stretching your arm might be a case in which proprioception is 
sufficient, because it does not involve anything else than just one’s own arm.
8
 But every 
time that agents interact with the environment, as with turning a door handle, 
                                                 
8
 Even stretching my arm might not do: it supposedly involves gravitational forces, our awareness of 
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proprioception isn’t enough to become aware that you are turning a door handle. And it 
isn’t necessary either: looking at yourself doing it will be sufficient.  
 
Summing up, this section has answered three questions: firstly, I have responded to the 
possible objection that lack of attention does not imply lack of awareness because it does 
not rule out proprioceptive awareness. I have clarified that what I take to be implied by 
lack of attention are lack of intellectual, perceptual, and epistemic awareness, not lack of 
proprioceptive awareness. And I have shown that one cannot be said to be 
proprioceptively aware of one’s actions, nor, therefore, of one’s automatic actions. An 
implication of this is that lack of proprioceptive awareness cannot distinguish between 
automatic and non-automatic actions, given that it applies to both. It therefore would not 
do as a criterion for automaticity.  
 
6. Is lack of attention necessary for automaticity? 
I have found lack of attention (and awareness) to be a very good candidate as the mark 
of automaticity. The next question must be whether lack of attention can be a necessary 
condition for automaticity. To answer this question I must see whether setting lack of 
attention as a necessary condition would exclude any behaviour that is intuitively 
automatic.  
 
Is there any attention involving performance that we might still want to call automatic? 
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When we describe someone as doing something by pure or blind habit, 
we mean that he does it automatically and without having to mind what 
he is doing. He does not exercise care, vigilance, or criticism. After the 
toddling-age we walk on pavements without minding our steps. But a 
mountaineer walking over ice-covered rocks in a high wind in the dark 
does not move his limbs by blind habit; he thinks what he is doing, he is 
ready for emergencies, he economizes his effort, he makes tests and 
experiments; in short he walks with some degree of skill and judgement 
(Ryle 1949, p. 42). 
 
One might want to describe the movements of the skilled mountaineer as automatic, 
exactly so that one does justice to the skills of the mountaineer. If that was so, then lack 
of attention could not be our criterion for automaticity, because clearly the mountaineer 
is paying quite a lot of attention to his movements. But I don’t see any reason to concede 
this, because I don’t see any reason why we should want to say that the mountaineer’s 
movements, in this scenario, are automatic.  
 
In fact, it is Ryle himself who seems to propose a good way of understanding this 
scenario. Ryle here is distinguishing between two kinds of skills: the skill, which by 
Ryle’s own admission involves automaticity (“he does it automatically”), of a normal 
walker, and the skill of the mountaineer. The very fact that Ryle is contrasting the two 
scenarios is evidence for the idea that the latter scenario, differently from the former, 
does not involve automaticity; but that, Ryle is proposing, does not mean that there is no 
skill involved in the latter scenario. Sticking to Ryle, then, is enough to dismiss the 
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There are kinds of habits which might fail to meet the lack of awareness condition, and 
which might then represent a counterexample to the supposed condition. Think, for 
example, of virtuous behaviour. Virtuous actions, it has been argued (historically by 
Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics; for a contemporary defence of the idea, see Pollard 
2003), are habitual ones. Think of the pedestrian who unhesitatingly gives to the beggar. 
If this was indeed an habitual action then, it could be argued, it should be automatic. But 
it would sound odd to say that the pedestrian was unaware of giving money away.  
 
I don’t think this is a counterexample to my proposed condition, because I don’t think it 
is necessary for the action to be automatic in order for it to be virtuous. Pollard (2003) 
does list automaticity as one of three features of habitual action; but he does not say that 
it is a necessary feature. And I think it is fair not to set it as a necessary condition, at 
least for the cases of virtues. I don’t think that the agent’s noticing that she is giving 
money away takes away from her virtue (while having thought about it, according to the 
Aristotelian, does make the agent the less virtuous because of it). 
 
So there don’t seem to be any obviously automatic actions left out by setting lack of 
attention as a necessary condition for automaticity. Lack of attention does so far seem to 
be shared by all the actions of which we intuitively want to say that we do them 
automatically. Let us now see whether lack of attention is sufficient for automaticity, or 
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7. Is lack of attention sufficient? 
Would setting lack of attention as a sufficient condition for automaticity include actions 
that are clearly not automatic? Here it might be proposed that lack of attention is not 
sufficient for acting automatically because it would include all those other movements 
listed at the beginning, of which we wanted to say that they don’t even count as acting. 
This might be true: but it must be remembered that here I am only looking for a 
definition of automaticity, and that it will be for the last section of this chapter to then 
distinguish automatic actions from other automatic movements. So, for now, all those 
reflexes and movements should not be used as a counterexample to the sufficiency of 
lack of attention, because we are interested in its sufficiency for automaticity, and not 
specifically for automatic action. 
 
A potential counterexample to the sufficiency of lack of attention is represented by 
unforeseen consequences to what we do, and in general by all those actions that are 
often called ‘unintentional’. It is often the case that an agent, for lack of planning, or 
lack of attention and care, or just because of stupidity or bad fortune, does something, or 
brings about something, that she did not mean to do or bring about (or with which she 
isn’t satisfied).  
 
A classic example: suppose I am bitching to Sam about Karl. Suppose that, unbeknownst 
to me, Karl is in the next room, listening: he gets hurt. Hurting Karl is something I do, 
and at the same time something I am not aware of – but I am not hurting Karl 
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automatically. Necessarily then, lack of attention (awareness) cannot be sufficient for 
automaticity, because otherwise my hurting Karl would have to be included, while it is 
definitely not something I am doing automatically.  
 
It might be proposed, as a way out of this counterexample, that hurting Karl is not an 
action of mine. That might be,  but I can’t use that argument here because, again, it is 
not specifically with automatic actions that I am concerned, but only with automaticity. 
And therefore the fact that hurting Karl might not be an action of mine does not by itself 
disqualify it from being automatic. I need some other argument to reject this 
counterexample. 
 
I think that these kinds of cases call for a revision of the lack of attention condition. 
What characterizes automaticity is not only the absence of attention, but also that 
automatic performances do not require any attention. With Pashler’s words, tasks, when 
they become automatic, “no longer impose” (Pashler 1998, p. 357) such demands. The 
agent does not need attention and awareness to complete automatic tasks. This aspect we 
have already discussed. But it helps us here in distinguishing automaticity from these 
other things that we are unaware of.  
 
Therefore a second condition must be added: what defines automaticity is not just that 
there is no attention, but that there is no need for attention. Since both conditions involve 
attention, it would be tempting to collapse them into one; but this will not do: firstly 
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attention. But neither can we just say that automatic performances are characterised by 
the fact that they don’t require attention, because sometimes my attention will be caught 
by what I’m doing, or I will draw my attention to what I am doing, and those 
performances will therefore cease to be automatic. So we need two conditions: lack of 
attention and no need for attention. It seems fair to suppose that one condition explains 
the other, so it will often be the case that agents do not attend to their automatic 
performances because they don’t need to attend to them. Think of downshifting again: 
you no longer look at the gear-stick because, having grown comfortable and confident 
with your driving, you no longer need to.  
 
This further condition helps us distinguishing automatic performances from 
unintentional cases because while in unintentional cases, like the one I presented, lack of 
attention is the cause of the misunderstanding, in automatic cases lack of attention not 
only does not compromise the completion of the task, but it in fact promotes the success 
of the performance. While with mistakes, errors, and unintentional actions it is often the 
case that they needed more attention – that more attention promotes the success of the 
performance, with automatic actions it is the opposite: they don’t need attention, and 
often more attention actually disrupts the automatic performance.  
 
Here it could be objected that the success of ‘hurting Karl’ is also promoted by lack of 
attention. Had I paid more attention, I would not have hurt Karl – and therefore more 
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automatic performances. What is the difference between automatic performances and 
unintentional performances in terms of attention, then? 
 
It could be proposed that the difference is in the role that attention has played in the 
history of the performance. Take ‘turning a door handle’. When I was little, I had to 
learn how to turn a door handle. In the beginning, ‘turning a door handle’ was probably 
not an automatic action. I had to look at the handle, think whether to turn it left or right, 
maybe even concentrate. The performance, in short, needed much of my attention. Now 
I don’t even think which way to turn; and, indeed, if I were to think about it, it would 
probably take me longer to complete the task, and I might even fail to complete the task 
more often if every time I wondered which way to turn the handle. This is the history of 
attention to tasks that have become automatic: it used to be necessary, then it became 
superfluous, and now it is even counterproductive.  
 
This is not the case with unintentional actions: there was never a time when I learned to 
do things unintentionally. And there was never a time when I paid attention to my 
unintentional performances – indeed, those last two statements hardly make any sense. 
Unintentional performances have always been defined by the fact that I didn’t realize 
what I was doing (under that description), and by the counterfactual that, had I realized, 
I wouldn’t have done it – which is not the case with automatic actions. And this is why, 
now, it makes sense to say that I don’t need to pay attention to my ‘turning the door 
handle’, but it does not make sense to say that I don’t need to pay attention to my 
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Some psychological literature is quite explicit about the fact that attention is disruptive 
in automatic cases: “… conscious attention to this aspect of performance can disrupt the 
action” (Norman and Shallice 1986, p. 3). This is a pretty intuitive idea: try to look at 
your steps while you walk up the stairs to your office, and you will be more likely to trip 
over. Similarly, if you are, like me, a compulsive cash machine user, looking at the 
numbers you are entering often complicates a process you are so good at rather than 
simplifying it (possibly because you’ll inevitably ask yourself, at some level, whether 
they are the right numbers). But given how many times you have entered that set of 
numbers, the question is not only unnecessary; it is actually counterproductive: it spoils 
the automatic flow.  
 
Baseball legend Yogi Berra is reported to have said: “Think? How can you hit and think 
at the same time?” (Beilock, Wierenga, and Carr (2002), found in Sutton (2007), p. 1). 
Sutton even refers to this intuition that thought messes up automatic performances as a 
“prevalent view”: “the prevalent view that thinking too much disrupts the practised, 
embodied skills involved in batting” (Sutton (2007), p. 1). 
 
I think that this idea that attention can disrupt automatic performances could be a good 
explanation of why the more one practices a performance, the less attention that 
performance requires. But I don’t want to make a further condition of this idea: that 
attention is no longer required could also just be explained by the fact that agents tend to 
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automatically, noticing (or thinking of) what you are doing disrupts your performance. If 
you happen to look at the gear-stick while downshifting, you are probably not going to 
get the wrong gear. But while this shows that attention does not always disrupt the 
performance, it does not show that attention was required; exactly because your 
attention, we are supposing, is casually caught by what your are doing. If attention were 
indeed required, then that would mean that you have not practiced enough in order to 
have made the performance in question automatic.  
 
There is another objection to the sufficiency claim that I must deal with: the reader 
might wonder why I have excluded Pashler’s second condition, which seemed very 
reasonable: voluntary control. Pashler (1998), as we saw at the beginning of the chapter, 
claims that it is “widely agreed upon” among psychologists that automatic behaviour is 
not subject to voluntary control. This seems intuitive: part of some behaviour becoming 
automatic appears to be that I no longer need to exercise much control over it: I am so 
used to it that it runs to completion without me needing to check up on it. Think, again, 




 I don’t actually need to voluntarily 
control that I am downshifting to 4
th
 gear.  
 
Not only the absence of what Pashler calls “voluntary control” is intuitive and supported 
by the psychological literature, but it is also at the basis of one of the empirical 
hypotheses that is more favourable to automaticity: the idea of dual control. Dual 
control, which I discuss at length in Chapter 2, proposes, in short, that there are a 
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behaviour is characterized by being selected and implemented without the aid of 
conscious (voluntary) control.  
 
So the reader might object that my two attention conditions cannot be sufficient for 
automaticity: automaticity also requires lack of voluntary control, as the empirical 
literature suggests. As I said, I do agree that automatic performances are not subject to 
the agent’s voluntary control, but I don’t think that I need to pose lack of voluntary 
control as a third condition: it just comes with lack of attention and awareness. If an 
agent were consciously or voluntarily controlling a performance of hers, then it could 
not be possible for the agent not to be paying attention to or be aware of that 
performance. That’s just what voluntary or conscious control of a movement is: attention 
to that movement such that the agent is aware of that movement. So when I say that 
some automatic performance is unaware, it follows that the agent is not consciously or 
voluntarily controlling it (which, as dual control suggests and as I show in the last 
section of this chapter, does not mean that the agent is not in control). 
 
The same is also true of another condition mentioned by Pashler: effortlessness. It is 
probably true that automatic actions lack mental effort, but there is no need to make that 
into a further condition because if an action gave rise to mental effort, then that would 
presumably catch the attention of the agent, and so the action would not be automatic on 
grounds, again, that it would not meet the lack of attention condition. So effortlessness, 
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There is at least another intuitive feature of automaticity that is implied by lack of 
attention: the fact that agents can’t remember many automatic actions. Presumably, if 
the agent did not attend to her performance, she has no way of remembering her 
performance. I don’t remember turning the door handle the last time I came into the 
office; and that’s probably because I didn’t pay attention to it. Evidently, here I am not 
proposing that every activity of ours that we can’t remember is automatic; nor even that 
every recent activity of ours that we can’t remember is automatic. Only that, if one 
thought that it was characteristic of automatic actions not to be remembered by the agent 
(and I am not going to commit myself to this further claim here), then there would be no 
need to propose this as a further condition for automaticity, because it just follows from 
lack of attention.  
 
In conclusion, I think that there are two individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for automaticity: some behaviour is automatic if and only if the agent does 
not need to attend to it and the agent does not attend to it. Having now defined 
automaticity, the job of the last section is to distinguish between automatic actions and 
other automatic movements. 
 
8. Guidance and Intervention control  
The aim of this section is to distinguish two different phenomena that meet the 
conditions for automaticity: on the one side, there are movements such as down-shifting 
or turning a door handle, of which we want to say that they are actions; and therefore 
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mentioned in Section 1, such as eye-blinking, heart-beat, or sleep-walking which, 
despite being automatic, we don’t normally call actions. 
 
There is one possible way of drawing this distinction between automatic actions and 
other automatic movements that I want to rule out at the outset: I could just help myself 
to one of the established criteria of action, such as, for example, Davidson’s idea that 
some movement is an action only if it is intentional under at least one description 
(Davidson 1971). The reason why I won’t use such a well-established account of action 
is that in Chapter 3 I will argue that Davidson’s account is not suitable for automatic 
actions; so I can’t help myself to it now.  
 
Harry Frankfurt (1978) has famously argued that agents don’t need to voluntarily or 
consciously control what they are doing in order to be in control of what they are doing. 
Frankfurt calls this idea of 'being in control' without 'controlling' guidance: 
 
A driver whose automobile is coasting downhill in virtue of 
gravitational forces alone might be satisfied with its speed and direction, 
and so he might never intervene to adjust its movement in any way. This 
would not show that the movement of the automobile did not occur 
under his guidance. What counts is that he was prepared to intervene if 
necessary, and that he was in a position to do so more or less effectively. 
Similarly, the causal mechanisms which stand ready to affect the course 
of a bodily movement may never have occasion to do so; for no 
negative feedback of the sort that would trigger their compensatory 
activity might occur. The behaviour is purposive not because it results 
from causes of a certain kind, but because it would be affected by 
certain causes if the accomplishment of its course were to be 
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Some movement can be under the agent’s guidance even though the agent is not actually 
causing the movement in question, nor doing anything in order to control the movement. 
So an agent can be in control of movements that she is not herself causing: gravitational 
forces, rather than the driver, are causing the car’s movements in the scenario. But 
nevertheless the car is under the agent’s control. This is because at any time the agent 
can intervene to redirect the car’s movements. In applying this concept to habits, Pollard 
(2003) calls it intervention control: 
 
For we have the capacity to intervene on such behaviours. This is 
particularly the case for those automatic behaviours which we have 
learned. Since there was a time when we didn’t do such things, it will 
normally still be possible for us still to refrain from doing them in 
particular cases (though perhaps not in general). We intervene by doing 
something else, or nothing at all, either during the behaviour, or by 
anticipating before we begin it. In this way habitual behaviours contrast 
with other automatic, repeated behaviours such as reflexes, the 
digestion, and even some addictions and phobias in which we cannot 
always intervene, though we may have very good reason to do so. I call 
this intervention control (Pollard 2003, p. 416). 
 
From Pollard’s remarks it is clear how helpful the concepts of guidance and intervention 
control can be for me in distinguishing automatic actions from other automatic 
movements.
9
 Automatic movements such as eye-blinking, heart-beat or sleep-walking, it 
is easy to see, have two crucial features in common with automatic actions like turning a 
door handle or downshifting: they are movements of my body; and they are unaware. 
                                                 
9
 In Chapter 5 I highlight some differences between guidance and intervention control – namely, that the 
agent's capacity for intervention is a pre-requisite for guidance, but that guidance is a more specific 
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But guidance gives us a very good way of distinguishing between those automatic 
movements that we want to call actions, and those that we don’t.  
 
The idea is that while with automatic movements such as turning a door handle we can 
always (and easily) intervene to stop ourselves from performing them, the same cannot 
be said of automatic movements such as heart-beat and eye-blinking. We don’t, I take it, 
have guidance over those latter movements. This does not mean that it is always 
impossible, for us, to avoid blinking our eyes. We know that, if we try hard enough, we 
can avoid blinking for a while. But we can’t avoid blinking for good, and we can’t 
always avoid blinking; the same way in which we cannot avoid breathing for good 
(assuming that killing ourselves does not count as a way of controlling our breathing 
patterns). 
 
Here we must distinguish between a direct way of intervening, and an indirect way of 
intervening. In fact, it is not impossible for me to stop myself from sleep-walking. I can 
lock the bedroom’s door or tie myself to the bed. But this looks very different from 
stopping myself from turning the door handle. Indeed, I want to say that only the latter 
kind of control counts as guidance. Tying myself to the bed is an indirect kind of control 
which I don’t think is sufficient for guidance. One way of drawing this intuitive 
distinction is by saying that while, in order to control my sleep-walking, I need to do 
something else - tying myself to the bed - there is nothing else I need to do in order to 
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This difference might not be enough to establish what an action is, nor to establish that 
automatic behaviours such as turning a door handle do indeed count as actions, but it 
might very well be enough to show why automatic movements such as eye-blinking, 




There is, nevertheless, a possible objection to my use of guidance to draw the distinction 
between automatic actions and other automatic movements: that guidance is not 
compatible with automaticity because an agent cannot have guidance over a 
performance of which she is unaware. To see this objection, take Frankfurt’s own 
scenario: for the driver to have the ability to intervene over the car’s movements if she 
wants or needs to, the driver must be aware of the car’s movements. If she is unaware of 
where the car is going, the driver cannot intervene in order to redirect it.  
 
The same point can be made if we come out of the metaphorical scenario and abandon 
the car: if the agent is not paying attention to her own door handle turning, the objection 
will go, how can she possibly have the ability to intervene to stop herself from turning 
the handle? How can she possibly have the ability to stop herself from doing something 
that she is not aware of doing? 
 
The answer is already suggested in Pollard’s passage that I quoted earlier: the fact that 
agents are acting automatically does not mean that they don’t have the ability to draw 
                                                 
10
 In Chapter 5 I actually argue that guidance is sufficient for agency; and that will have the interesting 
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their attention to what they are doing, if they want or need to. The claim is that lack of 
attention characterizes automatic action. It does not follow, from the claim that 
automatic actions are not attended to by the agent (and that the agent does not need to 
attend to them), that the agent does not have the ability to attend to them. Take the case 
of downshifting again: the fact that you do it without paying attention to it and the fact 
that attention is not required do not imply that you cannot, if you want or need to, draw 
your attention to the performance. Acting automatically does not mean that your ability 
for attention is impaired; only that it is spared.  
 
To show that agents, while acting automatically, have such an ability to draw their 
attention to something at will, it will help to compare acting automatically with those 
other automatic movements. Take, for example, sleep-walking. While you are sleep-
walking, you might happen to wake up, and wonder what you are doing in the staircase. 
But you can’t wake up at will; that is not the way in which sleep-walking works. So, in 
the case of sleep-walking, the agent does not have the ability to draw her attention to 
something at will – for example, the agent does not have the ability to draw her attention 
to the fact that she is sleep-walking at will.  
 
Contrast this with our standard cases of automatic actions: downshifting and turning a 
door handle. The fact that you are not normally paying attention to those performances 
does not mean that you can’t, if you want or need, draw your attention to them. And if 
you can draw your attention to them, as in the case of downshifting and turning a door 
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cannot draw your attention to your performance, as in the case of sleep-walking, then 
you cannot stop yourself. This is, then, the sense in which automatic actions like 
downshifting or turning a door handle are different from automatic movements such as 
sleep-walking.  
 
We might want to conclude, then, that having the ability to become aware of, or draw 
one's attention to, some action of ours is one way in which we can be said to have 
guidance over that action. But it needn't be the only way. Automatic actions being 
performances with which we have much familiarity and practice, it seems likely that, 
were an error or anomaly to occur, our attention would be caught by the fact that the 
usual pattern was being spoiled.  
 
Indeed, it might be argued that part of the process of an action becoming automatic 
(compare McDowell's Bildung (1994) – on this, see also Chapter 3, Section 3.3) is the 
agent's acquiring the ability to detect anomalies without any active participation on the 
part of the agent herself. So that the agent does not need to be 'on the lookout' for 
anomalies; she doesn't need to be paying attention in case anomalies were to occur. If 
and when anomalies did occur, they will inevitably catch the agent's attention, because, 
given her familiarity with the pattern, the difference will be too striking to go by 
unnoticed. Indeed, were an agent not to detect the anomaly, we would say that she hadn't 
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So it is the anomaly that does the work by catching the agent’s attention; the agent 
doesn’t need to do anything. But, obviously, for something to count as an anomaly, the 
agent must have done something in the past: namely, she will have habituated herself to 
a practice in such a way that, if something new happens in the context of that practice, it 
will count as an anomaly – and catch the agent’s attention.  
 
There is another possible objection I must deal with: it could be argued that I have only 
shown that agents can intervene to stop themselves during the performance; but that I 
have not shown that agents can stop themselves before the performance. And, the 
objection could go, if agents do not have this sort of prior control over what they do, 
then they don’t have control at all.  
 
The idea is that an agent can draw her attention at will to what she is doing and, if she 
likes or needs to, stop herself. But how can agents draw their attention to something that 
they are not yet doing? If you can draw your attention to the fact that you are turning a 
door handle, you can also draw your attention to the fact that you are approaching the 
door, or about to turn the door handle. And, I want to say, if in the former case your 
ability to draw your attention to what you are doing means that you can stop yourself, 
then in the latter case your ability to draw your attention to what you are about to do 
means that you can stop yourself from doing it. The latter case, admittedly, needs 
something else: possibly a belief, judgement or expectation on what you are about to do; 
so that you can infer, from, say, the fact that you are approaching the door, that you are 
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So, while in the former case the only judgement required might have been the realization 
that you are turning the door handle, in the latter case the agent needs, on top of the 
judgement that you are approaching the door, a judgement like “therefore I must be 
about to turn the door handle”. The presence of these judgements implies, in the former 
case, perceptual attention and, in the latter case, both perceptual attention and 
intellectual attention. But the presence of these judgements is no problem for 
automaticity: when you intervene, either to stop yourself while you are doing something 
or to stop yourself from doing something, the action ceases to be automatic (or is no 
longer automatic). Importantly, the ability to intervene is only dependent on the capacity 
to become aware, rather than on previous, or constant, awareness. And the agent need 
not have those beliefs and expectations while she is acting automatically; she only needs 
to be able to make these judgements once she has become aware. 
 
I want to deal with one final objection. Flexing one’s muscles, an objector might say, is 
under the agent’s guidance, but it is not, intuitively, an action of ours. I don’t want to 
take issue with the idea that we have guidance over flexing our muscles: we can 
intervene over our muscle flexing, to flex more or less, or to stop flexing. What I don’t 
see is why it would be problematic to say that flexing our muscles is an action of ours. 
The objector might propose that we don’t want to refer to flexing as an action because it 
is never something we just do, but always something we do in order to act. It is a 
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flexing is something we do, I don’t see what should stop us from conceding that it is an 
action.  
 
It is definitely different from the mere bodily movements from which I want to 
distinguish actions through guidance: for a start, it doesn’t happen to us, we do it. Also, 
flexing our muscles might not be the only thing that we never just do: it might be that we 
never just move our arm; that there is always some other description of our moving our 
arm. Further, as Hornsby (1980 – Anscombe too (1957)) points out, we can devise a 
scenario in which we just flex our muscles: “A man learns that certain particular muscles 
of his arm have to be contracted if ever he is to clench his fist; and we may imagine that 
he has a reason to contract those very muscles – perhaps he wants to please some 
experimenter. He does so. As we say: he contracts his muscles by clenching his fist” 
(Hornsby 1980, p. 20).  
 
Indeed, this appears to be a case in which it is fair to say that the man, in contracting his 
muscles, acts. And Hornsby later suggests that, on the Davidsonian view of 
individuation that I accept (one on which different action-descriptions can belong to the 
same action, as opposed to Goldman’s view (1970) that every action description 
individuates a different action – see footnote 7, this chapter), flexing one’s muscles 
might indeed be an action of ours: “On the view of individuation I have argued for, there 
is only one action when a man contracts his muscles by clenching his fist, a single 
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On this reading, then, clenching one’s fist and contracting one’s muscles are two 
different action-descriptions of the same action. Davidson would argue, further, that 
those two descriptions are both descriptions of actions rather than of mere bodily 
movements because they are intentional under at least one description; which here 
would actually be ‘contracting one’s muscles’ (while in normal cases it would be 
‘clenching one’s fist’). As I said before, I won’t commit myself to this latter part of 
Davidson’s view, but I don’t see why, if Davidson accepts that contracting one’s 
muscles can be an intentional action, I should deny that it can be an action in the first 
place. 
 
So, in conclusion, the difference between automatic actions and other automatic 
movements is that agents have guidance over their automatic actions, but they don’t 
have guidance over other automatic movements such as heartbeat and sleepwalking. 
This ability to intervene directly depends on the fact that agents have the ability to draw 
their attention to their performances at will. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented the subject matter of the thesis: automatic action. I have 
done so in two steps: first, I have defined the concept of automaticity; and then I have 
distinguished between automatic actions and other automatic movements. In defining 
automaticity, I have proposed two individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions: some behaviour is automatic iff the agent does not need to attend to it and 
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of deliberation, which would include many performances that are intuitively not 
automatic. I also found that lack of attention implies lack of awareness, effortlessness, 
and lack of voluntary control. So I did not need to set those as further conditions for 
automaticity. After having defined automaticity, I have distinguished between two sets 
of movements which meet the conditions for automaticity: tasks such as turning a door 
handle or downshifting when you are driving, which we intuitively consider actions; and 
movements such as heart-beat and sleep-walking, which we don’t intuitively refer to as 
actions. I have shown that the difference between those two kinds is the agent’s 
guidance: agents have the ability to intervene directly on performances such as turning a 
door handle, but they don’t have the ability to intervene directly on movements such as 
sleep-walking. 
 
In the next chapter I will show that automaticity and automatic actions have received 
much attention from empirical psychology; and that the kinds of automatic behaviours 
empirical psychologists are interested in meet my conditions for automatic action as set 








The aim of this chapter is to show that the concept of automatic action that I have 
defined in Chapter 1, despite being novel within philosophical literature, has been well-
established in empirical psychology for decades. I will do this by looking at the work of 
Bargh on automatic biases and at the work of Norman and Shallice on dual control; and 
I will show, crucially, that both are talking about automatic actions in my sense. 
 
Why should a philosopher even bother establishing the presence of a philosophical 
concept within empirical research? First of all in order to show that the concept of 
automatic action matters, and that its interest and relevance reaches far beyond 
philosophy.1  
 
Also, if one accepts that empirical hypotheses and data can constitute evidence in favour 
of a conceptual claim, such as my definition of automatic action from Chapter 1, then 
this chapter will also provide further justification for my definition. But here I won’t 
defend the antecedent of the above conditional. 
 
                                                 
1
 And, given the lack of philosophical discussion of automatic action, in order to show that I am not the 
only one who is interested in the topic. 
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It is important to clarify that the chapter does not mean to provide an argument for the 
existence of automatic actions: I take what I say in Chapter 1 to be sufficient for that 
purpose. Nor does the chapter mean to present a causal explanation of automatic action: 
here it is (only) in the definition of the concept of automatic action that I am interested.  
 
1. Bargh 
Bargh's work is probably the most influential research on the topic of automaticity. 
Bargh (1996, 1999) has conducted notorious experiments on the extent of automatic 
influences over human behaviour. In this section I will show that the kinds of behaviours 
which result from Bargh’s experiments meet my conditions for automatic action.  
 
But first I think it is important to provide some background on Bargh’s motivation for 
studying automaticity. Bargh, like me, takes automaticity to be a good phenomenon: he 
is interested in the way in which automaticity makes us more successful agents, in that it 
increases our familiarity with a task, and decreases the energies required to complete it: 
 
Thus “the automaticity of being” is far from the negative and 
maladaptive caricature drawn by humanistically oriented writers; rather, 
these processes are in our service and best interests – and in an intimate, 
knowing way at that. They are, if anything, “mental butlers” who know 
our tendencies and preferences so well that they anticipate and take care 
of them for us, without having to be asked (Bargh and Chartrand 1999, 
p. 476). 
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Differently from me, though, Bargh appears to think that automaticity poses questions of 
free will.
2
 This is how Bargh himself describes his interests: “My lines of research all 
focus on the question ‘How much free will do we really have?’” (from his web-page: 
http://bargh.socialpsychology.org/). In this section, by arguing that the behavioural 
responses of Bargh’s experiments are automatic actions, I deny that Bargh’s cases pose 
more of a problem to free will than do any other kinds of action.  
 
Let us look now at the most famous of Bargh’s experiments, in which participants were 
primed with “words related to the stereotype of the elderly (e.g., Florida, sentimental, 
wrinkle)” (Bargh and Chartrand 1999, p. 466
3
), while a control group was primed “with 
words unrelated to the stereotype” (ibid). The findings were quite amazing: “participants 
primed with the elderly-related material subsequently behaved in line with the stereotype 
– specifically, they walked more slowly down the hallway after leaving the experiment” 
(ibid) 4. Importantly, subjects were not aware that they were primed with the elderly 
stereotype: “No participant expressed any knowledge of the relevance of the words in 
the scrambled-sentence task to the elderly stereotype” (Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996, 
p. 237). 
 
                                                 
2
 Just like Libet (1985) took his experiments’ results to pose a challenge to free will. 
3
 The full list of words: “worried, Florida, old, lonely, grey, selfishly, careful, sentimental, wise, stubborn, 
courteous, bingo, withdraw, forgetful, retired, wrinkle, rigid, traditional, bitter, obedient, conservative, 
knits, dependent, ancient, helpless, gullible, cautious, and alone” (Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996, p. 
236). 
4
 According to my own calculations on Bargh’s (1996) data (the article does not give the speed), the group 
subject to the elderly stereotype does on average a speed of, approximately, 4.2 kph, while the control 
group does 4.8 kph.  
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The agent’s behaving under the influence of the elderly bias appears to meet my 
conditions for automaticity: the agent does not need to attend to the fact that she is 
subject to the bias (or, more specifically, to the fact that she is behaving under the 
influence of the bias), in order to so behave. Also, the agent does not indeed attend to the 
fact that she is subject to the elderly bias - and that, supposedly, explains why the agent 
is not aware of the bias. So the agent’s behaving under the influence of the bias does 
indeed meet my two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for 
automaticity. 
 
This remains true if one changes the description of what the agent is doing: ‘walking at 
4.2 kph’, for example: the agent can do that without paying attention to what speed she 
is doing; and she probably will do that without paying attention to what speed she is 
doing. So this description meets my conditions on automaticity too.  
 
The remaining question is whether what the agent does is an automatic action: so 
whether the agent’s movements, in leaving the experiment’s room, are under the agent’s 
guidance or intervention control. In order to answer this question, we must first establish 
what it is that the agent does.  
 
This is because even though, as I have already said in Chapter 1, I accept, with 
Anscombe (1957), Davidson (1971), and Hornsby (1980), the view that different action-
descriptions can belong to the same action, that does not mean that different descriptions 
of the same action share all the same properties. Take, for example, Davidson’s case 
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(1963) of flipping the switch to turn the light on and, unbeknownst to me, alerting the 
prowler. According to Davidson, ‘turning the light on’ and ‘alerting the prowler’ are 
different descriptions of the same action, but that does not mean that they have the same 
properties: ‘turning the light on’ is, for example, intentional on Davidson’s account; 
while ‘alerting the prowler’ isn’t. 
 
It might be proposed, here, that the property of being intentional works at a different 
level from the property of being under the agent’s guidance; because the former is a 
property of action-descriptions, while the latter is a property of movements; and that a 
consequence of this is that all action-descriptions that belong to the same action 
necessarily share the property of being under the agent’s guidance, while they don’t 
necessarily, as we have seen, share the property of being intentional.  
 
The reason why I won’t help myself to this point here is that I will challenge this point 
in Chapter 5; so now I can’t let my discussion rely on a claim that I will later reject. But 
I will show that Bargh’s cases are automatic actions even without the aid of the above 
claim. 
 
So to establish that one description has some property – being under the agent’s 
guidance, say – does not necessarily imply that another description of the same action 
has that property. Therefore, if all I could show was that the description ‘walking at 
4.2kph’ is an automatic action, then it might be objected that I have not shown that 
Bargh’s cases are automatic actions, simply because the description ‘walking at 4.2kph’ 
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does not actually capture Bargh’s cases because it leaves out the essential feature of the 
experiment, the fact that agent’s are walking under the influence of the ‘elderly’ 
stereotype. 
 
So, in order to put to rest this kind of objection, I must show not only that ‘walking at 
4.2kph’ is an automatic action, but also that ‘walking under the influence of the 
stereotype’ is an automatic action – and so that the latter is under the agent’s guidance 
too. 
 
In fact, there are some descriptions of the agent’s behaviour, in leaving the room after 
the experiment, which are obviously under the agent’s guidance: if one describes what 
the agent does as ‘walking’, that is under the agent’s guidance: the agent can at any time 
stop walking, as she can start running (or crawling, for that matter).  
 
Also, if one describes what the agent does under the description ‘walking at 4.2 kph’, 
that description too is under the agent’s guidance: the agent can at any time increase or 
decrease her speed (suppose, for example, that the agent receives an emergency phone 
call, or that the fire alarm goes off, or that she starts to wonder whether she has left her 
bag in the experiment’s room). Now the question is: does the agent also have guidance 
over her action under the description ‘walking under the influence of the stereotype’? 
 
That an agent who is under the influence of such stereotypes can change her behaviour 
has been shown in a experiment by Macrae (1998), modelled on Bargh’s version: 
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subjects were primed with the stereotype of ‘helpfulness’, and then put in a situation in 
which they could have picked up a pen that the experimenter pretended to accidentally 
drop. Macrae’s results matched Bargh’s: subjects who had been primed with the 
‘helpfulness’ stereotype tended to pick up the pen more often then subjects in the control 
group. But Macrae added an element: sometimes the pen was working fine, and 
sometimes it was leaking. And he found that when the pen was leaking, there was no 
registered effect of the ‘helpfulness’ stereotype: primed subjects no longer tended to 
help more often than control subjects.  
 
Macrae’s experiment appears to prove an obvious point: that the fact that agents are 
subject to the stereotype, and behave accordingly to it, does not mean that agents cannot 
change their behaviour: so, again, in Bargh’s scenario, agents would have obviously 
picked up their speed if the fire alarm had gone off, for example. The interesting 
question, there, is whether primed agents who rushed to the exit would have been still 
slower than control agents who rushed to the exit: Macrae’s findings, which registered 
no effect of the ‘helpfulness’ stereotype in the leaking pen cases, appear to suggest that 
primed agents would not have in fact been slower than control agents had the fire alarm 
gone off.  
 
So what subjects do in leaving the experiment’s room, under descriptions such as 
‘walking at 4.2 kph’ and ‘walking under the influence of the stereotype’, is under their 
guidance. And since I have already shown that it also meets my conditions for 
automaticity, we can conclude that it is a case of automatic action.  
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Here it might be objected that I have only shown that, had the circumstances changed, or 
had the circumstances been different, the agent would have behaved differently. But that 
this does not show that, in the actual circumstances, namely when Bargh registered a 
speed of 4.2kph, agents had guidance. The possible fire alarm case (or the phone 
ringing), then, would not show that the agent had guidance over the actual case; because 
in the actual case, no fire alarm went off. What I need to show for guidance, then, would 
be that agents are able to change their speed, or to stop walking at will, independently of 
a change in circumstances such as the fire alarm going off. 
 
I think I can do that: suppose that, while walking down the corridor, one of the subjects 
that Bargh had just primed with the ‘elderly’ stereotype feels a sudden rush of affection 
for her new born baby, which, for the first time, she has left at home with someone else. 
It would be very weird to think that, because she is under the influence of the ‘elderly’ 
stereotype, she could not run home to hug her baby (thereby increasing her speed). That 
shows, I think, that subjects can change their speed at will, independently of the 
circumstances.  
 
Here, a defender of the previous objection might still want to reply that I have not shown 
that the intervention is independent of the circumstances because, indeed, having a 
sudden rush of affection for your new born baby is a change in circumstances. This did 
not happen in the actual case, and therefore it does not show guidance in the actual case. 
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First of all, we don’t know that primed subjects did not have sudden rushes of affection 
in leaving the room. We only know that, if they had them, they did not result in 
increased speed (not even that, actually: 4.2kph might be the result of them walking 
faster than they would have had, had they not had the rush of affection). But, most 
importantly, if the defender of the objection is willing to reduce any act of will to a 
change of circumstances, then they would have set a target, a pure act of will, that they 
themselves consider unreachable. But then they would end up with the counterintuitive 
position of denying control not only in the ‘elderly’ stereotype cases, but in all cases; 
because any case could be potentially reduced to a change of circumstances.  
 
But then their objection would no longer concern Bargh’s cases; it would just be a 
general objection about the possibility of control. They would, indeed, be accepting my 
point that Bargh’s cases, despite the stereotype, resemble normal cases; it’s just that they 
would deny that normal cases are under the agent’s guidance in the first place. But then 
this is not the place to take on their general scepticism about control (and maybe, 
eventually, free will).  
 
Another objection might be that ‘acting under the influence of the stereotype’ might be 
helped, but that the agent cannot help being under the influence of the stereotype. This 
doesn’t matter: it is with the agent’s behaviour that we are concerned; and with whether 
the agent has guidance over her behaviour being affected by the stereotype. Once we 
have shown that she does, then it doesn’t matter that she can’t help being (whatever that 
means) under the influence of the stereotype. 
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So, we can conclude, the agent’s behaviour, in leaving the experiment’s room, is under 
the agent’s guidance or intervention control under both ‘walking at 4.2kph’ and ‘walking 
under the influence of the stereotype’: so those are both cases of automatic action. In this 
section I have therefore shown that the cases discussed by Bargh are cases of ‘automatic 
action’ in my sense. 
 
I can imagine the reader being rather disappointed with my discussion of Bargh. There 
was no mention, in Chapter 1, of automaticity being about psychologists influencing the 
behaviour of people. And, when faced with the frightening side of automaticity - some 
people’s ability to make other people do as they wish - I just contented myself with 
demonstrating that those are cases of automatic action too. But there must be a salient 
difference, the reader will object, between someone being made to walk slower (or being 
made to buy one particular product rather than another, or being made to help someone 
rather than not, and, more worryingly, vice versa) through influences of which she isn’t 
even conscious, and ‘turning a door handle’. The former is scary; the latter is just 
‘turning a door handle’.  
 
It was not my intention to disregard the distinctiveness of Bargh’s cases (and, possibly, 
their social relevance); but it was my intention to normalize them. My concern, in 
arguing that Bargh’s cases are actions, is to show that they do not imply any diminished 
responsibility or diminished control. I don’t think, in short, that it makes sense to say 
that those agents that have been primed with the elderly stereotype have less control 
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over the speed at which they walk down the corridor than those agents that have not 
been primed with the elderly stereotype. Yes, primed subjects walk slower than control 
subjects. And yes, primed subjects walk slower than control subjects because of the 
elderly stereotype. But I don’t think that this amounts to any determination or 
diminished control, and therefore I don’t think that their walking slower implies any 
diminished responsibility.  
 
The point is that primed agents are as responsible for walking at 4.2 kph as control 
agents are responsible for walking at 4.8 kph. It’s as if the first group of subjects, rather 
than being primed, would have to walk down a corridor with an acclivity so slight that 
they would not realize there was one; while the second group would walk down a 
perfectly flat corridor. Predictably, the first group would be on average slower than the 
second group; suppose, again, 4.2 kph against 4.8 kph. Would it make any sense to say 
that the first group is less responsible for doing 4.2 kph than the second group is for 




But one might want to argue, rather, that the first group is not responsible for walking 
slower than the second group. And that, similarly, the primed group is not responsible 
for walking slower than the control group. But what does that mean? We know from 
                                                 
5
 It might be argued that the fact that, in the first case, part of the responsibility lies with someone – the 
experimenter – who is absent from the second case, must mean that subjects in the first case are less 
responsible than in the second because they share their responsibility with the experimenter. But 
responsibility does not work like that: it is not a cake. One’s increased responsibility does not necessarily 
imply that someone else’s responsibility must decrease. Suppose I was given life for having planted a 
bomb on a school bus. If it later came out that I had an accomplice, that would not decrease my 
responsibility – even though I would obviously share my responsibility with them.   
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both commonsense and Macrae’s (1998) findings that subjects in the first group are, in 
both cases, perfectly able to increase their speed. And that suggests that neither the slight 
acclivity of the corridor nor the elderly stereotype could excuse the agent if she was, say, 
late in picking up her kids from school.  
 
Contrast this case with the case in which the door at the end of the corridor is locked. 
The agent cannot leave, she is stuck. Now this is a case in which the agent might be 
excused from being late in picking up her kids. Crucially, it emerges that the agent’s 
awareness of the bias doesn’t matter: in the case of the locked door the agent is aware of 
the bias and still she is excused. In the case of the elderly stereotype the agent is not 
aware of the bias but nevertheless she is not excused.  
 
2. Dual control 
In this section I present the well-established empirical hypothesis of dual control, in the 
version by Norman and Shallice (1986
6
), showing that the behaviours for which it gives 
a causal explanation (explanation with which this thesis is not concerned) meet my 




                                                 
6
 A very similar version of dual control is presented by Perner (2003). Even though most of what I shall 
say about Norman and Shallice would apply to Perner’s model, here I shall not concern myself with it.  
7
 I don’t think it can be the job of a philosopher to provide empirical evidence for an empirical thesis. 
Therefore, anyone who’s interested in the empirical evidence for dual control, should look at the 
following: Norman and Shallice (1980), Shallice (1982), Norman and Shallice (1986), Shallice (1988), 
Shallice and Burgess (1996), Cooper and Shallice (2000). 
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The basic idea of dual-control is that there is a conscious level of control and a non-
conscious automatic level of control.
8
 And that some performances can be carried out by 
the lower level of control without the involvement of the conscious level, while other 
performances require the supervision of consciousness. In this section I will be showing 
that those performances that can run without the involvement of the conscious level of 
control meet my conditions for automatic action.  
 
After briefly sketching Norman and Shallice’s model, I shall argue that the behaviours 
the model proposes to explain are not only similar to automatic actions, they actually 
are automatic actions – just because these behaviours meet the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for automatic action from Chapter 1.  
 
This is, firstly, how Norman and Shallice describe their model’s goals: 
 
Our goal is to account for several phenomena in the control of action, 
including the several varieties of action performance that can be 
classified as automatic, the fact that action sequences that normally are 
performed automatically can be carried out under deliberate conscious 
control when desired, and the way that such deliberate control can be 
used both to suppress unwanted actions and to enhance wanted ones. In 
addition, we take note both of the fact that accurate, precise timing is 
often required for skilled performance and the fact that it is commonly 
believed that conscious attention to this aspect of performance can 
disrupt the action (Norman and Shallice 1986, p. 3). 
 
                                                 
8
 I will here and throughout refrain from speaking of “automatic control” because that name also refers to 
the engineering discipline which studies systems such as thermostats (I know, philosophy studies 
thermostats too!). Perner (2003) talks of vehicle control for the lower level and content control for the 
higher level. 
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This shows that Norman and Shallice share much of my motivation for discussing 
automatic actions. First, they emphasize that “several” different kinds of actions can be 
classified as automatic. Indeed, in Chapter 1 I have shown how performances as 
different as skilled actions and habitual actions can both be said to be automatic; and 
that there is a difference between spontaneous and subsidiary automatic actions. 
Furthermore, Norman and Shallice emphasize, as I do, that an action becomes automatic 
through practice; and that (possibly because of that) the fact that a performance has 
become automatic does not mean that it is now beyond the agent’s attention and 
conscious control. 
 
Also, the agent can draw her attention to an automatic performance and consciously 
control such a performance “when desired”. Indeed, an agent can intervene both to 
“suppress” unwanted aspects of a performance and to “enhance” more appropriate ones. 
Finally, Norman and Shallice, like me, want to account for the “commonly believed” 
intuition that attention, in the case of automatic action, can “disrupt” the performance.  
 
Here are some further similarities between what Norman and Shallice want to account 
for and what I say about automatic actions in Chapter 1: 
 
The theory must account for the ability of some action sequences to run 
themselves off automatically, without conscious control or attentional 
resources, yet to be modulated by deliberate conscious control when 
necessary. Accordingly, we suggest that two complementary processes 
operate in the selection and control of action. One is sufficient for 
relatively simple or well learned acts. The other allows for conscious, 
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attentional control to modulate the performance (Norman and Shallice 
1986, p. 1). 
 
Norman and Shallice’s references to both “well learned acts” and to the intervention of 
“conscious control when necessary” already point to my concept of automatic action.  
 
On Norman and Shallice’s model, the lower level of control is regulated by what they 
call contention scheduling: action schemas - potential reactions to some perceptual input 
- have different activation values in relation to some perceptual input; and a perceptual 
input will activate an action schema if that action schema has a low enough activation 
value in relation to that perceptual input, such that contention scheduling can select that 
action schema without the intervention of consciousness.  
 
Here’s an example: my office door doesn’t have a handle; I just push it to come in. So, 
supposedly, when I’m accessing my office, the activation value of the action schema 
‘push the door’ will be lower than the activation value of the action schema ‘turn the 
door handle’. Also, because I go in and out of my office dozens of times a day, the 
action schema ‘push the door’ when I receive the perceptual input of seeing my office 
door from the outside will supposedly be low enough to be selected by contention 
scheduling, so that I will often push my door open automatically. 
 
There are two basic principles of the contention scheduling mechanism: 
first, the sets of potential source schemas compete with one another in 
the determination of their activation value; second, the selection takes 
place on the basis of activation value alone – a schema is selected 
whenever its activation exceeds the threshold that can be specific to the 
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schema and could become lower with use of the schema (Norman and 
Shallice 1986, p. 5). 
 
Sometimes, according to Norman and Shallice, some perceptual input is such that no 
action schema has, in relation to it, an activation value low enough for the schema to be 
selected. Think, for example, of novel experiences; or things one is not very good at. 
Those reactions to the environment cannot be dealt with by contention scheduling alone: 
the intervention of consciousness is required.  
 
We propose that an additional system, the Supervisory Attentional 
System, provides one source of control upon the selection of schemas, 
but it operates entirely through the application of extra activation and 
inhibition to schemas in order to bias their selection by the contention-
scheduling mechanisms (Norman and Shallice 1986, p. 6). 
 
There are, then, two functions for the Supervisory Attentional System (SAS): it lowers 
down activation values when no action schema has a low enough value to be selected by 
contention scheduling; and it inhibits action schemas that, despite their activation value 
being low enough to be selected by contention scheduling, are inappropriate to the 
circumstances.  
 
An example of the latter is when one is involved in a familiar activity, but this time the 
agent has to do something slightly different. Think of driving on familiar roads towards 
unfamiliar destinations: I usually go this way on my way home, but today I am headed to 
a friend’s house. Being on a familiar road, the action schemas relevant to driving home 
have very low activation values, sufficient to be selected by contention scheduling – just 
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because I have gone this way endless times. But this time I am going somewhere else: 
therefore the SAS must inhibit selection of the inappropriate action schemas.  
 
3. Dual control and automatic actions 
Having described how Norman and Shallice’s dual control model is supposed to work, I 
will now show, by looking at their writings, that the behaviours the model is supposed to 
explain meet my necessary and sufficient conditions for automatic actions. 
 
The first thing to look at is what Norman and Shallice mean by the term ‘automatic’: 
 
Examine the term automatic… First, it refers to the way that certain 
tasks can be executed without awareness of their performance (as in 
walking along a short stretch of flat, safe ground). Second, it refers to 
the way an action may be initiated without deliberate attention and 
awareness (as in beginning to drink from a glass when in 
conversation) (Norman and Shallice 1986, pp. 1-2). 
 
The first point is one that I have also made in Chapter 1: there is no need for awareness 
in order to execute automatic actions. This is, given that on my account awareness 
depends on attention, my second necessary condition on automaticity: no need for 
attention. The example is particularly illustrative: when walking, an agent need not be 
aware of her legs’ movements in order for her legs to perform.  
 
The second point makes, again, specific reference to the fact that attention and 
awareness are not necessary: but in this case Norman and Shallice talk of the initiation 
of the performance rather than its execution. I have not drawn such a distinction in 
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Chapter 1, but it appears clear that, on my account, attention and awareness are not 
necessary, and are lacking, both in the initiation and in the execution of the performance. 
Because if one’s attention was caught or employed for either initiation or execution, then 
an agent would be attending to the performance, and then the performance would no 
longer be automatic.  
 
Here the reader might accept that the relationship between attention and awareness on 
the one side and automaticity on the other envisaged by Norman and Shallice and the 
one I establish in Chapter 1 is the same; but they might question whether Norman and 
Shallice might mean something else by ‘attention’ and ‘awareness’. After all, they aren’t 
philosophers. And so the fact that they use the same words is no guarantee for the fact 
that they are talking about the same phenomena.  
 
In answering this point, I should first clarify something: in order to show what I want to 
show in this section, namely that dual control models are an example of the relevance of 
automatic actions in empirical literature, I don’t actually need to show that Norman and 
Shallice mean exactly what I mean by attention, awareness, or automaticity. Indeed, 
their being scientists rather than philosophers, it is hard to imagine that they could ever 
mean the very same things by those terms. It is sufficient, for this section, that I show 
that those behaviours they are out to explain meet my conditions for automatic action. 
 
Having said that, could their conception of attention and awareness be incompatible with 
mine? A suggestion that it might be comes from another passage:  
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It is possible to be aware of performing an action without paying active, 
directed attention to it. The most general situation of this type is in the 
initiation of routine actions (Norman and Shallice 1986, p. 2). 
 
Here Norman and Shallice deny that lack of attention implies lack of awareness: they 
propose, indeed, that one can be aware of some performance without paying “active, 
directed” attention to it. I have not distinguished between active and passive attention, or 
between directed and non-directed attention. I have said, though, that what I mean by an 
agent attending to some action includes the case in which the agent’s attention is caught 
by the action rather than being directed to the action. Furthermore, I have said that both 
ways of attending are ways of becoming aware.  
 
Therefore, if Norman and Shallice’s position, as the text suggests, is that one need not 
direct one’s attention to some performance in order to become aware of it, then my 
account from Chapter 1 makes that point too: one can also become aware by one’s 
attention being caught by the performance.  
 
But there is another possible inconsistency that the above passage from Norman and 
Shallice might suggest: namely, that routine actions do not imply lack of awareness; and 
eventually, even though Norman and Shallice don’t specifically say that, that automatic 
performances might not require lack of awareness. I have denied that point in Chapter 1: 
the first necessary condition on automaticity is lack of attention and awareness. 
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But I think that this suggestion is not grounded in Norman and Shallice’s text, as can be 
seen from the passage below (which directly follows the last one I quoted): 
 
Phenomenally, this corresponds to the state that Ach (1905) describes as 
occurring after practice in reaction time tasks. Over the first few trials, 
he said, the response is preceded by awareness that the action should be 
made, but later there is no such awareness unless preparation has been 
inadequate (Norman and Shallice 1986, p. 2). 
 
With practice, then, awareness disappears; and we find awareness only if we have not 
practiced enough. On my account, it is only after practice that performances become 
automatic. So the idea that, to begin with, the agent is aware of her performances is not 
incompatible with my account; because, to begin with, the agent’s performances are not 
automatic.  
 
So far, then, the behaviours that the empirical hypothesis of dual control is concerned 
with meet both my individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for 
automaticity: lack of attention and awareness; and no need for attention and awareness.  
 
Another suggestion of the fact that the behaviours discussed by Norman and Shallice are 
automatic in just the sense I have individuated in Chapter 1 comes from their list of 
activities that are not automatic: 
 
- They involve planning or decision making 
- They involve components of troubleshooting 
- They are ill-learned or contain novel sequences of actions 
- They are judged to be dangerous or technically difficult 
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- They require the overcoming of a strong habitual response or 
resisting temptation (Norman and Shallice 1986, pp. 2 and 3). 
 
Now look at my examples of non-automatic actions from Chapter 1: 
 
...finally confessing to a wrong-doing; holding on to the rope from 
which your best friend is hanging; driving through a snow-storm on a 
mountain road, at night (Chapter 1, p. 17). 
 
The similarity is striking. My first example (confessing) clearly belongs to category 1. 
My second example belongs to both 3 and 4. My third example belongs to both 2 and 4. 
Finally, recall that in Chapter 1 I have said that many automatic actions can be found in 
habits and skills: indeed, category 5 explicitly refers to habits (“habitual response”); and 
category 3 makes clear reference to skills (“ill-learned”). 
 
Clearly, what I have established so far does not yet show that the behaviours that 
Norman and Shallice discuss are automatic actions; I still have to show that they meet 
my third necessary condition on automatic action, guidance. It does nevertheless show 
that we share a conception of automaticity. 
 
Even this point, though, must be clarified: as I said before, it would be surprising if our 
concept of automaticity was exactly the same, given that theirs is based on empirical 
work and considerations, while mine is the result of conceptual analysis. So, in that 
sense, it would be pointless to try and argue that our concepts of automaticity are 
identical. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which they are: they refer to the same set of 
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behavioural performances. And this sense is all I need in order to make the point that 
those behaviours are automatic in my sense.  
 
4. Dual control and Guidance 
Having established that Norman and Shallice’s behavioural performances are automatic 
in the sense I individuated in Chapter 1, in this section I will argue that, meeting my 
guidance condition, they are also actions; and that therefore they are automatic actions.  
 
Let us remind ourselves of what guidance is: it is the agent’s ability to intervene to stop 
herself from doing something. And it is only those performances over which the agent 
has guidance that, I argue in Chapter 1, can be said to be actions. So are the 
performances that Norman and Shallice want to explain through contention scheduling 
under the agent’s guidance? 
 
Norman and Shallice say early on in their article what they think the relationship 
between automatic performances and control is:  
 
Our goal in this chapter is to account for the role of attention in action, 
both when performance is automatic and when it is under deliberate 
conscious control (Norman and Shallice 1986, p. 1). 
 
According to Norman and Shallice, then, automatic performances are not under 
deliberate conscious control. And this is a point I have also made in Chapter 1, when I 
said that lack of attention and awareness implies lack of conscious control. But this is 
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not incompatible with guidance: indeed, in Chapter 1 I show that an agent can have 
guidance over some performance that she is not consciously controlling.  
 
It might be thought that the incompatibility arises because of contention scheduling. 
Recall that if some action schema has low enough activation value relative to a 
perceptual input, it will be selected. It might be thought that, because this process 
happens without the agent’s awareness, the agent cannot stop a low enough action 
schema from being selected. And that this means that the agent has no guidance over the 
selection of that action schema. If that was the case, then the performance resulting from 
the selection of that action schema could not be a case of automatic action, because it 
would fail to meet one of my necessary conditions. 
 
Suppose that I drive from a country where green means ‘go’, to a country where green 
means ‘stop’; and suppose that I have never before been in a country where green means 
‘stop’. Now, we can suppose that I am so used, from decades of driving, to press on the 
accelerator when I see green that, according to Norman and Shallice, ‘pressing on the 
accelerator’ has very low activation value in relation to perceptual input ‘green’; low 
enough, indeed, that it will be selected by contention scheduling without the 
involvement of the SAS.  
 
Having shown that performances that are selected by contention scheduling are 
automatic in my sense, we can say that I often automatically press on the accelerator 
when the lights turn green. Does this mean that I have no guidance over ‘pressing on the 
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accelerator’? I don’t think so: when I drive across the border, I will have to remember 
that ‘green’ no longer means ‘go’. But it won’t be a case of being unable to stop myself 
from pressing on the accelerator when I see green. It will only be a case of paying more 
attention than usual, so that my reaction to green won’t be, this time, automatic.  
 
And I think that Norman and Shallice acknowledge this point too: 
 
…a schema might not be available that can achieve control of the 
desired behaviour, especially when the task is novel or complex. We 
propose that an additional system, the Supervisory Attentional System 
(SAS), provides one source of control upon the selection of schemas, 
but it operates entirely through the application of extra activation and 
inhibition to schemas in order to bias their selection by the contention 
scheduling mechanisms (Norman and Shallice 1986, p. 6). 
 
Once in the foreign country, then, the task of reacting to ‘green’ will be novel; and 
complex, indeed, exactly because I must make sure not to slip back into the old habit. 
Because of this, according to Norman and Shallice, the task cannot be dealt with by 
contention scheduling alone. There are, indeed, two issues, and Norman and Shallice 
cover them both: activation of the novel reaction, ‘stopping when the light is green’; and 
inhibition of the habitual reaction, ‘pressing on the accelerator when the light is green’. 
Both activating and inhibiting are, here, too much for contention scheduling alone. 
 
But this, Norman and Shallice acknowledge, does not mean that the agent has no control 
over her reactions to ‘seeing the green light’; but only that the agent must deal with 
‘seeing the green light’ differently. In this case the agent will have to attend to what she 
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does, as Norman and Shallice acknowledge: “Attention, which we will associate with 
outputs from SAS…” (Norman and Shallice 1986, p. 7).  
 
So not only are behaviours selected by contention scheduling not incompatible with 
guidance, but actually Norman and Shallice too defend the idea that agents can intervene 
to correct, guide, or inhibit their automatisms.  
 
In conclusion, then, the behaviours that the hypothesis of dual control is supposed to 
explain not only meet my conditions for automaticity, but they are also under the agent’s 
guidance; they are, therefore, automatic actions.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at two very influential examples of the importance of 
automatic actions within empirical psychology: Bargh’s automatic influences and 
Norman and Shallice’s dual control model. I have shown that Bargh’s cases, such as 
subjects walking slower out of a room where they have just been primed with the 
‘elderly’ stereotype, meet my necessary and sufficient conditions for automatic action. 
Then I have presented the hypothesis of dual control, according to which there are an 
automatic unconscious level of control, and a conscious level of control. I have shown 
that those behaviours that, according to Norman and Shallice, are controlled by the 
lower level of control, are automatic. And, since they are also under the agent’s 
guidance, they are in fact automatic actions. So, not only has this chapter shown how 
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psychology is interested in automatic actions; it has also shown that psychologists accept 
the definition of automatic action that I have given in Chapter 1.  
 
I now consider the task of presenting automatic actions concluded. I will therefore move 
on to establish, in Chapters 3 and 4, whether causal accounts of intentional action, such 
as Davidson's reductive one (Chapter 3) and Bratman's non-reductive one (Chapter 4) 
can account for the intuition that automatic actions are intentional.  
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Chapter 3: Davidson, Unconscious Beliefs, and Causes 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss Davidson's account of intentional action, as presented in 
Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963). I show that Davidson's account does not work 
for automatic actions. This is because Davidson's account relies on the attribution of 
particular mental states as the causes of action in every case. But, I argue, there is no 
evidence for thinking that those mental states are always present in all automatic 
cases; nor is there evidence for thinking that they are always the causes of automatic 
actions. Furthermore, since those mental states, in automatic cases, must always be 
unconscious, they can always be attributed consequentially: but then, I argue, those 
mental states lose explanatory power.  
 
The chapter comprises five parts: in the first, I present Davidson's view. In the 
second, I show that, for automatic cases, Davidson's view necessarily needs to appeal 
to unconscious mental states. In the third I show that, in automatic cases, there is no 
evidence for attributing in every case the unconscious mental states required by 
Davidson's view. In the fourth section I present an argument against the attribution of 
those unconscious mental states: the argument from consequential attribution. 
Finally, in the fifth section I deal with a possible reply from the Davidsonian camp.   
 
1. Davidson's view 
Davidson’s account of intentional action is put forward in his famous article Actions, 
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Reasons, and Causes (1963), where Davidson defends the thesis that reasons 
explanation (rationalization) is “a species of causal explanation” (ibid, p. 3).  
 
Let me first say which part of Davidson’s argument I am interested in here: I am not 
concerned with Davidson’s main contention that rational explanation 
(rationalization) is a form of causal explanation. I will rather focus my attention only 
on what emerges from Actions, Reasons, and Causes as Davidson’s account of 
intentional action – see below. It is fair to say that an account of intentional action 
was probably not Davidson’s main concern in writing Actions, Reasons, and Causes. 
But in this thesis I am only after one such account.  
 
Furthermore, I should make the rather obvious point – at least for those who have 
read Actions, Reasons, and Causes – that Davidson does not speak of automatic 
actions. So the aim of this chapter is not to analyse Davidson’s application of his 
account of intentional action to automatic actions. It is rather to establish whether 
Davidson’s account of intentional action, which was not developed for nor applied to 
automatic actions, can be applied to them.   
 
On Davidson’s account, then, some action A is intentional under description φ only 
if that action was caused by a primary reason of the agent comprising of a pro 
attitude towards actions with a certain property, and a belief that action A, under 




                                                 
1
 Davidson only offers necessary conditions. Any attempt at giving sufficient conditions would, by 
Davidson’s own admission (Davidson 1973), run against the problem of deviant causal chains (more 
on this in Chapter 5).  
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R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A, under 
description d, only if R consists of a pro-attitude of the agent towards 
actions with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under 
the description d, has that property (ibid, p.5). 
 
Pro attitudes, says Davidson, can be “desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a 
great variety of moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social 
conventions, and public and private goals and values” (Davidson 1963, p. 3).  
 
So, on Davidson's account, my flipping the switch is intentional under the description 
‘flipping the switch’ only if it was caused by a primary reason composed of a pro 
attitude of mine towards actions with a certain property, say the property of 
‘illuminating the room’; and a belief that my action, under the description ‘flipping 
the switch’, has the relevant property of ‘illuminating the room’.  
 
The crucial element of Davidson’s view is that the primary reason, composed of a pro 
attitude plus a belief, is the action’s cause. As Davidson himself points out (ibid, p. 
12), causes must be events, but pro attitudes and beliefs are states, and so they cannot 
be causes. Davidson therefore proposes the “onslaught” (or onset, see Lowe 1999, p. 
1) of the relevant mental state as the cause of action.  
 
The difference between a mental state and its onset, which is a mental event, is the 
same as the difference between believing that there is a bottle on my desk (mental 
state), and forming the belief (noticing, realizing) that there is a bottle on my desk 
(mental event). Clearly, while both mental states, pro attitude and belief, are always 
needed to rationalize an action under some description, only one mental event is 
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necessary to cause the action. 
  
As Stoutland (1985) emphasizes, the mental states required by Davidson’s view must 
have a very specific content: 
 
The thesis is a very strong one: it is not saying merely that reasons are 
causes of behaviour but that an item of behaviour performed for a 
reason is not intentional under a description unless it is caused by just 
those reasons whose descriptions yield the description under which the 
behaviour is intentional. This requires that every item of intentional 
behaviour have just the right cause (Stoutland 1985, p. 46). 
 
So there must be a content relation between the primary reason and the action 
description in question. Recall Davidson's definition of “primary reason” (Davidson 
1963, p. 5): the belief must make explicit reference to the action description which it 
rationalizes.  
 
The following primary reason, for example, would not do: a pro attitude towards 
‘illuminating the room’, and a belief that my action, under description ‘turning on the 
light’, has the property of ‘illuminating the room’. This primary reason makes no 
mention of the description ‘flipping the switch’, and therefore it cannot rationalize my 
action under the description ‘flipping the switch’. Even though it will rationalize my 
action under the description ‘turning on the light’.  
 
One note of clarification: the content constraint emphasized by Stoutland is on the 
belief rather than on the pro attitude. That is to say that, as long as the belief has the 
‘right’ content, the pro attitude can have any content. For example, my action of 
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flipping the switch can be rationalized under the description ‘flipping the switch’ by a 
very wide selection of pro attitudes - ‘turning on the light’, ‘illuminating the room’, 
‘wasting energy’, ‘finding some comfort’, ‘stretching my arm’, etc. – as long as the 
agent believes that her action, under the description in question – ‘flipping the switch’ 
– has the relevant property towards which the agent has a pro attitude: ‘turning on the 
light’, say.  
 
A peculiar case will be represented by the case in which I flip the switch with a pro 
attitude towards ‘flipping the switch’. In this case, the content of the belief will be 
tautological: that my action, under description 'flipping the switch’, has the property 
of 'flipping the switch' (I return to these sorts of cases in Section 3.1.1).  
 
1.1 Inference to the best explanation 
Before arguing against Davidson's view, I must clarify what Davidson takes to be the 
nature of his argument. This is particularly important since in this chapter I will be 
arguing, primarily, that there are no arguments in favour of the application of 
Davidson’s view to automatic actions, rather than arguing for the impossibility or 
incoherence of such application.  
 
Davidson admits that he has no positive argument in favour of his causal view:  
 
...failing a satisfactory alternative, the best argument for a scheme 
like Aristotle's [a causal account] is that it alone promises to give an 
account for the 'mysterious connection' between reasons and actions 
(Davidson 1963, p. 11). 
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If this were to apply also to Davidson’s account of intentional action, then the reason 
for thinking that an action is intentional only if it is rationalized by a primary reason 
which is its cause would simply be that there is no “satisfactory alternative”: 
therefore Davidson's argument wholly relies on this assumption about the absence of 
a “satisfactory alternative”.  
 
Indeed, Davidson's argument could be taken to be an inference to the best 
explanation.
2
 We have a case of ‘inference to the best explanation’, in the words of 
Harman (1965, the first to use this expression), when “one infers, from the premise 
that a given hypothesis would provide a ‘better’ explanation for the evidence than 
would any other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true” 
(Harman 1965, p. 89). 
 
Under this comparative understanding of the value of an hypothesis, then, to argue 
against some theory one must show that there is a better view. In the absence of such 
a view, the hypothesis under scrutiny must be taken to be true (as long as it is, it 
should be added, consistent). And what Davidson says is indeed that there is no 
satisfactory alternative to his view. So, on this understanding, rather than arguing 
against Davidson's view, in this chapter I should look for alternative views of 
intentional action. 
 
I am willing to accept this point, because in Chapter 5 I will develop an alternative 
account of the intentional character of automatic actions. So if one wants to 
                                                 
2
 I owe this point to Tony Booth.  
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understand Davidson's argument as an inference to the best explanation, then one 
should take what I say in this chapter against Davidson's view, and what I say in 
Chapter 5 in favour of my own account, as reasons for thinking that my own account 
is a better view of automatic actions than Davidson's.  
 
Obviously, since here I am only interested in the application of Davidson’s view of 
intentional action to automatic actions, it is only on those grounds that Davidson’s 
view must be compared to the one that I present in Chapter 5. Claims such as 
Davidson’s contention that rationalization is a form of causal explanation, for 




There is an obvious shortcut that one could take in arguing against Davidson's view. 
As the reader will recall from Chapter 1, a necessary condition on automatic action is 
lack of attention and awareness. Therefore, if Davidson's view required that the agent 
be aware of her actions, then Davidson's view couldn't work in the case of automatic 
actions. In this section I will show that this shortcut isn't available, because it is not 
possible to establish, from Davidson's writings, whether awareness of action is 
indeed a requirement of his account.  
 
Firstly, though, I must clarify the relationship between the agent's awareness of her 
actions and the agent's awareness of her reasons, since the two passages from 
Davidson that I will be looking at concern the agent’s awareness of actions and 
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awareness of reasons respectively. Only the former is a necessary condition on 
automatic action, so that an action can be automatic, under some description, only if 
the agent isn’t aware of it under that description (see Chapter 1). But if an agent is 
aware of a primary reason of hers, then she will be aware of her action under the 
description which is rationalized by the primary reason of which the agent is aware. 
This is simply because, as we have seen in Section 1, it is a requirement of 
Davidson's thesis that the action description be part of the content of the primary 
reason: specifically, of its belief component.  
 
Therefore an agent can be unaware of some action description only if she is not 
aware of the primary reason (or just its belief component) which rationalizes that 
action description. The agent's awareness of the primary reason, then, given the 
content constraint (see Section 1), is sufficient for the agent's awareness of her action 
under the description being rationalized. Specifically, since it is the content of the 
belief that must refer to the action description, the agent mustn't be aware of the 
belief, if her action is to be automatic under the description which that belief 
rationalizes. The agent needn't be unaware of the pro attitude, since, as we have 
already seen, the pro attitude doesn’t need to make reference to the action description 
being rationalized. But if the agent was aware of the whole primary reason, then the 
agent would be aware of the belief component. So if the primary reason is 
understood as a whole, then the agent mustn’t be aware of it, because the agent 
mustn’t be aware of its belief component. 
 
Suppose, for example, that I flip the switch because I had a desire to turn off the light 
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and a belief that my action, under description 'flipping the switch', had the property 
of turning off the light. Since 'flipping the switch' is part of the content of the agent's 
belief, if the agent is aware of her belief, then the agent is aware of 'flipping the 
switch'.  
 
Here I am therefore ruling out the possibility of an agent who is aware of her pro 
attitude towards actions with the property P, and is aware of her belief that her 
action, under description φ, has property P, but is unaware of φ-ing. But one could 
devise odd cases in which an agent who is aware of the relevant primary reason falls 
unconscious on the point of acting, but still has the luck of completing her action, of 
which she would therefore be unaware, in a way in which the action satisfies the 
primary reason.  
 
One could suppose, again, that I had a pro attitude towards turning off the light, and 
a belief that my action, under description 'flipping the switch', had the property of 
'turning off the light'; and that I was aware of my belief. But that, on the point of 
flipping the switch, I fell unconscious. Nevertheless, by a stroke of luck, my hand 
falls upon the switch and flips it anyway, but I can't be aware of it because I have 
fallen unconscious. Now this might be a case in which I am aware of my reasons 
without being aware of my actions; but, intuitively, given the crucial role of luck and 
the obvious absence of control, this doesn’t even look like an action of mine, never 
mind an intentional action. So I don't need to worry about these sorts of odd cases. I 
am happy to restrict what I said above about the relationship between awareness of 
reasons and awareness of actions to actions that are intuitively intentional.   
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Having clarified the relationship between awareness of actions and awareness of 
reasons, the question is whether the former is a requirement on Davidson's view. But 
also, as we have just seen, were the latter to be a requirement on Davidson’s view, 
the view would violate the lack of awareness condition on automatic action. There 
are two places in Davidson's writings to which we might refer in order to answer this 
question. Below is the first: 
 
To dignify a driver's awareness that his turn has come by calling it an 
experience, or even a feeling, is no doubt exaggerated, but whether it 
deserves a name or not, it had better be the reason why he raises his 
arm (Davidson 1963, pp. 12-13). 
 
Here, despite saying that it would be “exaggerated” to describe the driver as having 
an ‘experience’ or ‘feeling’, Davidson not only speaks of the “driver’s awareness”, 
but he says that the driver’s awareness of the turn had “better be the reason why he 
raises his arm”; implying that, had the driver not been aware of the turn, his 
behaviour couldn’t have been rationalized. If that were Davidson’s meaning, then 
automatic actions, the agent having to be unaware of them, could not, on Davidson’s 
view, be rationalized.  
 
But in a later article, when discussing awareness of reasons, Davidson appears to take 
a position that is, for our purposes, importantly different: 
 
We cannot suppose that whenever an agent acts intentionally he goes 
through a process of deliberation or reasoning, marshals evidence and 
principles, and draws conclusions. Nevertheless, if someone acts with 
an intention, he must have attitudes and beliefs from which, had he 
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been aware of them and had the time, he could have reasoned that his 
action was desirable (or had some other positive attribute) (Davidson 
1978, p. 85). 
 
Here it appears clear that the attitudes and beliefs which compose primary reasons 
need not be mental states of which the agent is aware at the time of action. Indeed, 
Davidson says “had he been aware of them”, which must imply that the agent wasn’t 
aware of them; and, therefore, that agents need not be aware of the mental states 
which rationalize their actions; so the action descriptions rationalized by those mental 
states can be automatic (if they fulfil my other criteria).  
 
Even though there is some discrepancy between Davidson’s views in the different 
articles, I shall conclude – being as charitable to Davidson as possible - that there 
isn’t enough evidence from Davidson’s writings to conclude that awareness of action 
is indeed a requirement on his view. So, at least on that ground, there is no 
incompatibility in principle between Davidson’s account of intentional actions and 
automatic actions as I have defined them in Chapter 1.  
 
In the next section I show that, in automatic cases, the beliefs needed by Davidson's 
view have to be unconscious, given the lack of awareness condition on automatic 
actions.   
 
2. Unconscious mental states 
As I have just shown, if Davidson’s theory is to have any chance of being applied to 
automatic actions, then the agent mustn’t be aware of her primary reasons. Again, it 
must be specified that it isn’t the whole primary reason that has to be unaware or 
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unconscious in the automatic case, but only its belief component; the one that, on 
Davidson’s account, must make reference to the action description.  
 
So, if Davidson’s theory is to have any chance of working for automatic actions, it 
must appeal to unconscious mental states: as in, mental states of which the agent is 
not aware. In the literature (see Searle 1992) there is a distinction between two kinds 
of unconscious states: unconscious states such as my belief that ‘the Eiffel Tower is 
in France’, and unconscious states such as ‘the myelination of the axons in the 
nervous system’. The former, says Searle, is unconscious most of the time (not now) 
because we almost never entertain the belief that ‘the Eiffel Tower is in France’ – 
obviously, when we do entertain such belief, then it isn’t unconscious. Nevertheless, 
such belief, when it is unconscious, is still accessible by consciousness.  
 
The latter kind of state, on the other hand, is unconscious just because it is not the 
right kind of state for consciousness to access or entertain – it is, in Dennett’s (1969) 
terminology, a sub-personal state, while the belief that ‘the Eiffel Tower is in France’ 
is a personal state, even when it is unconscious, because it is accessible. Searle 
proposes to call the ‘Eiffel Tower is in France’ kind of state unconscious state, and 
the ‘myelination of the axons in the nervous system’ kind of state non-conscious 
state: I will stick to Searle’s terminology. 
 
It is important as much as obvious to point out that it is only the unconscious kind of 
state that can be deployed by Davidson’s theory in accounting for automatic actions. 
The latter kind, the non-conscious state, being a subpersonal state of the brain, does 
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not have content because it is not about anything; and it therefore cannot rationalize 
behaviour, given that, as we have seen, according to Davidson there must be a 





So the kind of unaware belief that Davidson’s theory needs in the automatic case is 
what Searle calls an unconscious mental state: a mental state which is unconscious 
because the agent is not aware of it, but that can be accessed by the agent: it can be 
'directly' brought to consciousness (as opposed to, say, discovering one's own states 
of mind by looking at a brain scan (which works for the non-conscious kind too), or 




So, if Davidson’s theory is to rationalize E’s automatically flipping the switch, it has 
to attribute to the agent E some pro attitude towards, say, ‘saving energy’, plus an 
unconscious belief that E’s action, under the description ‘flipping the switch’, has the 
property of ‘saving energy’. What it means for such belief to be unconscious is, 
according to Searle (1992), that the agent isn’t aware of her belief at the time, but that 
the belief is, nevertheless, accessible.  
 
                                                 
3
 Here one could appeal to the distinction between propositional and non-propositional content (see 
Crane 2003, p. 1), and argue that subpersonal states can at least have content in the latter sense. It is 
not at all clear that subpersonal states can have non-propositional content either (which is usually 
rather applied to mental states other than propositional attitudes, such as emotions); but even people, 
such as Bermudez (1995), who claim that subpersonal states can have content accept that subpersonal 
explanation isn’t rational explanation. Therefore even from their point of view a subpersonal state 
cannot rationalize behaviour.  
4
 The kinds of states of mind that can be discovered through psychoanalysis must be therefore 
distinguished from Searle's unconscious states, because they are accessible in a different, external, 
way. Moran (2001) and Romdenh-Romluc (forthcoming) divide what Searle calls unconscious states 
in subconscious states (the ‘Eiffel Tower’ kind) and unconscious states (the Freudian kind).  
DAVIDSON, UNCONSCIOUS BELIEFS, AND CAUSES 
 101  
This picture does, indeed, suit intuitions about automatic actions: when we do 
something automatically, such as flipping a switch, we do not think about it, we do 
not deliberate, we do not pay attention to what we do. But that doesn’t necessarily 
mean, supporters of Davidson’s picture will want to say, that we don’t have the 
relevant beliefs. It is just that those beliefs are unconscious. And as long as those 
mental states are unconscious, Davidson’s picture does not clash with our intuitions; 
nor, as I have shown, does it clash with my definition of automatic actions from 
Chapter 1.  
 
But that it is possible for those unconscious beliefs to be attributed, so that Davidson's 
view can work for automatic actions, is still no argument in favour of their 
attribution. In the next section I will argue that, in automatic cases, there is not always 
evidence for the attribution of the required unconscious belief. Therefore Davidson’s 
account does not work for all cases; so that his necessary condition – that actions are 
intentional only if they are rationalized by a primary reason – does not stand; because 
amongst intuitively intentional actions there are some automatic ones that Davidson's 
account fails to rationalize: so that being rationalizable isn’t necessary for being 
intentional.  
 
Before proceeding with my argument, though, I must deal with another potential 
objection: that I am setting my target too low. Rather than arguing against the 
attribution of unconscious mental states in all automatic cases, I should argue that it is 
never possible to attribute the required mental states in automatic cases.  
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Given that I am conceding to Davidson the possibility of the attribution, then, in the 
absence of a 'satisfactory alternative', Davidson's view should be chosen, because it 
can deliver, at least in principle, on the intentionality of automatic actions. But if 
Davidson’s view is not the only one which can, in principle, deliver on the 
intentionality of automatic actions then, given the alternative (that I present in 
Chapter 5), it is not enough that attributing unconscious mental states is possible: we 
actually need an argument for doing so.  
 
3. Arguments for the attribution 
In this section I argue that there is not always evidence for thinking that in all 
automatic cases the agent has the relevant unconscious beliefs; and that those 
unconscious beliefs cause action. Then I look at two more possible arguments in 
favour of the attribution of the required unconscious beliefs, and I find that neither is 
conclusive.  
 
3.1 Attributing unconscious beliefs 
We have so far established that for Davidson’s account to work for automatic actions, 
it may be possible to appeal to unconscious mental states as their rationalizers and 
causes. Now we need to find out whether there is any evidence for thinking that, in 
every automatic case, there indeed is an unconscious belief (or, as a whole, an 
unconscious primary reason) that causes and rationalizes each automatic action. The 
point here is twofold: each time, the agent must have had the relevant unconscious 
belief, and that unconscious belief must have been the cause of the agent's automatic 
action.  
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First of all, since the beliefs required by Davidson's thesis are unconscious, clearly 
Davidson's thesis cannot help itself to the most obvious ground for the attribution of 
mental states: that the agent has entertained the mental state; or, as Nagel (1970) 
famously put it, that there is something that it is like for the agent to be in that mental 
state. Unconscious mental states are, in this sense, phenomenologically silent. And 
therefore phenomenology does not constitute a reason to attribute unconscious mental 
states.  
 
This point must be distinguished from the claim that phenomenology constitutes a 
reason against the attribution of unconscious mental states. The latter claim would be 
unfair: if a mental state is unconscious, then one cannot expect phenomenology to 
warrant its attribution. Phenomenology is just the wrong sort of domain.  
 
One might think that there is a further reason why phenomenology is the wrong sort 
of domain: namely, that introspection isn't the right kind of evidence (as Wittgenstein 
(1953: § 551, 587, 591) appeared to think). If that were true, then phenomenology 
wouldn't just be the wrong sort of ground for unconscious mental states. It would 
actually always be the wrong sort of ground for the attribution of a mental state, no 
matter if conscious or not.  
 
But, as I said, it is not with phenomenology that I shall concern myself with here. 
Another obvious ground for the attribution of the required beliefs is wanting to make 
sense of the agent's behaviour. If one flips a switch with the desire to illuminate the 
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room, her behaviour makes sense only if she has the relevant belief - that flipping the 
switch will illuminate the room. But clearly this is not a sufficient ground for 
attributing the belief, otherwise we would have to accept that agents always do 
sensible things. So if we want to allow for the fact that agents act sometimes 





Rather, I shall look into what appears to be the strongest ground in favour of 
Davidson’s picture: the idea that agents, if asked for explanation (if asked what 
Anscombe (1957) called the 'why? question'), would answer by self-attributing a 
primary reason, or, anyhow, by self-attributing something that would enable us to 
construct a primary reason. And, more importantly for our purposes, that agents 
would do that even in automatic cases. So, for example, if E automatically flips the 
switch, then E, at the time of action, was unaware of flipping the switch. But the idea 
is that, if you pointed out to E her switch-flipping, and asked her why she had flipped 
the switch, she would answer with something quite similar to Davidson's primary 
reason: “I wanted to save energy”, say – which supposedly implies the belief that her 
action, under description 'flipping the switch', had the property of 'saving energy'. Are 
those self-attributions, then, evidence for thinking that the unconscious beliefs 
required by Davidson’s thesis always cause automatic actions? 
                                                 
5
 Indeed, this is a further problem for Davidson’s picture. Intuitively, when we flip a switch we 
normally act rationally. But if Davidson constrains our acting rationally to the agent having the 
relevant primary reason, and if I will be successful in showing that there are cases in which we don’t 
have arguments for the attribution of the required belief, then Davidson will end up with cases in 
which agents intuitively act rationally but still his theory doesn’t have grounds for the attribution of 
the beliefs that it requires in order to claim that the agents’ behaviour was indeed rational. Just as with 
intentionality, I am pointing to cases that are intuitively intentional and intuitively rational – such as a 
normal switch-flipping, and then asking whether Davidson’s theory can account for their 
intentionality and rationality. But here I will leave the ‘rationality’ part of my argument aside: it is 
only with intentionality that this thesis is concerned. 
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Note that Davidson allows for incomplete statements of reasons:  
 
A primary reason consists of a belief and an attitude, but it is generally 
otiose to mention both. If you tell me you are easing the jib because you 
think that will stop the main from backing, I don't need to be told that 
you want to stop the main from backing... Similarly, many explanations 
of actions in terms of reasons that are not primary do not require 
mention of the primary reason to complete the story... Why insist that 
there is any step, logical or psychological, in the transfer of desire from 
an end that is not an action to the actions one conceives as means? It 
serves the argument as well that the desired end explains the action only 
if what are believed by the agent to be means are desired (Davidson 
1963, pp. 6-7).  
 
That it is generally otiose to spell out the primary reason does not mean, though, that 
Davidson's thesis can do without the relevant pair of pro attitude plus belief. The 
relevant pair is what actually rationalizes action, but we don't always need to mention 
both in giving the agent's reasons. Often we can make sense of the agent's behaviour 
without mention of the specific primary reason in question or of one of its 
components, but for Davidson, that does not mean that, had the agent not had the 
relevant pro attitude plus belief, her action would have still been rationalized: it 
would not have been (at least by the mental states in question). 
 
The idea, then, is that the fact that agents themselves would self-attribute primary 
reasons (or parts thereof) even in automatic cases provides us with an argument for 
always attributing the required unconscious beliefs. So, even though agents might 
have been unaware of their beliefs, the fact that they can report them afterwards is a 
reason to think that the agent had the required unconscious belief.  
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We have already encountered the first consideration against this argument from self-
attribution: just as with introspection, can we accept the agent's own version of 
events? If we take the agent's own explanation of her behaviour as good evidence, 
then we have to accept a sort of epistemic authority of the agent over her reasons and 
actions. And the philosopher, at least as much as the layman, cannot just accept what 
people say about themselves (Tanney (1995, p. 10) puts this point rather nicely).  
 
The concern here is a methodological one: a theory that need not rely on the agent 
being both truthful and correct about herself is a methodologically superior theory 
(Pollard (2005) makes a similar point).  
 
It is not only both philosophical and lay common sense that speak against relying on 
self-attributions. It is also psychoanalysis, which tells us that agents are often 
mistaken (in denial) about their reasons, in the way of both being unaware of one's 
actual reasons, and mistaking other considerations for one's actual reasons. Both these 




Another reason for being sceptical about agents’ self-attributions is that, when they 
come in the shape of answers to questions, they might be influenced by the way in 
which the question has been asked: so that a Davidsonian question might lead a 
Davidsonian answer. The agent might provide a primary reason only because the 
question assumed one; but they might have not actually volunteered one.  
                                                 
6
 Here I shall not discuss the interesting question of whether acting from Freudian beliefs and desires 
constitutes acting intentionally (under that description, that is). I won't do that simply because that 
kind of behaviour isn't automatic; because, as we already saw in Section 2, we don't have the right 
kind of access, 'direct' access, to our behaviour in such cases; so that the sense in which we are 
unaware of it is different from the sense in which we are unaware of automatic actions.   
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One more reason not to accept self-attributions as evidence comes from everyday 
language. People are often accused of, rather than congratulated for, 'rationalizing' 
their behaviour. The accusation is that they make up their reasons ad hoc to make 
sense of their behaviour. Suppose the meal you've just cooked for your friends turns 
out tasteless because you have forgotten salt altogether. When the complete absence 
of salt is pointed out to you, you might rationalize your behaviour to your friends by 
citing health concerns. What has actually happened is that you forgot. What you are 
doing, there, is constructing a story that will make sense of your actions and get you 
off the hook: you are trying to avoid responsibility and look good. Concern for your 
friends' health would rationalize, in Davidson's sense, your actions if you had actually 
acted from those considerations. But since you didn't, those considerations do not 
rationalize your behaviour. What you are actually doing, in making up your story – 
‘rationalizing’ in the everyday language sense – is, in short, lying.  
 
Note, also, the similarity between the way in which everyday language understands 
the practice of rationalizing and my general line of argument against Davidson: both 
in everyday language and in my argument the respective practices that go under the 
name of 'rationalization' are accused of constructing, rather than reporting, reasons. 
And a braver philosopher than I am would claim that to be in itself an argument 
against Davidson.  
 
The crucial point, indeed, is that constructions are not good enough for Davidson's 
thesis. His view needs descriptions because it needs actual mental states and actual 
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causes. It has been argued that constructions could be good enough to make sense of 
an agent's behaviour as rational (see Pollard 2003, p. 424). But as long as those 
constructions would not point to the agent's psychology (her mental states), then they 
would not be good enough for Davidson's rationalization, even though they might 
work on a different conception of rationalization and rationality than Davidson's.  
 
There is another interesting case of construction rather than description in which even 
Davidson would not want to speak of genuine rationalization. In some cases of reflex 
behaviour, such as eye blinking, I often discover a threat from the way in which my 
body reacts to it, rather than the other way around. My eyes might blink, and only 
afterwards will I realize that there was a fly or that a tree branch was too close for 
comfort. My eye blinking could, indeed, be rationalized by a desire to protect my 
eyes and a belief that avoiding the tree branch has the property of protecting my eyes. 
But if those kinds of movements have to be considered genuine reflexes, then 
Davidson himself would deny that I have actually acted, even unconsciously, upon 
such pair of pro attitude plus belief; because otherwise my reaction would be an 
intentional action rather than a mere reflex.  
 
Indeed, this is a case in which it might be the agent herself who self-attributes the 
relevant mental states to rationalize eye blinking: “Why did you blink?” “Because of 
the fly”. But, again, what she would be doing is constructing a story rather than 
reporting the mental states that actually caused her actions. And in this case Davidson 
himself would accept this, as far as his view would want to allow for genuine reflex 
movement.  
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So the agent’s self-attributions of reasons don’t seem to be good enough evidence for 
thinking that the agent actually acted from the reasons she attributes to herself. 
Should we then conclude that self-attributions should be disregarded altogether as a 
guide for understanding an agent’s reasons? Such a conclusion seems too strong: all I 
have shown is that, when our only ground for concluding that an agent acted for some 
reason is that the agent thinks or says that she acted for that reason, then we do not 
have sufficient grounds for attributing that reason to the agent. Obviously, in normal 
cases we will accept the agent’s version; but that is just because, in normal cases, we 
will have other elements which substantiate that version (environment, circumstances, 
what we know about the agent’s past, habits, and preferences, what we know about 
human nature, other people’s versions, etc). 
 
3.1.1 Alternative stories 
There is an independent reason why self-attributions don't support Davidson's 
argument. Even if, despite what I have argued so far, we accepted self-attributions as 
good evidence, not all self-attributions support Davidson's view.  
 
First of all, sometimes people don't know their reasons; they actually don't know why 
they did something. Dennett (1991) offers a nice example of this: 
 
I was once importuned to be the first base umpire in a baseball game 
– a novel duty for me. At the crucial moment in the game (bottom of 
the ninth, two outs, the tying run on third base), it fell to me to 
decide the status of the batter running to first. It was a close call, and 
I found myself emphatically jerking my thumb up – the signal for 
OUT – while yelling “SAFE!”. In the ensuing tumult I was called 
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upon to say what I had meant. I honestly couldn’t say, at least not 
from any privileged position (Dennett 1991, p. 248).  
 
It might be debatable whether Dennett both intentionally yelled “Safe” and 
intentionally jerked his thumb up. But it appears obvious that he did at least one of 
those things intentionally. And he hasn’t got a rationalization for why he did either – 
or, anyway, he cannot self-attribute a rationalization from the inside, through 
introspection. 
 
Not only does this kind of case suggest that we are not always able to self-attribute 
an explanation. It also supports what I have already said about construction rather 
than description: because we don't know what, if anything, went through our mind, 
we might make it up.  
 
So this was a case in which the agent was actually unable to self-attribute a 
rationalization. Other times agents are perfectly able to make self-attributions, but 
still the kind of self-attributions that they might provide do not support Davidson's 
view. This is the case for things like “For no reason”, “I didn't think”, 'I just did it”, 
“I did it automatically”, or “I just wanted to”: many of those replies would apply to 
what Hursthouse (1991) has called 'arational actions' (a list of which I give in 
Chapter 5, Section 4.4.1). The point here is not that when agents give these kinds of 
reports, they must have lacked the relevant mental states. As we just saw, agents’ 
self-attributions can’t establish as much: agents might have had the mental states 
they self-attribute, and those mental states might have been the actual causes of their 
behaviour. But the point is that the fact that agents give these sorts of replies 
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weakens the case for the availability of Davidsonian rationalization, in stopping the 
appeal to reasons. 
 
What I just said might be taken to be incompatible with what Anscombe had to say 
about this: 
 
Now of course a possible answer to the question 'Why?' is one like "I 
just thought I would" or "It was an impulse" or "For no particular 
reason" or "It was an idle action - I was just doodling". I do not call an 
answer of this sort a rejection of the question. The question is not 
refused application because the answer to it says that there is no 
reason, any more than the question how much money I have in my 
pocket is refused application by the answer "None" (Anscombe 1957, 
p. 25). 
 
Anscombe might be read as saying then that those sorts of answers do not stop the 
appeal to reasons, as I was suggesting. I think that would be a mistaken reading: 
Anscombe is saying that the question is appropriate, but that the answer is, at least 
this one time, that there was no reason why I so acted. And this is no problem for 
Anscombe's account, as long as we read it as saying that everytime we act for a 
reason, we act intentionally.
7
 But it would be a problem for her account if we read it 
as saying that we act intentionally only when we act for a reason - Davidson's 
account. Because here we have cases in which there is no apparent reason - as in no 
reason volunteered by the agent - but still we want to say that the agent acted 
intentionally. 
 
                                                 
7
 Here I am not offering an interpretation of Anscombe’s account; I am only using it to show why 
those cases might trouble Davidson’s. So it might be that Anscombe’s view ought not to be 
understood as saying that ‘everytime we act for a reason, we act intentionally’. Having said that, Kelly 
and Knobe (unpublished) describe the difference between Davidson’s and Anscombe’s accounts 
exactly as I have above.  
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As we saw in the previous section, obviously the agent's story might be wrong. But, 
on the assumption that what agents report deserves to be taken at face value, then we 
must also accept that often agents make reports that don't look like primary reasons. 
So not all self-attributions support Davidson's view.  
 
Here a defender of Davidson's theory might want to object that it isn't true that those 
sorts of stories don't support Davidson's view. Davidson himself discusses this point 
in at least two places in Actions, Reasons, and Causes. He first says: “We cannot 
explain why someone did what he did simply by saying the particular action 
appealed to him; we must indicate what it was about the action that appealed” 
(Davidson 1963, p. 3). Few pages later, he states: “...it is easy to answer the question, 
'Why did you do it?' with, 'For no reason', meaning not that there is no reason but 
that there is no further reason, no reason that cannot be inferred from the fact that the 
action was done intentionally; no reason, in other words, besides wanting to do it” 
(ibid, p. 6).  
 
But here it actually doesn’t matter to my discussion whether Davidson can reconcile 
this apparently troublesome cases with his thesis. What we were looking for was 
evidence in favour of his thesis. And those cases do not provide any evidence in 
favour of Davidson: they only can, at best, be made to fit into his picture. But this 
latter project, once we have established that those kinds of cases don’t support 
Davidson, is no concern of us. 
 
So far, then, we have shown why it is problematic to take agents’ self-attribution as 
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evidence for the existence and causal role of unconscious beliefs. And that, even if 
we could, not all self-attributions would support Davidson's view. But there is one 
final problem with self-attributions which would be in the way even if we accepted 
them as evidence, and even if we dismissed all the self-attributions that don't fit 
Davidson's picture: that agents might very well truthfully and correctly self-attribute 
reasons, but that does not mean that they are pointing to some actual mental states of 
theirs as causes of their actions.  
 
The point is two-fold: it means, on the one hand, that self-attributions might lend 
support to the Humean belief-desire model of motivation (according to which both 
beliefs and desires are necessary to motivate an agent to act, see Smith 1987 & 
1996), but that does not mean that they lend support to Davidson's particular version 
of it, according to which not only is the belief-desire pair necessary to motivate the 
agent to act, but actually the belief-desire pair causes the agent’s actions. So even if 
agents did self-attribute reasons, that would not mean that they were self-attributing 
causes.  
 
This point is pretty simple: on the assumption that a Humean need not accept 
Davidson’s causal thesis, then self-attributions do not support Davidson’s causal 
thesis either. Because they do not explicitly point to causes and, on the above 
assumption, what they point to – reasons – do not necessarily need to be causes.  
 
Secondly, the fact that agents self-attribute reasons does not mean that they 
necessarily self-attribute mental states. Indeed, that would be assuming internalism 
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about reasons. According to externalists about reasons for action, such as Collins 
(1997) and Dancy (2000), reasons are not psychological states of the agent, but facts 




To this second point it could be objected that, actually, self-attributions of reasons do 
point to the agent’s mind and psychology: agents say things such as ‘I thought that 
x’, ‘I wanted x’, etc. And, since I have here assumed for the sake of argument that 
self-attributions can be taken as evidence, it is not open to me to reply by pointing to 
my arguments, in the previous sections, against self-attributions. On the face of it, 
then, self-attributions seem to support internalists about reasons for action such as 
Davidson.   
 
I don’t think so. What externalists such as Collins and Dancy say is that, when an 
agent says ‘I turned the light on because it was getting darker’ (or ‘I turned the light 
on because I thought (or ‘believed’) that it was getting darker’), the reason is not the 
agent’s belief that it is getting darker, but rather the fact that it is getting darker. They 
do not necessarily deny that the agent has the relevant belief (or some other cognitive 
relationship with the fact that ‘it is getting darker’); but they argue that the reason is 
not the belief.  
 
And, if anything, in so far as ‘I turned the light on because it was getting darker’ is a  
more common expression than ‘I turned the light on because I thought (or 
‘believed’) that it was getting darker’, then what agents say appears to be on the side 
                                                 
8
 More on externalism about reasons for action in Chapter 5, Section 4.  
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of externalists; simply because agents, more often than not, point to the fact, not to 
the belief. But I won’t defend this latter point; here I only wanted to show that self-
attributing reasons doesn’t necessarily mean self-attributing mental states; and that 
therefore self-attributions don’t support Davidson over externalists.  
 
There is a similar, but independent, consideration which also suggests that self-
attributed reasons (or, indeed, intentions) might not imply the self-attribution of 
mental states. Suppose I automatically flip the switch. Suppose someone asks me: 
“Did you want to turn off the light?” or “Did you intend to turn off the light?”. And 
suppose that I would answer positively to both questions. Now, a supporter of 
Davidson might take that to mean that I am self-attributing a pro attitude (or 
intention) towards turning off the light. But all that I am saying about myself might 
actually be that I did not have any attitude or desire not to turn off the light, or that I 
did not intend not to turn off the light.  
 
Take 'P' to be my pro attitude or intention to turn off the light. The defender of 
Davidson's thesis would then be proposing that my replying positively to the 
questions means that I am self-attributing the pro attitude or intention that 'P'. But 
actually all that I might be saying about myself is that '¬¬P'. 'P' and '¬¬P', here, are 
not at all equivalent, because in saying about myself that 'P' I attribute a mental state 
to myself. While in saying about myself that '¬¬P' I attribute no mental state at all. 
But it is not at all obvious that a layman, in answering the ‘why? Question’, will pick 
up on such a difference; especially if the question, ‘Did you intend to P?’, suggests 
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one kind of answer, ‘P’, rather than the other, '¬¬P'.
9
 Davidson, importantly, needs 
the relevant mental states because he needs causes: so '¬¬P' won't do for Davidson's 
theory.  
 
In conclusion, I have shown that we ought not to accept agents' self-attributed stories 
as good evidence for the truth of a philosophical view. And that, even if we did, not 
all those self-attributed stories would actually lend support to that philosophical 
view. And finally that, even if we dismissed all the stories that did not support that 
view, we wouldn’t have actually found evidence for Davidson's particular view, 
because we would not have found evidence for two of its most controversial aspects: 
that reasons are causes, and that reasons are ‘in the mind’.  
 
3.2 Unity 
In this section I shall consider another possible argument for the attribution of the 
required unconscious mental states: that the attribution is necessary in order to give a 
unified theory of agency; and that therefore we should attribute the required mental 
states – regardless of the evidence for them or lack thereof – in order to have a 
unified theory of agency. I will show that this consideration isn't sufficient for the 
acceptance of Davidson's causal thesis.  
 
It might be suggested that we should always attribute unconscious mental states in 
automatic cases, notwithstanding the (lack of) evidence, in order to have a unified 
                                                 
9
 Here it could also be argued, as I did in Section 3.1, that the question ‘Did you intend to P?’ leads a 
positive answer, ‘P’, rather than a negative one, ‘¬P’. That might be true; but here I only need the less 
controversial claim that the question suggests ‘P’ much more than it does ‘¬¬P’: and this seems so, as 
long as it is true that the question suggests a positive or negative answer – either P or ¬P – over a 
double negation.  
DAVIDSON, UNCONSCIOUS BELIEFS, AND CAUSES 
 117  
theory of agency; one that puts forward, as Davidson's does, the same kind of 
explanation for every kind of action. A unified theory does indeed offer many 
advantages: firstly, economy and simplicity. And a more economical theory, other 
things being equal, should be preferred. Similarly, a simpler theory, other things 
being equal, should be preferred.  
 
But there is a more important advantage offered by a unified theory of agency: the 
idea that a unified theory does justice to the unity of agency, to the fact that all 
actions, being actions, share something: whatever it is that marks them all as actions.  
Indeed, throughout this thesis I have never denied that automatic actions are full-
blown actions (contra, one might think, Velleman 1992 – see my Introduction), and 
Davidson's thesis would acknowledge them as such, by offering for them the same 
kind of explanation provided for non-automatic actions.  
 
So Davidson could acknowledge the unity of agency, and he could acknowledge 
automatic actions as proper actions. He could also acknowledge that automatic 
actions too call for rational enquiry: automatic actions too are subject, to use 
Anscombe’s expression, to the 'why? question'. And all these similarities, it could be 
argued, outweigh the differences between automatic and non-automatic actions 
outlined in Chapter 1: attention, awareness, conscious control, effort, deliberation, 
thought. Because, by my own admission, those differences may not be enough to 
make automatic actions lesser actions.  
 
All these considerations from the unity of agency I accept. What I deny is that these 
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considerations recommend Davidson's view. Davidson's is a very specific kind of 
unified theory, because it is a causal one. And the need to always attribute mental 
states depends exactly on Davidson's commitment to reasons being the causes of 
actions.  
 
The argument from unity does not, I think, justify accepting Davidson's causal thesis 
simply because it recommends its most famous alternative just as much. In fact, the 
theories of the relation between reasons and actions that Davidson sets out to 
criticize in Actions, Reasons, and Causes – Ryle 1949, Anscombe 1957, Hampshire 
1959, to cite but a few – provide a unified account of agency too; but one in which 
the relation between reasons and actions is logical rather than causal. But if the 
argument from the unity of agency recommends these theories as much as 
Davidson's, then it cannot be an argument in favour of the acceptance of the crucial 
difference between Davidson's thesis and the so-called 'logical connection argument' 
alternative: that there are, in every case, mental states that cause and rationalize 
action.  
 
So unity might be a strong enough consideration to recommend a unified theory, but 
it is not sufficient to recommend Davidson’s unified theory. But then, if one accepts 
the considerations from unity, a unified theory like Davidson’s will at least be better 
than a non-unified theory. That might be true: but here I was looking for arguments 
in favour of Davidson’s theory, rather than for a comparison between Davidson’s 
theory and a non-unified theory.  
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On the other hand, if one accepted – as of Section 1.1 - that Davidson’s argument 
was an inference to the best explanation, unity will be a consideration in favour of 
Davidson’s account of intentional action when it is compared with non-unified 
views. With this latter point I deal in Chapter 5, Section 4.   
 
3.3 Naturalism 
There is another possible argument in favour of Davidson's view: naturalism. Taking 
a naturalistic approach, according to Blackburn, means to “refuse unexplained 
appeals to mind or spirit, and unexplained appeals to knowledge of a Platonic order 
of Forms or Norms; it is above all to refuse any appeal to a supernatural order” 
(Blackburn 1998, pp. 48-49, found in Pollard 2005, p. 70). 
 
It could be argued that we should embrace Davidson's theory because it promises a 
naturalistic understanding of the relation between reasons and actions, by claiming 
that reasons cause actions; and therefore acknowledging both reasons' and actions' 
place in nature (Davidson (1971, p. 44) takes actions to be a subclass of events: 
“there is a fairly definite subclass of events which are actions” – and I have no 
qualms with this claim of his).  
 
I take naturalism to be a strong consideration in favour of Davidson's view; but an 
argument in support of Davidson's causal thesis from naturalism wholly relies, just 
as with the 'inference to the best explanation', on the premise that Davidson's thesis 
alone promises to give a naturalistic understanding of the relationship between 
reasons and causes. Indeed, this is just like Davidson's admission that “...failing a 
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satisfactory alternative, the best argument for a scheme like Aristotle's [a causal 
account] is that it alone promises to give an account for the 'mysterious connection' 
between reasons and actions” (Davidson 1963, p. 11). Had Davidson written Actions, 
Reasons, and Causes twenty years later, he might have even said that his thesis 
'alone promises to give a naturalistic account of the mysterious connection between 
reasons and actions'.  
 
But it's just not true that Davidson's is the only kind of naturalism. McDowell, in 
Mind and World, has suggested an alternative naturalism, one developed around “the 
notion of second nature” (McDowell 1996, p. 84): a person's character acquired 
through upbringing. McDowell calls the process of acquiring and developing a 
second nature Bildung. It involves “initiation to conceptual capacities” and 
“responsiveness to rational demands”. The general idea is that the characteristics of 
human rationality and reason (what Sellars (1956) calls the space of reasons) are at 
once natural and familiar.  
 
This should defuse the fear of supernaturalism. Second nature could 
not float free of potentialities that belong to a normal human 
organism. This gives human reason enough of a foothold in the 
realm of law to satisfy any proper respect for modern natural science 
(McDowell 1996, p. 84). 
 
Here I am not going to discuss nor defend McDowell's version of naturalism. My 
point is simply that, since Davidson’s is not the only version of naturalism, one of the 
premises of the argument from naturalism in support of Davidson's causal thesis is 
false: namely it is not true that Davidson’s is the only available version of naturalism. 
Therefore rejecting Davidson’s causal account does not amount to a rejection of 
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naturalism.  
 
4. Arguments against the attribution 
I have so far argued that there is no evidence for attributing the required unconscious 
beliefs in every case; and that unity and naturalism aren't good enough reasons 
either. In this section I show that there are also arguments against always attributing 
unconscious beliefs: namely, that it is always possible to attribute such unconscious 
beliefs; and that therefore these unconscious beliefs lack the distinctiveness required 
by explanation. 
 
This point has already been made by McDowell (1978) for what he calls 
consequentially ascribed desires: 
 
But the commitment to ascribe such a desire is simply consequential 
on our taking him to act as he does for the reason we cite; the desire 
does not function as an independent extra component in a full 
specification of his reason, hitherto omitted by an understandable 
ellipsis of the obvious, but strictly necessary in order to show how it is 
that the reason can motivate him... Of course a desire ascribed in this 
purely consequential way is not independently intelligible (McDowell 




In our case, then, the attribution of the unconscious belief would be simply a 
consequence of our taking the agent to have acted for some reason x. The ground for 
the attribution just being – in the absence of any phenomenological evidence and 
considering self-attributions not to be good enough evidence – the description under 
which we take the agent to have acted. So that, if in McDowell's case we take the 
                                                 
10
 Page numbers for McDowell 1978 refer to his 1998 collection, Mind, Value, and Reality.  
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agent to have turned left because she wanted to stop at the supermarket, we 
consequentially ascribe the desire to go to the supermarket. And in our case, if we 
take the agent to have flipped the switch to turn off the light, we consequentially 
ascribe the unconscious belief that flipping the switch has the property of turning off 
the light.  
 
The problem with this, as McDowell points out, is that the unconscious belief 
logically depends on what it is meant to explain, namely the action description; and 
therefore, in McDowell's words, the unconscious belief “is not independently 
intelligible” (ibid). But then the unconscious belief cannot do its job of explaining 
the agent’s behaviour under the relevant description, namely 'flipping the switch'. 
Because then the explanans – the unconscious belief – would logically depend on the 
explanandum. 
 
My point is, however, slightly different from McDowell's: the unconscious belief 
does complete the statement of the agent's reason, differently from McDowell's 
consequentially attributed desires. But this does not change its consequential nature: 
it is attributed on the sole basis of the action description that we want to explain; and 
therefore it depends on that action description, rather than the other way around, 
which would have been the proper direction of explanation (Pollard (2006, p. 9) 
makes a similar point). 
  
The consequential attribution of unconscious mental states raises another worry for 
the explanatory power of these unconscious beliefs that Davidson’s thesis needs: that 
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they leave no room for actions that cannot be rationalized, because it is always 
possible to rationalize any action by attributing the relevant unconscious belief. In 
short, unconscious beliefs explain too much because they can rationalize any action, 
even unintentional (or non-rationalized) ones. But if unconscious beliefs cannot 
distinguish between rationalizable and non-rationalizable (intentional and 
unintentional) actions, then they cannot offer a distinctive account of intentional 
(rationalizable) action. 
 
It is like the case, already discussed in Section 3.1, in which I forget to put salt in the 
meal I was cooking for my friends. It is always open to me as to others, to attribute 
unconscious mental states that will rationalize what I have done. I have 
unintentionally left the salt out of the meal. But my leaving the salt out can be easily 
made into an intentional action of mine by the attribution of an unconscious primary 
reason: say, again, a pro attitude towards my friends’ health, and a belief that leaving 
salt out is good for my friends' health.  
 
My point is not that unconscious beliefs are always attributed consequentially; it is 
only that unconscious beliefs can always be attributed consequentially. They can be 
consequentially attributed even when they are not attributed at all, and when they are 
attributed on other grounds. So I am not denying that there can be other grounds for 
the attribution of unconscious beliefs to the agent, even in automatic cases. I am only 
pointing out that consequential attribution is always possible. And the fact that it is 
possible in every case represents a problem for the explanatory power of those 
unconscious beliefs: the problem being that those unconscious beliefs, when they are 
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consequentially attributed, depend on what they are supposed to explain, the action 
description. And even when they are not attributed consequentially, since they can 
always be consequentially attributed, unconscious beliefs are unable to distinguish 
between rationalizable/intentional actions and non-rationalizable/unintentional 
actions.  
 
What we would need, in order for that distinction to be made, are cases in which 
unconscious beliefs can’t be attributed; cases in which it is not possible to attribute 
the relevant unconscious belief consequentially. So an account of intentional action 
that depends upon unconscious beliefs does not offer a distinctive account of 
intentional action.  
 
My argument here is not against unconscious beliefs in general: it only applies to the 
particular unconscious beliefs required by Davidson. Those that, in Stoutland’s 
(1985) words, must “yield” the action description. Also, here I do not pretend to 
have found a conclusive argument against Davidson’s employment of unconscious 
beliefs in automatic cases. Had I found that, all my previous arguments would be 
unnecessary. All I wanted to point out was that unconscious beliefs present a 
problem: and that in order for them to be utilized in a distinctive account of 
intentional action, one needs to show that there are cases in which those unconscious 
beliefs cannot be attributed consequentially. And, importantly, I have shown that this 
task is different from simply showing that there are other grounds for the attribution: 
because even when the relevant unconscious belief is attributed on different grounds, 
it can  be (or could have been) consequentially attributed.  
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One then starts to worry that unconscious beliefs must be always attributed, even in 
cases when the attribution is not warranted, simply because the theory needs them. 
This worry has already been expressed by Dennett (1991) and Pollard (2006). The 
latter makes the point more explicitly: 
 
Davidson's putative states of believing... look like the posits of 
somebody in the grip of a theory, rather than an independent datum 
being innocently incorporated into a theory whose correctness is still 
up for grabs (Pollard 2006, p. 9). 
 
The problem is simple: we assume the correctness of a theory, Davidson's, and we 
use unconscious beliefs to make the exceptions, automatic actions, fit the theory. If 
one assumes the validity of one's framework, it is understandable that one tries to 
make anomalies fit that framework. But, apart from pragmatic considerations, it is 
obviously unacceptable to do that if one's only argument is one's belief in the 
correctness of the framework; because that’s the very belief that the anomaly 
challenges. Otherwise we would never have had a Copernican revolution.  
 
Dennett too thinks that we must be careful in not over-applying one model of action 
explanation: 
 
Although we are occasionally conscious of performing elaborate 
practical reasoning, leading to a conclusion about what, all things 
considered, we ought to do, followed by a conscious decision to do 
that very thing, and culminating finally in actually doing it, these are 
relatively rare experiences. Most of our intentional actions are 
performed without any such preamble, and a good thing, too, because 
there wouldn’t be time. The standard trap is to suppose that the 
relatively rare cases of conscious practical reasoning are a good model 
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for the rest, the cases in which our intentional actions emerge from 
processes into which we have no access (Dennett 1991, p. 252). 
 
This warning can be easily applied to automatic actions: we mustn't apply a model 
developed around relatively rare cases, non-automatic deliberated actions, to cases 
where it looks as though there are no preceding mental states.  
 
5. A Davidsonian reply 
So in this chapter I have shown that there is no evidence for thinking that in every 
automatic case agents have the unconscious mental states required by Davidson's 
view. And I have shown that considerations from the unity of agency, and from 
naturalism, don't support the attribution of those unconscious mental states either. 
Finally, I have argued that those unconscious mental states are not explanatory, 
because they depend on the action descriptions they are supposed to explain, rather 
than the other way around; and further because they can always be attributed in order 
to rationalize the agent's behaviour, even in unintentional cases. 
 
Now I want to consider a potential reply to my objections that is still open to 
supporters of Davidson: they could argue that automatic action descriptions might 
not be intentional under their automatic descriptions, but that they will still be 
intentional under other descriptions. Gorr and Horgan (1980, p. 259), for example, 
say that it is their intuition that subsidiary performances such as those involved in 
driving are not intentional under their narrow descriptions, say ‘accelerating’, but 
only under broader descriptions, say ‘driving’ (more on this in Chapter 4, footnote 
11).  
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Take the following case: I automatically flip the switch. My 'flipping the switch' is 
rationalized by a pro attitude towards 'reducing my carbon footprint', and an 
unconscious belief that my action, under description 'flipping the switch', has the 
property of 'reducing my carbon footprint'. Suppose that the supporter of Davidson's 
thesis conceded to me that, as I have argued in this chapter, we don't have evidence 
for thinking that the required unconscious belief will be present in every automatic 
case. Davidson's supporter could then just say that my action might not be intentional 
under its automatic description, in this case 'flipping the switch'; but that's not too 
bad, as long as we can say that it is intentional under other descriptions: for example, 
'reducing my carbon footprint'.  
 
So, in general, it is open to a supporter of Davidson to reply that automatic actions 
will always be intentional under some other description; and that it is therefore not 
much to concede that Davidson's thesis can't account for their being intentional 
under automatic descriptions. Davidson's supporter would, in short, bite the bullet – 
and maybe say that it is only few cases that Davidson's theory can't account for. 
 
But this would be a substantial concession: firstly, because, on Davidson's account, 
unintentional actions too are intentional under some (other) description. So to say 
that automatic actions are intentional under other descriptions doesn’t say much in 
terms of intentionality, given that it leaves open the possibility of automatic actions 
being unintentional under their automatic description; and so it doesn’t even say that 
they are intentional rather than unintentional. It says, at best, that they are actions 
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rather than mere movements, because they are intentional under at least one 
description. But what I have been concerned with throughout is not just that when 
we do something automatically we are acting; but that when we do something 
automatically we, normally, act intentionally. When I automatically flip a switch I 
don’t just act; I act intentionally: I intentionally flip the switch.  
 
Secondly, and more importantly, because it is this thesis's driving intuition that 
automatic actions are intentional: which means intentional under their automatic 
description; because the other descriptions under which the supporter of Davidson 
might say that automatic actions are intentional might not even be automatic 
descriptions. Take flipping the switch: one might be able to rationalize it under 
‘saving the planet from global warming’ (and that might not be automatic because 
my political stance might be the result of much deliberation), and argue that as long 
as Davidson can show that ‘saving the planet from global warming’ is an intentional 
action, it doesn’t matter that Davidson cannot show that ‘flipping the switch’ is an 
intentional action. But that’s not good enough: the intuition, as the surveys also 
confirm (see Appendix), is overwhelmingly that ‘flipping the switch’ is an 
intentional action too.   
 
So if the supporter of Davidson concedes that Davidson’s thesis cannot account for 
automatic actions as being intentional under their automatic descriptions, then they 
have conceded that Davidson’s thesis cannot account for the intuition with which 
this thesis is concerned. So by proposing what initially appears to be a draw 
Davidson's supporter would really be conceding defeat.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that Davidson’s account of intentional action, according 
to which an action is intentional only if it is rationalized by a primary reason – 
composed of a pro attitude plus a belief – which is its cause, does not always work in 
the case of automatic actions. It doesn’t work, I have argued, because there is no 
evidence for thinking that in all automatic cases the agent has the required 
unconscious belief. Since the belief must be unconscious, the evidence can’t come 
from phenomenology; but I have also shown that we cannot accept the agent’s own 
self-attributions as evidence; and that even if we did, not all self-attributions support 
Davidson’s thesis. And that even if we only accepted those self-attributions that do 
appear to support Davidson’s thesis, we find that actually they only support 
something much broader than Davidson’s thesis, because the agent’s self-attributions 
don’t support the two most distinctive claims of Davidson’s thesis: that reasons are 
mental states, and that mental states cause action.  
 
I have also shown that there is a crucial argument against the attribution of 
unconscious mental states: that such attribution is only consequential on the action 
that the mental state is supposed to explain, and that therefore the explanans is not 
independently intelligible from the explanandum. A troublesome consequence of this 
is, for Davidson, that unconscious mental states can’t distinguish between intentional 
and unintentional actions, because they can be consequentially attributed in every 
case. 
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In the next chapter I show that the two most-influential non-reductive views of 
intentional action in the literature, the Simple View and Bratman’s Single 
Phenomenon View, can’t be used to defend the intuition that automatic actions are 








Chapter 4: Bratman and the Simple View 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed the most influential reductive account of 
intentional action: that of Davidson.
1
 In this chapter I turn to the two most influential 
non-reductive accounts of intentional action: the so-called Simple View and 
Bratman’s Single Phenomenon View. I show that neither view can be used to defend 
the intuition that automatic actions are intentional.  
 
1. The Simple View 
According to the Simple View (SV), as formulated by Bratman (1987
2
), 
E φ-s intentionally only if E intended to φ.  
 
For me intentionally to A I must intend to A; my mental states at the 
time of action must be such that A is among those things I intend. I will 
call this the Simple View (Bratman 1987, p. 112). 
 
So, if automatically flipping the switch is to be an intentional action of mine, then I 
must have intended to flip the switch.
3
 The SV is intuitive, and it provides the 
                                                           
1
 Davidson changed his position on reductionism about intentions: while when he wrote Actions, 
Reasons, and Causes (1963) he was a reductionist about intentions, by 1978, when Intending was 
published, Davidson was no longer a reductionist. Mele and Moser (1994) divide the field between 
reductionists and non-reductionists about intention in the following way (putting themselves among 
the non-reductionists). Reductionists: Audi (1973), Beardsley (1978), Davis (1984). Non-
reductionists: Harman (1976), Searle (1983), Brand (1984), McCann (1986), Bratman (1987). 
2
 A formulation of the SV first appeared in Bratman 1984, from which Bratman derived chapter 8 of 
his 1987’s book Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.  
3
 Supporters of the SV include Searle (1983), Adams (1986), McCann (1986, 1991, and 1998), Garcia 
(1990), and Nadelhoffer (2006). 
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simplest and most economical explanation of intentional action: why was E’s φ-ing 




On the other hand, the SV’s denial of the intentional character of non-intended 
actions has always been seen as a consideration against the view: 
 
It is thoroughly misleading that the word ‘intentional’ should be 
connected with the word ‘intention’, for an action can be intentional 
without having any intention in it (Anscombe 1957, §1). 
 
This sort of scepticism towards the SV is motivated by scenarios of the following 
kind: suppose I turn the radio on with the intention to listen to the news. I know that 
by turning on the radio I will definitely wake up my flatmate, but I don’t intend to 
wake up my flatmate – all I intend to do is listen to the news. Sure enough, the radio 
wakes my flatmate up. It doesn’t seem right to say that I haven’t intentionally woken 
my flatmate because I didn’t intend to wake her. Indeed, I intentionally woke her up 
even though I did not intend to wake her up – that seems to be the most appropriate 
way of describing what happened. 
 
                                                           
4
 For what concerns the intuitiveness of the SV, Knobe (2003, 2005, forthcoming) has recently 
surveyed people’s intuitions on the relationship between intention and intentional action, finding that 
people are more likely to ascribe intentionality for non-intended deeds that are obviously morally 
reprehensible than for those that aren’t: “they seem considerably more willing to say that a side-effect 
was brought about intentionally when they regard that side-effect as bad than when they regard it as 
good” (Knobe 2003, p. 193). This appears to show, then, that people’s intuitions on the SV largely 
depend on their moral intuitions. Generally, though, the fact that people are at all willing to ascribe 
intentionality for non-intended deeds appears to suggest that the layman does not have a particular 
intuitive commitment to the SV (see also Nadelhoffer 2006). For more information on so-called 
‘experimental philosophy’ – surveys of intuition such as Knobe’s, and the ones I present in the 
Appendix - see their blog http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com: a good source of material on 
recent developments). 
BRATMAN AND THE SIMPLE VIEW 
 133 
Bratman too thinks that a view of intentional action needs to be able to account for 
bringing about intentionally unintended consequences such as waking up my 
flatmate. Indeed, Bratman’s Single Phenomenon View, which I discuss in Section 2, 
can deliver on that point, differently from the SV.  
 
Automatic actions appear to be another consideration against the SV. Even 
supporters of the SV such as Searle (1983) admit that there are performances which 
do not require the agent to intend them, such as ‘spontaneous’ actions – “actions one 
performs… quite spontaneously, without forming, consciously or unconsciously, any 
prior intention to do those things” (ibid, p. 84, emphasis mine) - and ‘subsidiary’ 
actions – “even in cases where I have a prior intention to do some action there will 
normally be a whole lot of subsidiary actions which are not represented in the prior 
intention but which are nonetheless performed intentionally” (ibid, emphasis mine):  
 
… suppose I am sitting in a chair reflecting on a philosophical 
problem, and I suddenly get up and start pacing about the room. My 
getting up and pacing about are clearly intentional actions, but in 
order to do them I do not need to form an intention to do them prior 
to doing them… suppose I have a prior intention to drive to my 
office, and suppose as I am carrying out this prior intention I shift 
from second gear to third gear. Now I formed no prior intention to 
shift from second to third. When I formed my intention to drive to 
the office I never gave it a thought. Yet my action of shifting gears 
was intentional (Searle 1983, pp. 84-85). 
 
The reader will recall that I have used the same kinds of examples as Searle’s when 
defining automatic actions in Chapter 1. Bratman himself says something very 
similar about spontaneous automatic actions: 
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Suppose you unexpectedly throw a ball to me and I spontaneously 
reach up and catch it. On the one hand, it may seem that I catch it 
intentionally; after all, my behaviour is under my control and is not 
mere reflex behaviour, as when I blink at the oncoming ball. On the 
other hand, it may seem that, given how automatic and unreflective 
my action is, I may well not have any present-directed intention that 
I am executing in catching the ball (Bratman 1987, p. 126). 
 
Both Searle and Bratman suggest that talking of intentions and intending 
misrepresents the automatic character of the activities in question; but they come up 
with different solutions. Searle ends up offering another version of the SV: he 
distinguishes between prior intentions and intentions in action, claiming that 
spontaneous and subsidiary actions do not require prior intentions. Every intentional 
action, though, including spontaneous and subsidiary actions, requires an intention in 
action.
5
 Bratman offers the Single Phenomenon View (SPV), which I present in 
Section 2. 
 
Notwithstanding the above worries, if the SV were to be applied to automatic 
actions, one would have to suppose, just as with Davidson, that one’s intention to flip 
the switch, when one automatically flips the switch, is an unconscious intention. Just 
like we discussed in Chapter 3, if the agent was aware of her intention to flip the 
switch, then she would be aware of her action under the description ‘flipping the 
switch’, and therefore her action, given the lack of attention and awareness condition 
on automatic action, could not be automatic under that description. Presumably, then, 
my arguments against the attribution of unconscious mental events from Chapter 3 
                                                           
5
 I do not discuss Searle at length in this thesis because, as I said, I consider Searle’s view (1983) a 
version of the Simple View. But there is one peculiarity of Searle’s view that deserves mention: on 
Searle every intentional action requires, as we said, an intention in action. But Searle’s ‘intentions in 
action’ do not cause action, as do intentions for authors such as Bratman. Rather, ‘intentions in action’ 
are part of the action: they constitute, together with movement, action. So while it is fair to say, 
according to Searle (1983, Chapter 3), that intention in action causes movement, it is not the case that 
intention in action causes action.  
BRATMAN AND THE SIMPLE VIEW 
 135 
would apply to the unconscious intentions of the SV too. But here I don’t need to use 
those arguments because I accept Bratman’s argument against the SV, to the 
discussion of which I now turn.  
 
1.1 The Simple View refuted 
According to Bratman, “the Simple View is false” (ibid, p. 115). His refutation rests 
on the famous videogame counterexample.
6
 Bratman supposes that a player is 
playing identical twin videogames at the same time. The scope of the game is to hit a 
target on either videogame. The two videogames are connected in such a way that 
when a target is hit on either one, both videogames finish. Also, they are designed so 
that it is impossible to hit targets on both videogames simultaneously: “If I hit one of 
the targets, both games are over. If both targets are about to be hit simultaneously, 
the machines just shut down and I hit neither target… I know that although I can hit 
each target, I cannot hit both targets” (Bratman 1987, p. 114). 
 
Bratman supposes that, given that the player will win by hitting a target on either 
videogame, and given the player’s skills, the most effective way to win the game is 
trying at the same time to hit a target on each videogame; so the player decides to do 
that. The increased possibility of hitting a target on one of the videogames that comes 
from having a go at both rationally overwhelms the risk of shutting down the game. 
Now suppose the player hits a target on videogame 1. 
 
It seems, again, that I hit target 1 intentionally. So, on the Simple 
View, I must intend to hit target 1. Given the symmetry of the case, 
                                                           
6
 A version of the counterexample, this time with doors instead of videogames, also appears in Ginet 
1990. 
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I must also intend to hit target 2. But given the knowledge that I 
cannot hit both targets, these two intentions fail to be strongly 
consistent. Having them would involve me in a criticizable form of 
irrationality. Yet it seems clear that I need be guilty of no such form 
of irrationality: the strategy of giving each game a try seems 
perfectly reasonable. If I am guilty of no such irrationality, I do not 
have both of these intentions. Since my relevant intention in favor 
of hitting target 1 is the same as that in favor of hitting target 2, I 
have neither intention. So the Simple View is false (Bratman 1987, 
pp. 14-15). 
 
The idea is that the player hits target1 (t1) intentionally, but that the player did not 
intend to hit t1. Because, given the symmetry between the two cases, if the player had 
intended to hit t1, she would have also intended to hit t2. But if the player had 
intended to hit both t1 and t2, then her intentions would have been inconsistent, given 
that the player knows (and therefore believes) that she cannot hit both targets. This 
latter point rests on so-called rational constraints (or belief requirements) on 
intention.  
 
According to Bratman’s rational constraints on intention, an agent can intend to φ 
only if the agent does not believe that she will not φ. This is the difference between 
intentions and desires. While it is perfectly rational to desire to φ even if one believes 
that one will not φ, it is irrational, according to Bratman, to intend to φ if one 
believes that one will not φ. For example, it is irrational for Ezio to intend to play in 
the World Cup if Ezio believes – as he should, given his lack of talent - that he will 
not play in the World Cup. On the other hand it is perfectly rational for Ezio to desire 
to play in the World Cup even though Ezio believes that he will not play in the World 
Cup. Indeed, according to Bratman, if an agent believes that she will not φ, then her 
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So if the player intended to hit both targets, she would be guilty of irrationality on 
grounds of intention-belief inconsistency, because she knows (and therefore 
believes) that she cannot hit both targets. But the player is guilty of no such 
irrationality, so the player does not intend to hit both targets
8
; from which, given the 
symmetry, it follows that the player does not intend to hit t1; therefore the player 




It might be objected that Bratman's counterexample might indeed show that the SV - 
understood as a necessary condition on intentionality - is false; but that this doesn't 
necessarily mean that the SV can't be used to argue that automatic actions are 
intentional. Indeed, if all the Bratman-type counterexamples (and indeed any other 
potential counterexamples) against the SV that one could develop were cases of non-
automatic action, then it might still be that the SV would work for all automatic 
actions.  
 
                                                           
7
 In the literature there is, famously, a stronger version of rational constraints (defended by Grice 
(1971) and Harman (1976, 1986)), against which Bratman argues (Bratman 1987, p. 38). According to 
those stronger constraints an agent can intend to φ only if she believes that she will φ. But we needn’t 
worry about those stronger constraints, because Bratman’s argument only needs his weaker 
constraints.  
8
 This point can also be put without any reference to rationality: the player, given her beliefs, cannot 
intend to hit both targets; she can only desire to hit both targets. So the player does not intend to hit 
both targets.  
9
 Peter Milne has pointed out to me the difference between claiming that the player’s intention to ‘hit 
both targets’ is inconsistent with the player’s belief that she cannot hit both targets, and claiming that 
the player’s intention to hit t1 and the player’s intention to hit t1 are inconsistent with the player’s 
belief that she cannot hit both targets. The latter claim is false. What is true, though, is that the 
player’s intention to hit t1 is, given the player’s belief that she cannot hit both targets, inconsistent 
with the player’s intention to hit t2. So Bratman’s argument still goes through.  
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But there is no reason to suppose that counterexamples against the SV depend on 
using non-automatic actions. Indeed, even if the scenario used by Bratman was a 
non-automatic action, it doesn't look like the scenario would work against the SV 
only because the action is not automatic. To show this, it will suffice to suppose that 
'hitting t1' is an automatic action; and there is nothing that prevents us from 
supposing that. It might be that the player is so skilled, or that she is so concentrated, 
that she doesn't pay attention, or need to pay attention, to which target she is firing at: 
and that therefore she hits t1 without realizing that she hit t1. The nature of the 
scenario actually makes that quite likely, since the player is firing at both targets at 
the same time. 
 
So there is no reason to think that Bratman's counterexample works only for non-
automatic cases. 
 
1.2 Trying to rescue the Simple View 
In this section I discuss five objections to Bratman’s argument against the SV, 
showing that none works: 
 
1. giving up on rational constraints on intention 
2. overbooking 
3. conditional intentions 
4. redescribing the action 
5. time-specific intentions 
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1.2.1 Rational constraints 
The first objection to Bratman’s counterexample consists simply in giving up on 
rational constraints on intention. Because, as we have seen, Bratman’s argument 
relies on the particular version of rational constraints according to which E can 
intend to A only if E does not believe that she will not A. McCann (1986, 1991), for 
example, thinks that “unfortunately, all [rational constraints] are false” (1991, p. 
205). So not only are Bratman’s weak constraints false, but so too are Grice’s strong 
ones. 
 
There are a number of examples in which it is rational for agents to 
try to achieve goals that they believe they will not accomplish, and 
some of the examples involve mutually incompatible objectives. 
Moreover… when, unexpectedly, such attempts succeed, the sought-




I find this approach very implausible, because one ends up having to claim, as 
McCann does above, that achievements that are due to luck will be intentional 
achievements of the agent. So that I intentionally holed in one just because I tried, 
even though before end I would have acknowledged that I believed that I was not 
going to hole-in-one (I would have put it quite strongly: “Don’t be silly: it’s 
practically impossible to hole in one from here”). Or that I intentionally won the 
lottery just because I tried to win the lottery by buying a ticket. I think that to claim 
that those performances are intentional flies in the face of intuition.  
 
But here I will not engage with McCann’s objection because, by McCann’s own 
admission, giving up on rational constraints means giving up on what makes 
                                                           
10
 Adams (1986) objects to Bratman’s counterexample on these grounds too.  
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intentions irreducible to desires: “such constraints are of interest partly for their 
antireductionist implications, since other motivational states, in particular states of 
desire, are not similarly encumbered” (ibid, p. 204). But then one’s account of 
intentional action will be a reductive one, like Davidson’s; and I have already argued 
against such accounts in Chapter 3. So I am happy to accept that Bratman’s 
counterexample only applies to non-reductive accounts of intentional action which 
accept, at least, weak constraints on intention.  
 
1.2.2 Overbooking  
Sverdlik (1996) argues that it is sometimes rational to hold inconsistent intentions (as 
in, two or more intentions that are inconsistent with each other, or an intention that is 
inconsistent with one’s beliefs). He does so by giving the example of overbooking. 
 
An airline might rationally overbook a flight, knowing that some 
passengers will not show up... A rational agent, in such a situation, 
having certain desires that she wants fulfilled, may rationally form 
intentions which are such that she believes that they will not and 
cannot all be fulfilled. Nonetheless she is rational in that her having 
this set of intentions may be her best strategy for getting what she 
wants. I will call this strategy the overbooking strategy (ibid, pp. 
517-518).   
 
Suppose an airline overbooks a plane with 120 seats by selling 125 tickets. Given 
their statistics on the number of passengers that usually show up, we may suppose 
that this is the most rational way for the airline to pursue their goal of filling the 
plane. In this scenario the airline, according to Sverdlik, cannot be deemed irrational 
despite holding intentions that are inconsistent with each other, namely the intention 
to board each passenger despite knowing that only 120 passengers can be boarded.  
BRATMAN AND THE SIMPLE VIEW 
 141 
 
Before showing what I think is wrong with Sverdlik’s objection, I must report that 
Bratman, in the original statement of his argument, had anticipated an objection on 
the lines of Sverdlik’s; although without dealing, specifically, with the case of 
overbooking that Sverdlik comes up with. Bratman replies to a potential objection 
according to which the general rational presumption against inconsistency would be 
overridden by the case in question, because the agent might have strong pragmatic 
reasons for intending to hit each target, given that such is the best way to pursue her 
goal of winning the game: “My response is to reject the contention that I must intend 
to hit each target in order best to pursue the reward. What I need to do is to try to hit 
each target. Perhaps I must intend something – to shoot at each target, for example. 
But it seems that I can best pursue the reward without intending flat out to hit each 
target, and so without a failure of strong consistency” (Bratman 1987, p. 117).    
 
I think that Sverdlik’s mistake is to suppose that, in the overbooking scenario, the 
airline intends to board each and every passenger. It is only true that the airline does 
not intend for any passenger to be denied boarding. It doesn’t need to intend that 
because, according to its statistics, some passengers will not show up and therefore 
everybody who shows up will be boarded. But that does not imply that the airline 
intends to board each and every passenger to which it has sold a ticket. It only 
intends to board 120 of them; and so there are five that it does not intend to board. 
Those five cannot and need not be identified in advance. But they are the five that, 
statistically, will not show up. So in the case of overbooking the airline does not 
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actually have inconsistent intentions, because it does not intend to board each and 
every passenger to which it has sold a ticket.  
 
Another way of demonstrating my point is that it would be a mistake to describe the 
airline’s intention as a long conjunction of intending to board p1, p2… p125. There 
is no one in particular that the airline does not intend to board, but that doesn’t mean 
that the airline intends to board each and every passenger. Indeed, the airline’s 
intention should be described as a long exclusive disjunction, composed of all 
possible combinations of 120 passengers.  
 
Indeed, the upshot of this is that Sverdlik has actually provided another 
counterexample against the SV: suppose the airline intentionally boards passenger P. 
If the airline’s intentions can only be described as a long exclusive disjunction 
composed of all possible combinations of 120 passengers, then we cannot ascribe the 
intention to board P to the airline, because the long disjunction does not imply that 
the airline intends to board P, since the disjunction will be true even if the airline 
does not intend to board P.  
 
Sverdlik’s objection, then, can't rescue the SV by arguing that it is sometimes 
rational to hold inconsistent intentions because Sverdlik does not provide a scenario 
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1.2.3 Conditional and disjunctive intentions  
The third objection consists in redescribing the agent’s intentions in such a way that 
they are not inconsistent. Garcia (1990) has proposed to describe the agent’s 
intentions as a conditional intention to hit t1 should she miss t2, and a conditional 
intention to hit t2 should she miss t1. 
 
Bratman is right to think the player cannot rationally have both a 
simple (unconditional) intention to hit target 1 and another simple 
intention to hit target 2… However, denying that she has these 
simple intentions doesn’t require us to deny she has a conditional 
intention to hit target 1 should she miss target 2, along with a similar 
conditional intention to hit target 2 should she miss target 1 (ibid, p. 
204).  
 
But Bratman stresses very clearly that the agent is playing at both games 
simultaneously: it is not as if the player tries to hit a target and then, if that doesn’t 
work, she tries to hit the other one. The player could have chosen that strategy, but 
Bratman, as we have already seen, is very explicit in saying that the player chooses 
to have a go at both targets at the same time. So the agent’s intentions can at best be 
described as an intention to hit t1 but not t2 and an intention to hit t2 but not t1. But 
the conjunction {[A & (¬B)] & [B & (¬A)]} is always false.  
 
An alternative objection, on similar lines, would be to redescribe the agent’s 
intentions as an exclusive disjunction: the player intends to ‘hit t1 or t2’, but not ‘t1 
and t2’: [(A v B) & ¬ (A&B)]. It is not irrational for the player to intend to hit either 
of the targets but not both; in fact, that is just what the player is attempting to do. But 
the disjunctive intention [(t1 v t2) & ¬ (t1 & t2)]  cannot be reduced to the only 
intention that can save the SV, t1, because the disjunctive intention (t1 v t2) is true 
BRATMAN AND THE SIMPLE VIEW 
 144 
even when t1 is false. And therefore the truth of the disjunctive intention does not 
guarantee the truth of the intention required by the SV, t1. So to say that the player 
had the intention (t1 v t2) does not actually say that she intended to hit t1, which is 
what is required by the SV (for the same reasons, as we saw in subsection 1.2.2, 
Sverdlik’s overbooking ends up representing another counterexample against the 
SV).  
 
1.2.4 Redescribing the action  
The fourth objection consists in redescribing the action. One might say that there is 
no need for such a refined description of what the player does as “hitting t1”; and 
that, for example, “hitting one of the targets” might be a good enough description of 
the player’s behaviour. So that if the SV can account for that description of the 
player’s behaviour, then the SV is safe.  
 
The SV, as we have just seen, can account for this alternative description of the 
player’s behaviour: the intention to hit one of the targets, but not both (the 
disjunctive intention (t1 v t2)) is consistent with the player’s beliefs. So the defender 
of the SV can in fact say that the player hits one of the targets intentionally with the 
intention to hit one of the targets.  
 
The problem with this objection is that, for all it says, hitting t1 is still intentional. 
And, again, for all it says, the agent does not intend to hit t1. So, again, hitting t1 is 
intentional even though the agent does not intend to hit t1, but only to hit one of the 
targets. So this objection does not actually challenge Bratman’s counterexample to 
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the SV. This objection only moves on to show that, under different descriptions, the 
SV can still work. But no-one was arguing that the SV never works; only that it is 
false as long as it argues that an intention to A is a necessary condition for A-ing 
being intentional, because there is at least a case, Bratman’s videogame, on which A 
is intentional despite the agent not intending to A. 
 
So what this objection would have to do is to actually deny that the player hits t1 
intentionally. That way this objection would, rather than attacking Bratman’s 
counterexample, deny the intuition upon which the counterexample depends, namely 
that hitting t1 is an intentional action of the agent. It could then be proposed that the 
only thing that the player does intentionally is ‘hitting one of the targets’, while the 




Bratman deals with this objection in his original statement of his counterexample 
against the SV (1987, pp. 117-118). Bratman gives four reasons why it is 
implausible to deny that the player hits t1 intentionally:  
 
First, I want to hit target 1 and so am trying to do so. Second, my 
attempt to hit target 1 is guided specifically by my perception of 
that target, and not by my perception of other targets. Relevant 
adjustments in my behaviour are dependent specifically on my 
perception of that target. Third, I actually hit target 1 in the way I 
was trying, and in a way that depends on my relevant skills. Fourth, 
it is my perception that I have hit target 1, and not merely my 
                                                           
11
 Gorr and Horgan (1980, p. 259 say that their intuition about cases such as the performances 
involved in driving is that those performances are not intentional under the specific descriptions, say 
‘braking’ (in Bratman’s case, ‘hitting target 1’), while they are intentional under broader descriptions, 
say ‘driving’ (in Bratman’s case, ‘hitting one of the targets’). Gorr and Horgan don’t actually argue 
for this, and they even admit that “we recognize that in this case… intuitions may differ concerning 
intentionality. Indeed, our own intuitions are not entirely firm one way or the other” (ibid, p. 259).  
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perception that I have hit a target, that terminates my attempt to hit 
it (ibid, p. 118).  
 
Here Bratman has actually done more than he needed in order to reject the objection 
in question. He has actually shown not only that it is implausible, given the 
considerations above, to deny that the player hits target 1 intentionally; but also that 
to only say that the player intentionally hits one of the targets is not enough, because 
it misses out on the crucial features of the scenario described above.  
 
Stout (2005, pp. 104-105) has denied that the player hits t1 intentionally by denying 
that the player is trying to hit t1 - which, as we have just seen, is one of four reasons 
Bratman offers against denying that the player intentionally hits t1. 
 
[The player] cannot have been trying to hit the left target either (or 
the right one for that matter)... If he were really trying to hit it he 
would not have been going for the right target simultaneously. 
When he succeeded in hitting the left target there was no residual 
sense of failure in not hitting the right target. This is because he 
was not trying to hit the right target (or the left for that matter). 
What he was trying to do was to hit one of the targets. And his 
method was not to do this by trying to hit both. His method was to 
try to hit the left target unless the right one got hit first and to try to 
hit the right target unless the left one got hit first (Stout 2005, p. 
104). 
 
But if you "try to hit the left target unless the right one got hit first" and "try to hit the 
right target unless the left one got hit first" then, at least until either target is hit - and 
therefore, on Bratman's scenario, until the end of the game - you are trying to hit both 
targets. This is because until either target is hit, you are trying to hit the left target, 
because the right one has not been hit. And, until either target is hit, you are also 
trying to hit the right target, because the left one has not been hit. 
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1.2.5 Time-specific intentions  
The last objection is put forward by Adams (1986). He suggests we distinguish 
between the player’s simultaneously intending to ‘hit t1 and t2’, and the player’s 
intending to ‘hit t1 and t2 simultaneously’ (where ‘simultaneously’ is, importantly, 
part of the content of the intention). Only the latter, Adams suggests, is inconsistent. 
The former, if we specify the content of the agent’s intentions so that she “plan[s] to 
hit each target at slightly different times” (Adams 1986, p. 292), is consistent. So we 
would have to attribute to the agent, supposedly, an intention to hit target1 at time1, 
and an intention to hit target2 at time2. And given that the intention to hit target1 at 
time1 implies, supposedly, the intention to hit target1, then if the two new intentions 
are consistent, then the agent intentionally hits target1 with the intention to hit 
target1.  
 
The problem is that the agent only needs to hit one target; and that she knows that. 
Indeed, as we have seen, a good way of describing what the agent intends to do is by 
saying that she intends to hit either target but not both, or that she intends to hit one 
of the targets (see Bratman 1987, p. 117). So to intend to hit both, at whatever time, 
is still inconsistent with the agent’s beliefs. Adams might be right in thinking that to 
intend to hit each target at a different time is not inconsistent with the agent’s belief 
that, as Bratman says (p. 114), if the two targets are about to be hit simultaneously, 
the game shuts down. But it is still inconsistent with the agent’s belief that she 
cannot hit both targets.  
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In conclusion, having assessed and rejected five objections to Bratman’s argument 
against the SV, we can conclude with Bratman that the SV is false. So it cannot be 
used to defend the intuition that automatic actions are intentional. 
 
2. Bratman’s Single Phenomenon View 
The view that Bratman proposes in place of the SV is his Single Phenomenon View 
(SPV), according to which “in acting intentionally there is something I intend to do; 
but this need not be what I do intentionally” (Bratman 1987, p. 119).
12
 The SPV 
shares with the SV the idea that intention is a necessary element of intentional action. 
But on the SPV E’s φ-ing can be intentional even if E didn’t intend to φ, as long as E 
had some intention ψ, and E’s φ-ing was in the motivational potential of E’s 
intention to ψ.  
 
We can then formalize the SPV as follows:  
E φ-s intentionally only if E intended to ψ and φ-ing is in the motivational potential 
of ψ. 
 
In order for φ-ing to be in the motivational potential of E’s intention to ψ, E does not 
need to actually intend to φ. E can φ intentionally with only the intention to ψ, as 
long as φ-ing is in the motivational potential of ψ.  
 
                                                           
12
 Both the Simple View and Bratman’s Single Phenomenon View are versions of the ‘Single 
Phenomenon View’, which refers to views that appeal to only one phenomenon, intention (as opposed 
to views, such as Davidson’s, that appeal to both beliefs and pro attitudes). For brevity’s sake, here I 
will refer to Bratman’s version of the Single Phenomenon View as Bratman’s Single Phenomenon 
View, or just SPV.  
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A is in the motivational potential of my intention to B, given my 
desires and beliefs, just in case it is possible for me intentionally to 
A in the course of executing my intention to B. If I actually intend to 
A, then A will be in the motivational potential of my intention. But 
we need not suppose that if A is in the motivational potential of an 
intention of mine, then I intend to A (Bratman 1987, pp. 119-120). 
 
So everything that I intentionally do is in the motivational potential of some intention 
of mine. But in the motivational potential of my intentions there are also courses of 
action I do not actually intend. Some action φ is in the motivational potential of my 
intention to ψ, says Bratman, just in case it is possible for me to intentionally φ “in 




The difference between the SV and the SPV could be crucial for automatic actions, 
for two sorts of reasons. Firstly, because even if one accepted that my arguments 
from Chapter 3 also applied to intentions, the SPV would still not be challenged by 
those arguments; only the SV would be.  
 
My argument in Chapter 3 was that my automatically flipping the switch is 
intentional only if I had a pro-attitude towards, say, turning on the light, and an 
unconscious belief that flipping the switch would turn on the light. But, I have 
argued, there are not always reasons for attributing the relevant unconscious mental 
states to the agent. Similarly, on the SV, my automatically flipping the switch is 
intentional only if I had an unconscious intention to flip the switch. So here one 
                                                           
13
 Mele&Moser (1994) propose, I think, a version of Bratman’s SPV. They talk of plans including 
one’s φ-ing: “A person, S, intentionally performs an action, A, at a time, t, only if at t, S has an action 
plan, P, that includes, or at least can suitably guide, her A-ing” (Mele&Moser 1994, p. 229). If one’s 
φ-ing must be included in one’s plan without appealing to the SV (which they don’t want to do), then 
it looks as though they will need to appeal to something like Bratman’s motivational potential: φ-ing 
would then be part of the agent’s plan without the agent actually intending to φ.  
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could argue, symmetrically with Chapter 3, that there are not always reasons for the 
attribution of such unconscious intentions.  
 
But even if one could successfully manage to argue this latter point – which I will 
not try to do - that would not constitute a challenge to the SPV. This is because on 
the SPV all I need, for my automatically flipping the switch to be intentional, is an 
intention to, say, illuminate the room, or read a book, or whatever. And this intention 
would not even need to be unconscious, because if the agent was aware of her 
behaviour under the description ‘illuminating the room’, that would not imply that 
she was aware of her behaviour under the description in question, ‘flipping the 
switch’ – which could then be automatic. So the SPV appears to be more promising 
than the SV in accounting for the intentional character of automatic action. One note 
of caution: the SPV would have to spell out motivational potential without appealing 
back to mental states such as beliefs, otherwise the arguments from Chapter 3 would 
apply, at least in so far as those beliefs would ‘yield’, in Stoutland’s words, the 
action description in question; but appealing to beliefs, as I’ll show in the next 
section, is exactly the direction that Bratman appears to take.  
 
The fact that the SPV doesn’t require an unconscious intention whose content makes 
reference to the action description is also the second reason why the SPV appears to 
be better suited to automatic actions then the SV. As we have seen in Section 1, even 
supporters of the SV such as Searle admit that, in automatic cases such as 
spontaneous and subsidiary actions, the agent doesn’t need to priorly intend to A for 
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her A-ing to be intentional. It seems implausible that an agent needs an intention to 
flip the switch for each automatic switch-flipping of hers.  
 
But the SPV isn’t as demanding: as long as there is some intention, and such 
intention is suitably connected with the action through motivational potential, then 
the action is intentional. So we don’t need to suppose that every automatic switch-
flipping is preceded by an unconscious intention to flip the switch. We only need, in 
every case, some intention: the intention to read a book, say. And the claim that, 
whenever they automatically A, agents always have some intention seems to be not 
only more economical, but also much less implausible than the claim that they 
always have an unconscious intention to A. 
 
An example will clearly show the difference in the way in which SV and SPV deal 
with automatic actions respectively. Suppose Sarah is driving home from work, as 
she does everyday. This will involve a lot of automatic performances: many gear-
shiftings, many signallings, many looks in the rear-mirror, some fiddling with the 
radio, and so on. All of those activities are intentional, or so goes this thesis’s basic 
intuition. What the SV would have to say, here, is that Sarah’s gear-shifting was 
intentional only if she intended to shift gear; that her signalling was intentional only 
if she intended to signal, and so on. And, as we said, on the supposition that these 
activities are automatic, those intentions would have to be unconscious ones. But the 
SPV can do without all this: it is enough, on the SPV, to suppose that the agent had 
an intention to go home, and that all those automatic activities were part of the 
motivational potential of the agent’s intention to go home.  
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It must be said that Bratman himself admits that the above solution will not apply to 
every kind of action. It might apply, as above, to the subsidiary kind of automatic 
action, like all those activities that constitute the umbrella-action ‘driving’. But 
spontaneous automatic actions such as Searle’s (1983) “suddenly get up and start 
pacing about the room” are importantly different: they don’t appear to be easily 
reducible to any over-arching coordinating intention, the way in which subsidiary 
automatic actions are. So if the SPV might have an advantage over the SV when it 
comes to subsidiary actions, it doesn’t necessarily have the same advantage over the 
SV for spontaneous actions. And Bratman recognises this point: 
 
But matters here are complex, and I am unsure whether such a 
defence can work for all cases. Perhaps there will remain cases of 
spontaneous intentional action that fall outside my version of the 
Single Phenomenon View (Bratman 1987, pp. 126-127). 
 
In what follows I will show that Bratman’s caution is still too optimistic: as it turns 
out, the SPV doesn’t work for any automatic action. 
 
2.1 Motivational potential 
The crucial aspect of the SPV is, then, motivational potential. Bratman’s definition of 
motivational potential must be distinguished from apparently similar definitions: 
Bratman does not say that φ-ing is in the motivational potential of my intention to ψ 
only if I intentionally φ in the course of executing my intention to ψ. Nor does 
Bratman say that φ-ing is in the motivational potential of my intention to ψ only if I 
φ in the course of executing my intention to ψ. Neither does Bratman say that φ-ing 
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is in the motivational potential of my intention to ψ only if it is possible for me to φ 
in the course of executing my intention to ψ. Bratman says, instead, that φ-ing is in 
the motivational potential of my intention to ψ only if it is possible for me to 
intentionally φ in the course of executing my intention to ψ: “it is possible for me 
intentionally to A” (ibid, pp. 119-120 [emphasis mine]).  
 
This gives rise to a quite obvious circularity. If motivational potential is supposed to 
give us an account of the intentionality of φ-ing in the absence of an intention to φ, 
and this account itself relies on φ-ing being intentional, then the account is circular. 
If, in short, the intentionality of φ-ing is the analysandum then the intentionality of 
φ-ing cannot feature as part of the analysans. It must be specified, importantly, that 
the circularity is not in the definition of motivational potential itself, but only in the 
account of intentional action that motivational potential is supposed to provide, 
namely the SPV. So the SPV is circular.  
 
There now seem to be two alternatives for a defender of the SPV: either pretending 
that Bratman hadn’t said “intentionally to A” (ibid, p. 120), and rather work with the 
following definition, which avoids the circularity: φ-ing is in the motivational 
potential of my intention to ψ only if it is possible for me to φ in the course of 
executing my intention to ψ. Alternatively one could grant to the SPV some intuitive 
but distinct understanding of what it is to act intentionally; one that can be used to 
arrive at a proper definition of intentional action. In this latter case, the SPV’s 
definition of intentional action would possibly avoid the circularity, but it would be, 
at best, incomplete, because it would depend on an intuitive conception of intentional 
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action. So I choose to go with the former option, and I shall pretend that Bratman had 




We have seen how potentially useful the SPV is for showing how automatic actions 
are intentional; and it is also very helpful in showing that non-intended consequences 
that are still attributable to the agent, such as my intentionally waking up my flatmate 
with only the intention to listen to the news, are intentional actions.
15
 But it has now 
also emerged how such usefulness depends on the SPV’s account of intentional 
action being quite broad: for some action to be intentional, on the SPV, it suffices 
that it was possible for the agent to perform that action in the course of executing an 
intention of hers. One might think that the account is so inclusive that it doesn’t 
actually explain why some action is intentional.  
 
Adams (1986), for example, made exactly this point, accusing the SPV of failing to 
answer the following two questions: “1) in virtue of what is the action intentional 
under that description?, and 2) why is the action not intentional under other 
descriptions?” (Adams 1986, p. 294). And Bratman himself is the first to concede 
that motivational potential isn’t explanatory. 
                                                           
14
 I will not bother with the question of exegesis as to whether the alternative reading of motivational 
potential that I shall be working with - φ-ing is in the motivational potential of my intention to ψ if it 
is possible for me to φ in the course of executing my intention to ψ - ought to be attributed to Bratman 
too, or whether it should be considered a new view.  
15
 Here I won’t discuss non-intended intentional consequences, but it is worth mentioning that 
Bratman thinks that the SPV, differently from the SV, can give us a fair account of the Principle of 
Double Effect (see Nagel 1986, Foot 1967 and 1985). The idea behind the principle is that some 
things might be permissible if done as a non-intended consequence of some other goal of ours; but 
impermissible if intended. The SPV acknowledges the difference between doing something 
intentionally because one intended it, and doing something intentionally despite not intending it 
(while the SV doesn’t). And therefore the SPV can distinguish between the agent’s involvement in the 
two cases, without giving up on the idea that, in both cases, the agent acted intentionally – differently 
from the SV. Bratman doesn’t deal with the moral side of the question; but it is clear how his SPV 
could be used to drive a moral wedge between the two cases.  
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That my intention includes hitting target 1 in its motivational potential, 
even though it is not an intention to hit target 1, does not itself explain 
why it is true that I hit target 1 intentionally… The notion of 
motivational potential is intended to mark the fact that my intention to B 
may issue in my intentionally A-ing, rather than to explain it. It is a 
theoretical place-holder: it allows us to retain theoretical room for a 
more complex account of the relation between intention and intentional 
action while leaving unsettled the details of such an account. Such an 
account would not itself use the notion of motivational potential but 
would, rather, replace it with detailed specifications of various sufficient 
conditions for intentional conduct (Bratman 1987, p. 120). 
 
The account that will eventually replace motivational potential is what is required to 
support any claim about intentionality of action, and therefore, if it is to help us, also 
my claim about the intentionality of automatic action. Unfortunately, Bratman does 
not provide such an account. This has already been noted by Mele: “Bratman does 
not attempt a fully detailed account of intentional A-ing not produced by an intention 
to A” (Mele 1988, p. 633). 
 
The closest Bratman gets to an actual account of intentional action is an incomplete 
statement: 
 
Generalizing, we can expect a full theory of intentional action to 
generate true statements along the lines of: 
If S intentionally B’s in the course of executing his intention to B, 
and S believes that his B-ing will result in X, and his B-ing does 
result in X and ________, then S intentionally brings about X.  
For present purposes we can leave aside the subtle issue of just how 
the blank should be filled in (Bratman 1987, p. 123). 
  
Bratman’s overall goal in Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason is not to give an 
account of intentional action, but to provide a theory of intention, his planning theory 
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of intention. Therefore an incomplete account of intentional action might have been 
enough for him. Unfortunately for us, this thesis seeks an account of intentional 
action. Theoretical place-holders might do for Bratman; but they will certainly not do 
for me.  
 
There is also another problem with Bratman’s incomplete account above: it deploys a 
belief of the agent: “S believes that his B-ing will result in X” (ibid, p. 123). On this 
incomplete account, then, an action A is intentional only if the agent has some belief 
according to which action A will result from an intended action of the agent. With 
Davidson’s account, some action A could only be intentional if the agent believed 
that A would satisfy a pro attitude of hers. On Davidson’s account, if the agent’s 
belief were conscious, then the agent would be aware of her action under description 
A, and then her action could not be automatic under description A. This will then 
apply to Bratman’s appeal to belief too: if the agent’s belief that A will result from 
an intended action of hers is a conscious belief, then the agent is aware of her action 
under description A, and then her action under description A cannot be automatic. 
So, then, Bratman’s belief too would have to be unconscious, just like with 
Davidson. But then the arguments from Chapter 3 would apply.  
 
So, even having granted Bratman a way out of the SPV’s circularity, we are faced 
with an unpleasant trilemma: either we accept that motivational potential, and 
therefore the SPV as a whole, is just a theoretical place-holder for some view which 
will actually account for, rather than just mark, “the fact that my intention to B may 
issue in my intentionally A-ing” (ibid, p. 120). In that case, the SPV cannot be of any 
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use in defending the intuition that automatic actions are intentional, simply because it 
is not itself an account of intentional action. Alternatively, we could try to fill in 
Bratman’s incomplete statement. But whatever we fill in that account with, it would 
still rely on the agent’s belief. And that belief, in automatic cases, would have to be 
unconscious. And therefore the arguments from Chapter 3 would apply. Finally, we 
could take the SPV at face value; therefore as claiming that its criterion - that it was 
possible for the agent to A in the course of executing some other intention of hers - is 
a good enough account of intentional action
16
. But both Bratman and his critics (we 
have seen Adams and Mele) acknowledge that the SPV, understood as such, doesn’t 
actually explain why action A is intentional.  
 
3. An alternative view 
Could we make something of the SPV nonetheless? After all, it did promise to be 
useful in dealing with automatic actions (and also with unintended consequences). 
We could, for example, propose to understand motivational potential and the SPV in 
terms of Goldman’s (1970) by relations. So that φ-ing is intentional just in case the 
agent intends to ψ by φ-ing: understood broadly such that what comes after ‘by’ 
doesn’t necessarily need to be instrumental to what comes before ‘by’; it could also 
just be a consequence. This would, indeed, be quite similar to Bratman’s ‘it is 
possible to φ in the course of executing an intention to ψ’. The crucial difference 
would have to be that, on such modified account, the sense in which φ-ing is in the 
motivational potential of the intention to ψ would not just be that φ-ing is one of the 
                                                           
16
 I said ‘good enough’ rather than ‘sufficient’ because Bratman, just like Davidson, does not offer 
sufficient conditions for intentional action: if they did, as we have already said, then their accounts of 
intentional action would be subject to the deviant cases objection (more on it in Chapter 5). 
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indefinite number of things that the agent could do in the course of executing her 
intention to ψ.  
 
On this modified account, on the other hand, φ-ing would have to be specified in the 
content of the agent’s intention, without being itself intended by the agent. It could 
for example be proposed that, despite the fact that we don’t intend what we do 
automatically, we nevertheless expect to perform those actions. So that I will not 
have an intention to flip the switch every time that I flip a switch; but only, say, some 
general intention: going to bed, or reading a book. But nevertheless I know that 
things like going to bed or reading a book will involve some switch-flipping. And it 
might be proposed that this is the sense in which switch-flipping is part of the content 
of my intention to go to bed without being itself something that I intend: the 
difference could be spelled out in terms of the kind of attitude that an agent has 
towards switch-flipping as opposed to, say, going to bed: the agent intends to 
perform the latter, but only expects to perform the former. This, in turn, could be 
spelled out in terms of the difference in the attention and thought that the two 
activities require.  
 
It might be objected that this view, even if it can be made to work, won’t be able to 
account for spontaneous actions. This might very well be true, but then Bratman had 
already admitted, as we have already seen (1987, pp. 126-127), that his view 
probably couldn’t account for all spontaneous actions either. Bratman’s view, we 
then found, couldn't actually account for any automatic actions. While this modified 
view might at least account for some.  
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This modified account would then have some explanatory power, as opposed to the 
SPV, because it could answer the two questions set out by Adams (1986): 
1) In virtue of what is the action intentional under that description? Action A is 
intentional under description φ-ing because the agent intended to ‘ψ by φ-ing’ – 
where the by relation is cashed out in terms of the agent’s knowledge and 
expectations over what ψ involves. 
2) Why is the action not intentional under other descriptions? This is best answered 
with an example. Suppose I turn on the light by flipping the switch. This view would 
say that I intentionally flipped the switch because I intended to turn on the light by 
flipping the switch. Now, suppose also that I, unbeknownst to me, alert a prowler 
outside. This view would say that my action was not intentional under the description 
‘alerting the prowler’ because alerting the prowler wasn’t something that I expected 
as a result of turning on the light. 
 
So this modified version of Bratman’s view appears to have some merit. The 
problem is that, as long as it distinctively specifies, as an intention to ‘ψ by φ-ing’ 
does, φ-ing as part of the content of the agent’s intention, this view too will run 
against the counterexample that Bratman devises against the SV. This is because it 
will be irrational for the agent to intend to, say, win the game by hitting t1 and hitting 
t2, given that the agent knows that she cannot win the game by hitting t1 and hitting 
t2.  
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The reason why Bratman’s SPV survived the counterexample was that, by only 
requiring that it was possible for the agent to φ in the course of executing an 
intention to ψ, it did not give rise to an inconsistency. It is perfectly rational, indeed, 
for both hitting t1 and hitting t2 to be in the motivational potential of the player’s 
intention to win the prize; just because all this says is that it is possible for the agent, 
in the course of executing her intention to win the prize, to hit t1; and it is possible 
for her to hit t2. And those two, being mere possibilities, do not give rise to an 
inconsistency. Yes, it is not possible for the agent to both hit t1 and t2; but that does 
not mean that, in the course of executing her intention to win the prize, it is not 
possible for the agent to hit t1; and that it is not possible for the agent to hit t2. 
 
It won’t help to point out that this alternative view is using expectations rather than 
intentions. Because the natural way to understand expectations is in terms of beliefs, 
and then expectations would be subject to rational constraints too. Because it would 
be irrational for the agent to expect to hit t1 and to hit t2, when the agent knows that 
she cannot hit t1 and t2. Here one could propose that automatic actions should not be 
taken to be part of what the agent actually believes to be involved in the execution of 
her intention, but only of what it is reasonable for the agent to believe as to what will 
be involved in the execution of her intention.  
 
This alternative has the advantage of not attributing any belief to the agent – belief 
that might be subject to the arguments from Chapter 3. But unfortunately speaking of 
what would be reasonable for the agent to believe still does not get us around 
Bratman’s counterexample: it would indeed be unreasonable for the agent to believe 
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that she will win the game by hitting t1 and hitting t2, because, again, the agent 
knows that she cannot hit both. This latter claim depends upon the assumption that, 
even though there might be rational beliefs, intentions, or actions that are, 
nevertheless, unreasonable (such as drinking a can of paint if one wants to drink a 
can of paint), irrational intentions, beliefs, or actions will normally be, also, 
unreasonable ones to hold. So, that, prima facie, intending to sunbathe in the 
Meadows is a perfectly reasonable attitude. But intending to sunbathe in the 
Meadows on a rainy-Thursday, when one knows that it is raining, is not only 
irrational, but also unreasonable. I shall not defend this assumption here.  
 
We now see that Bratman, with his counterexample, has refuted the SV, but he has 
also condemned his own SPV because the only way in which the SPV escapes the 
counterexample, as shown above, is by giving up on explaining why φ-ing is 
intentional. Bratman has set the bar so high that even he can’t jump it, at least as long 
as he aspires to deliver an account of intentional action.  
 
The obvious way of lowering the bar is to give up on rational constraints; because it 
is only due to those constraints on intention that the counterexample arises. But the 
problem with this strategy, as we have already seen in Section 1.2.1, is that it lands 
us back with a Davidsonian belief-desire view. If there is no difference, in terms of 
rational constraints, between intentions and other pro attitudes such as desires, then 
our account of intentional action will be no different from a belief-desire model, and 
we have already seen in Chapter 3 what the problem with that sort of account is.  
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One could propose to give up on rational constraints in a different way. Instead of 
giving up on rational constraints on intention altogether, one could distinguish 
between the explicit content of one’s intentions, and the implicit content of one’s 
intentions, such that, in my intention to ‘ψ by φ-ing’, ψ-ing is the explicit content of 
my intention, while φ-ing is the implicit content of my intention. One could then 
propose that rational constraints only apply to explicit content, but not to implicit 
content; so that it would not be irrational for me to intend to ‘win the game by hitting 
t1 and hitting t2’ simply because rational constraints do not apply to whatever comes 
after ‘by’. This solution would have the advantage of accounting for the intuition that 
I do not explicitly intend to perform all the actions, many of those automatic, that are 
instrumental to – or anyhow part of – the satisfaction of my intentions. 
 
The issue with this proposal is, again, how to cash out the implicit content of one’s 
intentions. If we cash it out in terms of expectations then, as we have seen, we run 
into the arguments from Chapter 3. If, on the other hand, we cash it out in terms of 
Bratman’s motivational potential, then we give up, by Bratman’s own admission, on 
explaining why φ-ing is intentional. So even though talking of implicit content goes 
some way towards acknowledging our intuitions, we are still faced with more of the 
same problems: we still haven’t got the account of intentional action we need in 
order to defend the intuition that automatic actions are intentional.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at the two most influential nonreductive accounts of 
intentional action: the Simple View, according to which A-ing is intentional only if 
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the agent intended to A; and Bratman’s Single Phenomenon View, according to 
which A-ing is intentional only if A-ing is in the motivational potential of some 
intention of the agent. I have shown that neither view works: the Simple View is 
refuted by Bratman’s identical twin videogames counterexample; which, I have 
shown, survives five objections to it. Bratman’s Single Phenomenon View, on the 
other hand, faces a trilemma (even ignoring its evident circularity): either it is just a 
theoretical place-holder that stands in place of a view to come, in which case it 
cannot be used to argue for the intentional character of automatic actions. Or we 
could try to fill in the incomplete view that Bratman presents us with; but, given 
Bratman’s appeal to belief, any such attempt at filling in the SPV would run against 
the arguments I have presented in Chapter 3. Finally, we could take the view at face 
value; but in that case, by both Bratman’s and his critics’ admission, the SPV would 
not be explanatory. In the last section I have shown that attempts at modifying 
Bratman’s view fail to provide us with a view which escapes the trilemma. In 
conclusion, then, we are still at a loss for a view of intentional action that can be used 
to defend the intuition that automatic actions are intentional. In the next chapter I will 
develop such a view.  
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Chapter5: Frankfurt and the 'guidance view' 
 
In the previous two chapters I have argued that Davidson’s and Bratman’s causal 
accounts of intentional action, and the Simple View, cannot be used to defend the 
intuition that automatic actions are intentional. In this chapter, developing from 
Frankfurt’s (1978) work on guidance, I will present a way in which the idea that 
automatic actions are intentional can be defended, the 'guidance view': E φ-s 
intentionally iff φ-ing is under E's guidance. Then in the last section, Section 4, I defend 
the ‘guidance view’ from four potential objections.     
 
1. Frankfurt 
In The Problem of Action (1978), Frankfurt famously criticises causal accounts of 
action, and presents a way in which action can be understood non-causally. This is 
through the idea of guidance. Frankfurt’s is an account that does not rely on the 
antecedents of actions, and it therefore does not depend on psychological states - 
intentions (Bratman) or primary reasons (pro attitudes and beliefs - Davidson) – as the 
causes of action, as the causal theory does. On the other hand, it focuses on the 
relationship between an agent and her action at the time of action.  
 
What is not merely pertinent but decisive, indeed, is to consider whether 
or not the movements as they occur are under the person’s guidance. It is 
this that determines whether he is performing an action. Moreover, the 
question of whether or not movements occur under a person’s guidance 
FRANKFURT AND THE ‘GUIDANCE VIEW’ 
   165
is not a matter of their antecedents (Frankfurt 1978, p. 45 – emphasis in 
the original text).  
 
This is why Frankfurt’s view appears prima facie a very good one for arguing for the 
intentional character of automatic actions: because it does not depend on attributing 
psychological states to agents in automatic cases; attributions that, I have argued in 
Chapters 3 and 4, are not always warranted.  
 
Frankfurt initially distinguishes between two kinds of purposive movement: purposive 
movements which are guided by the agent, and purposive movements which are guided 
by some mechanism that cannot be identified with the agent. 
 
When we act, our movements are purposive. This is merely another way 
of saying that their course is guided. Many instances of purposive 
movement are not, of course, instances of action. The dilatation of the 
pupils of a person’s eyes when the light fades, for example, is a 
purposive movement; there are mechanisms which guide its course. But 
the occurrence of this movement does not mark the performance of an 
action by the person; his pupils dilate, but he does not dilate them. This 
is because the course of the movement is not under his guidance. The 
guidance in this case is attributable only to the operation of some 
mechanism with which he cannot be identified (Frankfurt 1978, p. 46). 
 
So not all purposive movement is action because, even though all purposive movement 
is guided, not all purposive movement is under the agent’s guidance. For cases of 
purposive movement that are guided by the agent, Frankfurt proposes to employ the 
term ‘intentional’. “We may say, then, that action is intentional movement” (Frankfurt 
1978, p. 46).  
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Through the idea of purposive movement, Frankfurt gives us an insight into what the 
agent’s guidance is: 
 
Behaviour is purposive when its course is subject to adjustments which 
compensate for the effects of forces which would otherwise interfere 
with the course of the behaviour, and when the occurrence of these 
adjustments is not explainable by what explains the state of affairs that 
elicits them. The behaviour is in that case under the guidance of an 
independent causal mechanism, whose readiness to bring about 
compensatory adjustments tends to ensure that the behaviour is 
accomplished. The activity of such a mechanism is normally not, of 
course, guided by us. Rather it is, when we are performing an action, our 
guidance of our behaviour (Frankfurt 1978, pp. 47-48). 
 
For some movement to be under the agent’s guidance, then, the adjustments and 
compensatory interventions don’t need to be actualized; it is just a question of the agent 
being able to make those adjustments and interventions: “whose readiness to bring about 
compensatory adjustments tends to ensure that the behaviour is accomplished” (ibid.).  
 
This latter point finds confirmation in Frankfurt’s famous car scenario, where he stresses 
that guidance does not require those adjustments and interventions to take place; it only 
requires that the agent be able to make those: 
 
A driver whose automobile is coasting downhill in virtue of gravitational 
forces alone might be satisfied with its speed and direction, and so he 
might never intervene to adjust its movement in any way. This would not 
show that the movement of the automobile did not occur under his 
guidance. What counts is that he was prepared to intervene if necessary, 
and that he was in a position to do so more or less effectively. Similarly, 
the causal mechanisms which stand ready to affect the course of a bodily 
movement may never have occasion to do so; for no negative feedback 
of the sort that would trigger their compensatory activity might occur. 
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The behaviour is purposive not because it results from causes of a certain 
kind, but because it would be affected by certain causes if the 
accomplishment of its course were to be jeopardized (Frankfurt 1978, p. 
48). 
 
So Frankfurt’s view does not depend upon those adjustments and interventions in the 
same way in which the causal view depends upon psychological states. As Frankfurt 
explicitly says, those adjustments and interventions might never actually have any causal 
effect upon some movement, but that does not mean that the movement is not under the 
agent’s guidance; and therefore it does not mean that the movement is not an action. On 
the other hand, as we have seen extensively in the previous two chapters, it is a 
necessary condition on the causal view that some movement be caused by particular 
psychological states, in order for it to be an action.  
 
We have so far individuated two major differences between the causal view (in 
Davidson’s and Bratman’s versions) and Frankfurt’s view. Frankfurt’s view does not 
depend upon the antecedents of action, as the causal view does: it depends upon the 
relationship between an agent and her action at the time of action - while she is 
performing it. Also, Frankfurt’s view does not depend on some event, in the form of 
adjustments and interventions from the agent, actually taking place, as the causal view 
does – in the form of an intention or primary reason. It depends on the agent’s ability 
and readiness to make those adjustments and interventions.  
 
The reason why the causal view could not be used to claim that automatic actions are 
intentional was that the causal view depended upon the attributions of psychological 
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states as causes of action. Frankfurt’s view does not depend on those: so, in this first 
respect, Frankfurt’s view appears to be one that we could use in order to claim that 
automatic actions are intentional, as long as we can claim that automatic actions are 
under the agent’s guidance.  
 
The idea that automatic actions are under the agent’s guidance is, as we saw in Chapter 
1, already in the literature. Pollard (2003) applied guidance to automatic action through 
the concept of intervention control: 
 
For we have the capacity to intervene on such behaviours. This is 
particularly the case for those automatic behaviours which we have 
learned. Since there was a time when we didn’t do such things, it will 
normally still be possible for us still to refrain from doing them in 
particular cases (though perhaps not in general). We intervene by doing 
something else, or nothing at all, either during the behaviour, or by 
anticipating before we begin it. In this way habitual behaviours contrast 
with other automatic, repeated behaviours such as reflexes, the 
digestion, and even some addictions and phobias in which we cannot 
always intervene, though we may have very good reason to do so. I call 
this intervention control (Pollard 2003, p. 416). 
 
The reader will have already noticed the similarity between guidance and intervention 
control from the quote; and actually Pollard, in a footnote at the end of the very passage 
just quoted, writes: “Frankfurt (1978, p. 46-48) describes a similar kind of control in his 
opposition to ‘causal’ accounts of action” (Pollard 2003, p. 416). But there are also 
differences, which I will illustrate later in this section.  
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Pollard too, then, stresses the fact that agents can intervene, and that it is not the actual 
intervention that is required, but our “capacity to intervene on such behaviours” (ibid). 
And Pollard also makes explicit reference to the fact that this capacity for intervention is 
retained in the automatic case. So, it seems, if when we act automatically we have the 
ability to intervene to correct (or inhibit) our movements, then those movements will be 
actions.  
 
Indeed, I have already argued in Chapter 1 for the intuitive idea that we don’t lose our 
capacity for intervention when we are acting automatically: that we downshift 
automatically does not mean that we cannot stop ourselves from downshifting if the 
lights, in the distance, turn green. Similarly, we are able to downshift to 2
nd
 rather than 
4
th
, say, if we are suddenly required to slow down dramatically. And, recall Chapter 1, 
those interventions and corrections don’t need themselves to be automatic. It might be, 
in fact, that the agent intervenes non-automatically, that she pays attention. But this does 
not mean that the action, before the intervention, and when, as in most cases, the 
intervention is not necessary, is not automatic.  
 
Here I don’t want to rehearse the arguments given in Chapter 1 in favour of the idea that 
automatic actions are under the agent’s guidance or intervention control. I want to argue 
that guidance is sufficient for the claim that automatic actions are intentional.  
 
In order to do that, I will first clarify the relationship between guidance and intervention 
control. Those two concepts are, as we have seen, similar; but they are not identical. And 
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the difference is an important one to my claim that guidance is sufficient for intentional 
action. Indeed, while Frankfurt (1978) claims that guidance is sufficient for intentional 
movement, Pollard (2003) does not make any claim about intentionality in relation to 





One might think, in fact, that intervention control is too broad a concept to use it for 
intentionality: that an agent could have performed all kinds of interventions says little, 
one might think, about whether the agent was acting intentionally. Only some potential 
interventions give us a clue about whether the agent was acting intentionally. Take the 
car scenario again: that the agent could have intervened to stop the car, or turn on the 
lights, tells us something about the agent's general control over the vehicle. But it tells us 
very little about whether the agent was, say, intentionally driving below the 50mph 
speed limit. What might suggest that the agent was intentionally driving below the 
50mph speed limit is only the agent's ability to intervene to reduce her speed (in case her 
speed was approaching the limit, say).  
 
This particular kind of potential correction says something about the agent's driving 
speed which the other potential interventions don't say. That is why one might think that 
not all potential interventions are relevant to intentional action, but only some. And this 
is why it is important to keep the idea of guidance separate from the idea of intervention: 
                                                 
1
 For more on the relationship between guidance and responsibility see this thesis’s Conclusion.  
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the capacity for intervention is a pre-requisite for guidance, but only the agent's ability to 
perform some particular corrections and interventions can count as guidance.  
 
We can talk, then, of having guidance as opposed to actually guiding one’s behaviour; 
and of having intervention control as opposed to actually intervening upon one’s 
behaviour. When the agent intervenes, the agent will be guiding her behaviour. But the 
agent need not intervene in order to have guidance over her behaviour (note the 
similarity with the everyday language distinction between ‘controlling’ and ‘being in 




In order to claim that guidance is sufficient for intentional action, Frankfurt’s position 
must be clarified. In fact, Frankfurt thinks that being under the agent’s guidance is 
sufficient for intentional movement which, he says, is action; but that being under the 
agent’s guidance is not sufficient for intentional action. For intentional action, Frankfurt 
holds a version of the Simple View: an action is intentional only if the agent intended it.  
 
Let us employ the term “intentional” for referring to instances of 
purposive movement in which the guidance is provided by the agent. 
                                                 
2
 Fisher and Ravizza (1998) talk of ‘guidance control’ as opposed to ‘regulative  control’. They say that 
“guidance control of an action involves an agent’s freely performing that action” (1998, p. 31). The 
difference between ‘guidance control’ and ‘regulative control’ is exemplified through a Frankfurt-type 
case: suppose Sally is driving a dual control car. Suppose Sally takes a right turn, and the instructor lets 
her take such a turn – but if Sally had been about to do anything other than turning right, then the 
instructor would have operated the dual controls so to make her turn right. Then, Fisher and Ravizza say, 
Sally has guidance control over the car, because she is guiding her movements which result in the car 
turning to the right. But she has no regulative control over the car, because she cannot make it go 
anywhere other than where it actually goes. It is not clear that ‘guidance control’ resembles Frankfurt’s 
idea of guidance, because it appears that an agent, on Fisher and Ravizza’s account, can have guidance 
control even if she cannot make any relevant corrections and interventions. So here I will refrain from 
using the term ‘guidance control’ for the agent’s guidance over her movements.    
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We may say, then, that action is intentional movement. The notion of 
intentional movement must not be confused with that of intentional 
action. The term “intentional action” may be used, or rather mis-used, 
simply to convey that an action is necessarily a movement whose course 
is under an agent’s guidance. When it is used in this way, the term is 
pleonastic. In a more appropriate usage, it refers to actions which are 
undertaken more or less deliberately or self-consciously – that is, to 
actions which the agent intends to perform. In this sense, actions are not 
necessarily intentional (Frankfurt 1978, p. 159). 
 
I have already presented and refuted the Simple View in Chapter 4: but the concept of 
intentional action that Frankfurt uses above is so restrictive that it is even stronger than 
just the Simple View. It is a kind of Simple View in which intentions are necessarily 
conscious or deliberate. Clearly, the general refutation of the Simple View already given 
in Chapter 4 applies also to this even less plausible version.  
 
So what I have to argue for is a stronger claim than Frankfurt's: not only that being 
under the agent’s guidance is sufficient for action, but also that it is sufficient for 
intentional action. Can we find in Frankfurt any evidence for this latter claim? 
 
First, Frankfurt gives us no reason for distinguishing between intentional movement – 
action – and intentional action. Furthermore, he gives us no reason for thinking that 
guidance is not sufficient for intentional action, despite its being sufficient for action. 
Frankfurt merely says that would be “pleonastic”; and that distinguishing would 
represent a “more appropriate usage” of the term ‘intentional action’.  
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Indeed, there doesn’t seem to be anything wrong with thinking that guidance is 
sufficient for intentional action: if what one is doing is under her guidance - if one does 
not intervene or correct her action, even though she could - presumably then she is 
acting intentionally. Indeed, because the agent has control over what she is doing, we 
tend to think that what she is doing can be attributed to her; because if the deed wasn’t to 
her satisfaction, then she could change it, or prevent it, or stop it, or modify it – she 
could, in short, intervene, because she is in control.  
 
I think that there are two difficulties with Frankfurt’s position: he wants to defend the 
idea that there is “nothing in the notion of an intentional movement which implies that its 
occurrence must be intended by the agent” (ibid., emphasis mine); I agree with that. But 
Frankfurt does not say what it is in the notion of an intentional action that implies that 
its occurrence must be intended by the agent. Indeed, it for example cannot be the very 
term ‘intentional’, and its relation with ‘intention’, because both ‘intentional movement’ 
and ‘intentional action’ share that term. And that is exactly why Frankfurt ends up with 
the tricky, phonetically if not semantically, claim that an intentional movement can be 
intentional or not intentional.  
 
Indeed, if the issue were just a terminological one, there probably would be a much 
better term to express the presence of an intention: ‘intended’. Those actions – 
intentional movements – that are under the agent’s guidance, but which are not preceded 
by an intention, would merely be intentional actions. Those intentional actions that are 
not only under the agent’s guidance, but are also preceded by an intention, would be 
FRANKFURT AND THE ‘GUIDANCE VIEW’ 
   174
intended actions. This version would even fit better with Frankfurt’s text, which talks of 
actions “being intended by the agent” (ibid), rather than being preceded by an intention. 
And it would not land Frankfurt with the awkward claim that an intentional movement 
can be intentional or not intentional, but just with the less confusing claim that an 
intentional movement can be intended or not intended. 
 
The very existence of two different words, 'intentional' and 'intended', suggests that there 
might be a difference. And Frankfurt, in conceding that 'intentional movement' does not 
require an intention, acknowledges that we can make sense of something being 
intentional without necessarily referring to an intention.  
 
But there is a more fundamental problem with Frankfurt’s attempted distinction: he slips 
back into the same considerations he is criticising, on the very same pages, in attacking 
the causal view. Frankfurt, as we have already seen, criticises the causal view for 
assessing a movement not because of itself and its relation to the agent at the time of 
action, but because of its antecedents. But now Frankfurt has also accepted that 
intentional actions are constituted by intentional movements: “When a person intends to 
perform an action, what he intends is that certain movements of his body should occur. 
When these movements do occur, the person is performing an intentional action” (ibid.). 
So there is nothing about the movements themselves that makes them intentional 
actions; what distinguishes them as intentional actions is just that they have been 
preceded by an intention. But this is exactly the sort of argument that Frankfurt rejects in 
the case of the causal view.  
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Clearly, it is open to Frankfurt to adopt the causal view for intentional action while 
rejecting it for intentional movement – action. But choosing to do so would, in the 
absence of Frankfurt's motivations for doing so, inevitably cast some doubt on his 
commitment to his argument against the causal view. More importantly, Frankfurt’s 
attempt to distinguish between intentional movement and intentional action lands him 
with a version of the Simple View – therefore subject to Bratman’s refutation.  
 
This tension should not come as a surprise, given Frankfurt’s understanding, with which 
The Problem of Action starts, of what the aim of the philosophy of action should be: 
 
The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between what an agent 
does and what merely happens to him, or between the bodily movements 
that he makes and those that occur without his making them (Frankfurt 
1978, p. 42).3 
 
So if Frankfurt accepts that the fundamental distinction is the one between action and 
mere bodily movements, why does he care to draw a further, problematic, distinction, 
between action and intentional action? Frankfurt has individuated in guidance the 
element that distinguishes between mere bodily movements, which lack guidance, and 
action, which is under the agent’s guidance. So he has solved, if guidance works, what 
he considers to be the problem of action. Why go further? In fairness to Frankfurt, he 
                                                 
3
 This is not the only place in his work where Frankfurt makes this point: "events that are actions, in 
which the higher faculties of human beings come into play, and those movements of a person's body - 
instances of behaviour other than actions, or mere bodily happenings - that he does not himself make” 
(Frankfurt 1988, p. 58). 
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doesn’t much care for the further distinction: in an 11-page article, he only dedicates two 
paragraphs – less than half a page – to drawing the distinction between intentional action 
and intentional movement. 
 
But that distinction might be important to us: the intuition with which this thesis started 
is not that automatic actions are intentional movements, but that they are intentional 
actions. So that is the claim that I must defend. Then again, intuition doesn’t probably 
distinguish between intentional action and intentional movement, so could I just settle 
for the idea that automatic actions are intentional movements – namely, that they are 
actions rather than just mere bodily movements? That was the deal proposed by the 
Davidsonian at the end of Chapter 3: I rejected that deal then, showing how just 
accounting for automatic actions being actions – intentional under other descriptions – 
isn’t enough.  
 
In fact, Frankfurt offers also another option: I could just accept that the sense in which 
automatic actions are intentional is pleonastic. So my claim that automatic actions are 
intentional would, on Frankfurt's account, be vindicated in at least two senses.  
 
But there is one general reason why one cannot be content with just showing that 
automatic actions are intentional movements and, therefore, actions: that is the very 
common concept, both in everyday language and in philosophical literature, of 
unintentional actions. Things we do can be actions of ours despite the fact that we do 
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them unintentionally: those cases would mostly amount to errors and consequences that 
we did not anticipate. 
 
So Frankfurt faces a dilemma – and so do I, as far as I go along with him: proposing his 
further distinction between intentional movement – action – and intentional action (in a 
non-pleonastic sense) lands us into the hands of Bratman’s refutation of the Simple 
View, and with the implausible claim that only things we do “deliberately or self-
consciously” can be said to be intentional actions of ours – which is no use for the 
intuition that automatic actions are intentional. On the other hand, renouncing that 
distinction deprives Frankfurt’s view of its capacity to allow for unintentional actions.  
 
In the next section, I will be proposing that we can accept the agent’s guidance as 
sufficient for intentional action without giving up on the distinction between acting 
intentionally and acting unintentionally.  
 
2. Unintentional actions 
A simpler taxonomy of behaviour on the lines of what Frankfurt takes to be a solution to 
‘the problem of action’ does not mean failing to allow for unintentional actions, or so I 
will argue in this section.  
 
While the causal view presents a tripartite taxonomy, Frankfurt’s criterion of guidance, 
in my modified version, the 'guidance view', only puts forward a bipartite taxonomy of 
behaviour. 
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The relevant difference between intentional actions and mere bodily movements is 
whether the way the agent’s body is moving is under the agent’s guidance - Frankfurt’s 
criterion. Differently from Frankfurt, though, I propose that guidance is sufficient for 
intentional action, and that therefore the distinction between action and intentional 
action does not even get drawn.  
 
Here I shall use Davidson to illustrate the tripartite taxonomy of the causal view: some 
movement is an intentional action, on Davidson’s (1963) account, if it can be 
rationalized by a primary reason which is its cause. Now, what further distinguishes in 
Davidson a movement that is not an action from a movement which is an action (which 
in turn can be an intentional action or an unintentional action depending on whether it is 
rationalizable under that description) is whether the movement is intentional under any 
description. In fact, on Davidson’s account, every action is intentional under at least one 
description.  
 
What then distinguishes mere bodily movements from unintentional actions is that the 
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unintentional action, for Davidson, will be intentional under a description that is 
different from the one description under which it is unintentional: “a man is the agent of 
an act if what he does can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional” 




One might think that every movement of one’s body can be made to fit into some 
intentional description; so that for example one could argue that even being pushed was 
part of my intentionally picking a fight; or my intentionally wanting to be a non-violent 
individual; or my intentionally leading the ‘good life’. But this would, if anything, be a 
problem for Davidson’s distinction between unintentional actions and mere bodily 
movements; but it wouldn’t help me in dealing with unintentional action.  
 
Also, here I share Davidson’s intuition that being pushed is, normally, importantly 
different from, say, spilling coffee. In the latter case, but not in the former, the accident 
is, we could say, goal-directed. Alternatively, we could cash out the distinction in terms 
of passive movement (being pushed) and active movement (spilling coffee). 
 
Here is one of Davidson’s classic examples of unintentional action: “I flip the switch, 
turn on the light, and illuminate the room. Unbeknownst to me I also alert a prowler to 
the fact that I am home” (Davidson 1963, p. 686). On Davidson’s account, ‘flipping the 
switch’ is an intentional action; ‘turning on the light’ is an intentional action; 
                                                 
4
 This whole scheme depends on Davidson’s action individuation understanding (which, as I said in 
Chapter 1, I accept), according to which different action-descriptions can refer to the same set of 
movements.  
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‘illuminating the room' is an intentional action; while ‘alerting the prowler’ is an 
unintentional action. The first three action-descriptions are intentional because they are 
rationalized by some primary reason. Something like: I want to illuminate the room (pro 
attitude), and I believe that turning on the light will illuminate the room, and that 
flipping the switch will turn on the light (beliefs) – this is a good example, by the way, 
of how uneconomical Davidson’s causal view is. But ‘alerting the prowler’ is not 
intentional because it cannot be rationalized by the above primary reason: I didn’t have 
any beliefs about prowlers, Davidson supposes – because I had no idea that there was a 
prowler outside - to rationalize my alerting the prowler. That is why ‘alerting the 
prowler’ was not intentional.  
 
Nevertheless, though, on Davidson’s account ‘alerting the prowler’ is an action because 
it is intentional under at least one description: indeed, in this case it is intentional under 
at least three, ‘flipping the switch’, ‘turning the light on’, ‘illuminating the room’. 
Because those descriptions belong to the same action as ‘alerting the prowler’, in that all 
four descriptions individuate the same set of movements, then ‘alerting the prowler’ is 
an action despite not being something I do intentionally.  
 
Some cases that the causal view takes to be unintentional actions aren’t, I think, actions 
at all. Some of them are merely bodily movements. This is because some of the cases 
that the causal view would consider to be unintentional actions are actually not under the 
agent’s guidance.  
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Take the following case: suppose I invite you around for coffee. Suppose you are 
wearing the new pair of trousers that I have just bought you. Suppose I trip over while I 
am passing you the cup of coffee, and spill the coffee on your new trousers, ruining 
them. That is the sort of thing of which we want to say that it was not intentional. I 
really did not want to do it; I was really grateful that you were wearing those trousers; 
and now I am really sorry. This is a case that Davidson’s view would call ‘unintentional 
action’: I intentionally offered you coffee, and unintentionally spilled it – so my 
movements were intentional under the description ‘offering coffee’ and unintentional 
under the description ‘spilling coffee’ – but, under both descriptions, my movements are 
cases of action: indeed, they are two different descriptions of the same action - of the 
same set of movements. 
 
It might be that the agent has been careless; or that the agent was trying to do too many 
things at once; or that she was trying to impress her guest. All those cases are likely to 
be ones in which the agent could have intervened to prevent the accident, and therefore 
cases in which the agent’s movements were under her guidance. But on the other hand, 
there could have been an earthquake, or a blackout, or the cup might have been slippery 
because it hadn’t been dried properly; or simply the agent might have been distracted by 
something that happened at that moment. In those latter cases there is nothing the agent 
could have done, at the time of action, to avoid spilling coffee: the agent was 
overwhelmed by nature. In those latter cases, then, her movements were not under her 
guidance, because she could not have intervened or corrected her behaviour; therefore 
they were not even actions. 
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Treating those cases in terms of guidance, rather than in terms of psychological states, 
helps us to acknowledge, importantly, that some errors are not even actions of ours: we 
didn’t do them, they just happened to us; there wasn’t anything we could have done in 
order to avoid them.
5
 So I think that, for the sorts of cases above, my guidance view is 
better than Davidson’s causal view. 
 
But I don’t think that cases such as ‘alerting the prowler’ resemble the kind of coffee 
spilling case in which the agent is overwhelmed by nature: in the coffee spilling case, we 
say that the agent was overwhelmed by nature because nature took control away from 
the agent, so that there was nothing that the agent could have done to avoid spilling 
coffee; so that spilling coffee would, in those particular cases in which the agent is 
overwhelmed by nature, resemble being pushed. Therefore it would be mere bodily 
movement, rather than action. 
 
But ‘alerting the prowler’ doesn’t work like that. The movements that constitute 
‘alerting the prowler’ – which are the same movements that constitute the other action 
descriptions, like ‘flipping the switch’ – are under the agent’s guidance: the agent can 
correct them, intervene upon them, inhibit them; the agent can do otherwise, or nothing 
                                                 
5
 This kind of idea can be also found in the psychological literature, as for example in Reason’s (1990) 
distinction between slips and mistakes: I might inadvertently elbow someone while trying to reach Marc to 
punch him (slip); but I might also punch who I take to be Marc, while the person I punch turns out not to 
be Marc (mistake). 
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at all. She is, in short, in control – differently than with being pushed or spilling coffee, 
as described above.  
 
But I think that there still is a difference in terms of guidance, and one that can 
distinguish between ‘alerting the prowler’ and ‘flipping the switch’; therefore one that 
can account for the fact that the agent doesn’t alert the prowler intentionally. The 
difference is in the kind of interventions and corrections that the agent can make: she can 
make interventions and corrections such as ‘Let’s not stretch my arm, otherwise I’ll flip 
the switch’; or ‘Let’s not flip the switch, otherwise the room will be illuminated’; but 
also things like ‘Let’s not turn the light on, so that I can be a good environmentalist’; or 
‘Let’s leave the room in the dark, so that I can save on my electricity bill’. The fact that 
her bodily movements are under her guidance means that the agent is in control and 
therefore that, should those or other considerations, but also changes in the environment, 
occur, she can intervene: correct, redirect, or stop her movements. 
 
All these kinds of considerations can occur while the agent is going through her routine 
of turning on a light in entering a room. Most times, those kinds of considerations don’t 
occur, and the agent will automatically turn on the light. But the kinds of interventions 
and corrections that the agent can make to her performance do not include things such as 
‘Let’s illuminate the room to alert the prowler that I am home’ or ‘Let’s leave the room 
in the dark, so that I can catch the prowler when she tries to come in’. Those kinds of 
considerations could only apply if the agent knew that there was a prowler, but Davidson 
is supposing that the agent doesn’t know. Indeed, had the agent known it – and therefore 
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believed it, her ‘alerting the prowler’ would have, on both my own and Davidson’s 
account, been intentional.  
 
This kind of distinction can be easily applied to Frankfurt’s car scenario too. There, it 
could be said that, say, the agent is intentionally keeping the car below 50mph; because, 
supposedly, the agent can easily find out what speed she is doing, and intervene upon it 
if she wants to or needs to. But if we remove the odometer from the scenario, the 
movements of the agent remain the same; but now, supposedly, the agent is no longer in 
a position to find out the car’s speed, and so we would no longer say that she was 
intentionally keeping below 50mph. 
 
So there seems to be an obvious epistemic difference between two kinds of cases: in the 
car case without the odometer, even though the agent’s movements are exactly the same 
than in the car with the odometer, and the agent has guidance over those same 
movements, the description ‘doing 48mph’ is not intentional; because, in the absence of 
the odometer, the agent doesn't know, nor can she know, her exact speed. But that same 
description is intentional in the case with the odometer, because the agent can check 
what speed she is doing.  
 
But this epistemic difference does not exhaust all cases: in the prowler scenario, 
supposedly, the agent can find out that there is a prowler outside; it’s just that she would 
have to go outside and look for it. Admittedly, here there is a difference of degree 
between finding out your speed by looking at the odometer and finding the prowler by 
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going to the garden to look for her; such that one might want to talk of the agent’s ability 
to directly come to know in the case of the odometer, as opposed to the indirect way in 
which the agent would have to go about finding the prowler, by doing other things.  
 
But the crucial point is that the agent has no reason to go outside and look for the 
prowler, because the agent has no reason to think that there is a prowler outside. Here 
our epistemic criterion takes on some normative connotations: it looks as though it 
would be unreasonable to expect of the agent that, every time she was about to flip a 
switch, she would first go outside to check that no prowler was in the garden. Indeed, we 
think that people who have these sorts of preoccupations are paranoid (or that they have 
obsessive-compulsive disorder). The same way in which we would consider paranoid – 
and dangerous - someone who could not take her eyes off the odometer when driving. 
 
On the other hand, though, it would no longer be unreasonable to expect that the agent 
go outside in case she hears a sudden loud noise coming from the garden. Similarly, an 
agent who would react to such noise by going to check the garden would by no means be 
considered paranoid. This is because the agent, now, would have a reason to go and 
check. It seems as though rational agents have a background sensitivity to abnormalities, 
such that they are able to react to them. And, as we have already said in Chapter 1, when 
the practice has become automatic this capacity to react to abnormalities does not 
require actively attending to particular aspects of your environment, nor does it require 
being constantly thinking about potential dangers. The more rational agent appears to be 
exactly the one who is able to react to abnormalities without having to dedicate all her 
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attentional resources to the circumstances in which those abnormalities could arise but 
do not arise. 
 
So now we can see the difference between ‘alerting the prowler’ and ‘illuminating the 
room’. The latter is a description of her movements that the agent can be expected to 
know or find out at no unreasonable cost – indeed, if the agent ignored that rooms are 
illuminated by lights being turned on, it would be pretty difficult to make sense of her 
behaviour. The former, as long as no sudden loud noise comes from the garden, isn’t a 
description of her movements that the agent can be expected to know or find out at no 
unreasonable cost. If, indeed, a sudden loud noise did come from the garden, and the 
agent chose to ignore it, then we could argue that the agent alerted the prowler 
intentionally because she ignored a relevant abnormality.  
 
One can think of this intuitive difference also in terms of which behaviours can be 
ascribed to the agent, and which can’t – for example in terms of praise and blame. It 
would be reasonable for someone to say to the agent: ‘I’m glad you didn’t turn the light 
on. It’s good for the environment’; or ‘We can’t see much, but at least we save on the 
electricity bill’. But it would be unreasonable for someone to blame the agent: ‘I wish 
you had turned the light on, so we would have scared the prowler away’; or ‘You 
shouldn’t have turned the light on, so that we could have caught the prowler’.  
 
We can, therefore, distinguish between the agent’s guidance over a set of movements, 
and the agent’s guidance over an action description. The idea is that, with Davidson’s 
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‘flipping the switch’ scenario, the agent has guidance over the set of movements to 
which ‘flipping the switch’, ‘turning on the light’, ‘illuminating the room’, and ‘alerting 
the prowler’ all refer. On the other hand, while the agent has guidance over action 
descriptions ‘flipping the switch’, ‘turning on the light’, and ‘illuminating the room’, the 
agent, for the reasons that I have given, does not have guidance over action description 
‘alerting the prowler’. So having guidance over a set of movements is necessary for 
intentional action, but not sufficient: the agent also needs to have guidance over the 
particular action description. This results in the statement of my ‘guidance view’ given 
at the beginning of the chapter: E’s ϕ-ing is intentional iff ϕ-ing is under E’s guidance 
(where ϕ-ing is an action description).  
 
If, for clarity’s sake, one wanted the distinction between a certain set of movements and 
the action descriptions that refer to that set of movements to be part of the statement of 
the view – so that the distinction between guidance over some movement and guidance 
over some action description was explicit in the view (that’s how for example Davidson 
states his view, see Chapter 3, Section 1), then the ‘guidance view’ would look as 
follows: 
E’s A-ing is intentional, under description ϕ-ing, iff A-ing, under description ϕ-ing, is 
under E’s guidance.  
 
In conclusion, I think that appealing to guidance as a sufficient condition for intentional 
action does not mean that I can’t distinguish between when agents act intentionally and 
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when they don’t. When an agent cannot be expected to know or find out some 
description of her movements at no unreasonable cost, because she has no reason to 
know or find out about that action description, then she cannot be said to be acting 




3. Deviant causal chains 
There is an important difference between my 'guidance view' and the causal view: the 
causal view only gives necessary conditions for intentional action, while I am proposing 
that guidance is both necessary and sufficient for intentional action. The reason why the 
causal view stops short of giving sufficient conditions is so-called deviant cases (also 
known as deviant causal chains; see Davidson 1973): deviant cases would be 
counterexamples to the causal view if the causal view were to posit primary reasons (or 
intentions) as sufficient for intentional action; but deviant cases are no counterexample if 
the causal view only supposes primary reasons (or intentions) to be merely necessary.  
 
What that means, unfortunately for the causal view, is that it stops short of giving a full 
account of intentional action. So my proposal does more than the causal view in that it 
gives both necessary and sufficient conditions for intentionality rather than just 
necessary ones; also, by posing guidance as a necessary condition for intentional action, 
                                                 
6
 This fits in very well with cases of culpable ignorance and negligence (see, for example, Rosen 2001 and 
2003). Those are, indeed, cases in which the agent should have known better, or should have found out 
before acting. If they have been saying for weeks on the news that the number of prowlers in my area has 
increased considerably, and I still go on and leave my door unlocked, it is fair to say that I let the prowler 
in, that I am responsible for it (which obviously doesn’t mean that the prowler is any less responsible). ‘I 
didn’t know’, ‘I have forgotten’, or ‘I never pay much attention to the news’ aren’t any good as excuses, 
when you could have been expected to know or find out – at no unreasonable cost - that leaving the door 
unlocked would let the prowler in. For more on responsibility see my Conclusion. 
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my proposal can deal with deviant cases: deviant cases, in fact, meet the necessary 
conditions for the causal view, but not the necessary conditions for my proposal, because 
such cases are not under the agent’s guidance. 
 
The paradigmatic deviant case was set by Davidson in Freedom to Act (1973, p. 79) with 
the climber example: suppose a climber decides to rid herself of the “weight and danger 
of holding another man on the rope” (Davidson 1973, p. 79).
7
 The decision to commit 
such a horrible act unnerves the climber so much that she loosens her grip on the rope, 
thereby ridding herself of the other man on the rope. Her decision to rid herself of the 
other climber both causes and rationalizes the loosening of the rope; but the agent did 
not intentionally loosen the rope: it was an accident. Such cases would be 
counterexamples to a view according to which a primary reason causing an action which 
it rationalizes would be sufficient for that action to be intentional. Nevertheless they are 
no counterexample to the causal view as long as the causal view does not set sufficient 




What is problematic for the causal view, with regards to deviant causal chains, is that the 
primary reason (or the intention) causes the agent to act in the way she had reasons for 
(or an intention to) exactly by making her lose control over her action. And that is where 
                                                 
7
 The other famous deviant scenario is the one in which Fred runs over his uncle by accident on his way to 
kill his uncle (Chisholm 1966). 
8
 In footnote 5 of the version of Actions, Reasons, and Causes reprinted in Davidson 1980, Davidson says 
explicitly that he does not want to pose sufficient conditions: “I say ‘as the basic move’ to cancel any 
suggestion that C1 and C2 are jointly sufficient to define the relation of reasons to the actions they explain. 
For discussion of this point, see the Introduction and Essay 4 [Freedom to Act]” (Davidson 1963, p. 12). 
C1 and C2 are, respectively, the necessary condition for primary reasons that I quote on this page (see 
above), and the claim that “A primary reason for an action is its cause” (Davidson 1963, p. 12). 
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the counterexample arises: because it looks as though the agent did not have the right 
kind of control over what happened to say that she acted intentionally, even though what 
happened was caused by the relevant primary reason (or intention).  
 
That the causalists are troubled by deviant cases shows, interestingly, that some sort of 
control condition must be implicitly necessary even in their accounts of intentional 
action, because it is exactly the intuitive lack of control that makes deviant cases 
troublesome.  
 
On the one hand Davidson wants to say that the agent did not loosen her grip 
intentionally; because it was an accident: it was something that happened as the result of 
the agent losing control, rather than something that happened under the agent’s control. 
On the other hand, though, the case matches Davidson’s necessary conditions for 
intentionality: her loosening her grip is caused by her desire to get rid of the other 
climber, and her belief that by loosening her grip she would get rid of the other climber. 
 
So the causal view, if primary reasons (or intentions) were posed to be sufficient, would 
be in trouble because the deviant case would be a counterexample in which the event is 
caused by the relevant primary reason (or intention), but it is, nevertheless, not 
intentional. That is why Davidson falls short of setting sufficient conditions for 
intentional action. Davidson admits this very candidly: “"[w]hat I despair of spelling out 
is the way in which attitudes must cause deeds if they are to rationalize the action'' 
(Davidson 1973, p. 79). And this problem should come as no surprise, if one recalls 
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Frankfurt’s general criticism of the causal view: that it focused on the antecedents of 
action rather than on action itself.  
 
Proposing guidance as a necessary and sufficient condition for intentional action, on the 
other hand, does not share the causal view’s problem with deviant cases: because it is 
characteristic of deviant cases that the agent’s movements, as in losing grip on the rope 
as a result of nervous tension, are not under the agent’s control: the agent is not guiding 
her movement; she grows so nervous – because of her evil temptations – that she loses 
her capacity for intervention; she loses guidance of her movements. Indeed, losing grip 
cannot even be said to be something the agent does. It is rather something that happens 
to her, a mere movement of her body, rather than an action of hers. In fact, it belongs to 
those cases, already discussed, in which the agent is overwhelmed by nature.  
 
Other causalists have attempted to deal with deviant causal chains by including a 
guidance-type requirement. Here is, for example, Mele&Moser's (1994) proposal
9
: “on 
our view, the proximal intentions to A whose acquisition initiates intentional A-ings 
sustain and guide the A-ings” (Mele&Moser 1994, p. 236). Those authors appear to 
accept that what is needed to deal with deviance is to supplement the causal connection 
with a guiding role for the intention. The intention, then, would cause the action not just 
in the sense of initiating it; but also in the sense of guiding and sustaining it. This is very 
clear in Thalberg’s version: 
                                                 
9
 For other examples of this kind of approach, see Brand (1984), Thalberg (1984), Alston (1986), 
Mele&Adams (1989), Mele (1992).  
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The person’s intention only inaugurates a sequence of causally related 
goings-on which terminate in behaviour; it does not continue to shape 
events, particularly the behaviour. I think a full-blown causal theory 
prescribes a tighter hookup – what I call ‘ongoing’, ‘continuous’ or 
‘sustained’ causation (Thalberg 1984, p. 257). 
 
These kinds of proposed solutions are, though, subject to a counterexample to which my 
version isn’t subject. The counterexample is sketched by Moya (1990, found in Stout 
(1996, pp. 86-95)) on the lines of Chisholm’s (1966) deviant case. Fred intends to drive 
over his uncle. He is afraid to miss him, so, on his way there, not to waste any time, he 
drives over a pedestrian that had got in the way. The pedestrian, sure enough, is his 
uncle. Here, it looks as though Fred’s behaviour is sustained by his intention. There is no 
gap, as in the original deviant case, which interrupts the guiding or sustaining role of 
Fred’s intention. But still, it looks as though Fred does not run over his uncle 
intentionally.  
 
But my view does not have a problem with this case: it seems as though Fred has 
guidance over running over the pedestrian; but he does not have guidance over running 
over his uncle, because Fred could not be reasonably expected to know or find out, at no 
unreasonable cost, that the pedestrian was his uncle – simply because Fred had no reason 
to think that the pedestrian may have been his uncle. Indeed, had Fred been aware that 
his uncle, at that time, would have been walking down that road, then we might be 
happy to concede that Fred ran over his uncle intentionally.  
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Finally, I want to show that my ‘guidance view’ can also deal with cases of so-called 
consequential deviance (as opposed to the basic deviance of cases such as Davidson’s 
climber, see Bishop 1989 and Schlosser 2007). The paradigmatic case of consequential 
deviance goes as follows: suppose I intend to kill Sam, and so I shoot Sam in order to 
kill him, but I miss. Nevertheless, the noise from my shot awakens a herd of wild pigs, 
which trample Sam to death.  
 
The satisfaction of my intention to kill Sam was caused by my intention to kill him. 
Nevertheless, I don’t intentionally kill Sam (indeed, it’s not even clear that it’s me who 
kills him; the pigs do). This is another case that satisfies the necessary conditions of the 
causal view, but that is not, intuitively, an intentional action.  
 
My ‘guidance view’ can deal with it pretty easily: at the time in which Sam is killed by 
the pigs, I have no guidance over Sam’s killing. I can’t directly intervene to stop the 
pigs. Furthermore, at the time when I fire the gun, I can’t be reasonably expected to 
know or find out, at no unreasonable cost, that I will awake a herd of wild pigs that will 
trample Sam to death. I therefore don’t have guidance over Sam’s killing, and that is 
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4. Objections 
In the rest of the chapter I will deal with four objections to the idea that guidance is 
necessary and sufficient for intentional action. 
 
4.1 Regress 
My proposal appears to be subject to a charge of regress; such charge had already been 
noticed by Frankfurt himself:  
 
Our guidance of our movements, while we are acting, does not similarly 
require that we perform various actions. We are not at the controls of 
our bodies in the way a driver is at the controls of his automobile. 
Otherwise action could not be conceived, upon pain of generating an 
infinite regress, as the matter of occurrence of movements which are 
under an agent’s guidance. The fact that our movements when we are 
acting are purposive is not the effect of something we do. It is a 
characteristic of the operation at that time of the systems we are 
(Frankfurt 1978, p. 160). 
 
As Ruben (2003, p. 112) notices, Frankfurt here does not give us an alternative account 
of guidance that avoids the regress – Frankfurt is merely stating that such an alternative 
must exist, otherwise guidance cannot be constructed free of regress. That, however, 
won’t do as a reply to the charge of regress – so below is my reply to the charge, in 
which I argue that my view does not generate a distinctive regress: as in, one to which 
the opposing proposal, the causal view, isn’t also subject. 
 
The charge appears to be that, on my proposal, whether an action is intentional depends 
upon whether it is under the agent’s guidance. And that whether an action is under the 
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agent’s guidance depends, in turn, upon whether the agent, at the time of action, is able 
to intervene over her behaviour, make corrections to her movements, or redirect them. 
Those activities, in turn, appear to be intentional actions. Therefore, or so goes the 
objection, my account of intentional action depends itself upon intentional actions.  
 
This objection depends, then, on the claim that guidance is the agent’s ability to perform 
some intentional action.
10
 But I think that, if this is the objection, then this objection can 
be made against the causal view as well, in so far as, on the causal view, intentional 
action depends on intentional states (psychological states): because proponents of the 
causal view accept that an essential feature of intentional states is that they are 
dispositional: not only behaviourists like Ryle (1949), or Stout (1996), but also 
Davidson: “Primary reasons consist of attitudes or beliefs, which are states or 
dispositions” (Davidson 1963, p. 12).  
 
The natural interpretation of this passage from Davidson seems to be that “states or 
dispositions” is an inclusive disjunctive, such that some beliefs will be states, and some 
dispositions; similarly, some attitudes will be states, and some dispositions. So if my 
view can be charged with regress for appealing to abilities or dispositions, then 
Davidson’s view can be charged with just the same regress. 
                                                 
10
 And in this respect this regress objection is importantly different from the regress one that Ryle (1949, 
p. 67) moves against volitionism. The objection against my account says that on my account whether an 
action is intentional depends on whether the agent is able, at the time of action, to perform other 
intentional actions. Ryle’s objection is that on volitionist accounts whether an action is intentional depends 
on whether it was brought about by an act of will – itself an intentional action. So my account of 
intentional action would depend on the agent’s ability to act intentionally; while volitionist accounts 
would depend on the agent actually acting intentionally through an act of will. On this point, see Stout 
(2005, p. 9). 
FRANKFURT AND THE ‘GUIDANCE VIEW’ 
   196
 
One might concede this, but press me on the fact that some other theory that appeals 
only to states cannot be charged with such a regress – and that therefore my proposal is 
at least worse off than a theory that only appeals to states.  
 
It seems to me that, if my theory is charged with the regress, even a theory that only 
appeals to states can be easily charged with that regress: in so far as that theory takes 
these states to have dispositional properties. Take functionalism: if a state is defined and 
individuated by its functional properties rather than its intrinsic ones, then some, if not 
all of those properties, will be dispositional ones. Such and such state tends to cause x; 
such and such state tends to be caused by y – where x and y can be either mental states 
or behavioural patterns – intentional actions, for example.  
 
Just to show that I am not re-writing functionalism to fit my purposes, here is a very 
authoritative account of functionalism, straight out of the ‘70s, signed by none other than 
Jerry Fodor and Ned Block: 
 
But FSIT [Functional State Identity Theory] allows us to distinguish 
between psychological states not only in terms of their behavioural 
consequences but also in terms of the character of their 
interconnections. This is because the criterion of identity for machine 
table states acknowledges their relations to one another as well as their 
relations to inputs and outputs (Fodor and Block, 1972, p. 167).11  
                                                 
11
 The following quote makes the relation between functionalism and dispositional properties even more 
explicit: “According to a prominent form of functionalism, the functional state identity theory, mental 
properties are higher-level, dispositional properties. To be in pain, for instance, is to be in some state or 
other apt to be caused by bodily damage and apt to cause avoidance behaviour (an actual functional 
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Those outputs are actions. Block again: “Functionalism says that mental states are 
constituted by their causal relations to one another and to sensory inputs and behavioural 
outputs” (Block 1980, p. 1). Just to make sure: it would not be of any help to the 
supporter of the distinctive regress to distinguish between behavioural outputs and 
intentional actions, because I am only measuring my view against accounts of 
intentional actions. So versions of functionalism that deny that intentional actions are 
one kind of output are not relevant to the charge of distinctive regress.  
 
If one were to develop an account of psychological states that was free of dispositional 
properties, and then use it for an account of intentional action, and then criticise my 
account on grounds of regress, then I might have to answer some more questions. Till 
then, I can reject the charge of regress, because even the ability to intervene is not 
enough to generate a distinctive regress. One might now ask me to show that the actual 
intervention does not generate a regress: I won’t do that – because my account does not 
rely on the actual intervention. It only relies on the ability to intervene. 
 
4.2 Principle of Alternate Possibilities 
Ironically enough, a potential threat to my proposal comes from Frankfurt himself, with 
his famous counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). Frankfurt's 
counterexample is supposed to show that it is a mistake to hold, as PAP does, that an 
                                                                                                                                                
characterization of pain would be rather more complicated than this). Mental properties, on this view, are 
purely dispositional” (Heil and Robb, 2003, p. 182 – my emphasis). 
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agent is responsible for an action A only if she could have done otherwise than action A. 
Frankfurt makes this point by showing cases where, even though the agent has chosen to 
act in the way she did, the agent could not have acted differently.  
 
One could apply this famous counterexample to my proposal as well. Someone could 
say that, if some intuitively intentional actions were such that the agent could not have 
done differently, like in Frankfurt-type cases (terminology from Fischer and Ravizza 
1998), then my view of intentional action would be false, because there would be actions 
that are intentional even though they aren’t under the agent’s guidance. In this section I 
will show that Frankfurt-type cases are no counterexample to my view.  
 
This is how Frankfurt sets out his counterexample against PAP:  
 
Suppose someone - Black, let us say – wants Jones to perform a certain 
action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, 
but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits 
until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing 
unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that 
Jones is going to decide to do something other than what he wants him 
to do. If it does become clear that Jones is going to decide to do 
something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones decides 
to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do. Whatever Jones’s 
initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will have his way… 
Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because Jones, for 
reasons of his own, decides to perform and does perform the very action 
Black wants him to perform. In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear 
precisely the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would 
have borne if Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do 
it. It would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones for his action, or to 
withhold the praise to which it would normally entitle him, on the basis 
of the fact that he could not have done otherwise. This fact played no 
role at all in leading him to act as he did. Indeed, everything happened 
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just as it would have happened without Black’s presence in the situation 
and without his readiness to intrude into it (Frankfurt 1969, pp. 835-36).  
 
The agent would have performed the action in question either way; so it is not true that 
the agent could have acted otherwise. According to PAP, then, the agent is not 
responsible for doing what she did. But, intuitively, the agent decided of her own will to 
do the action in question; and it seems that he must be held responsible for the action in 
question. Therefore PAP is false.  
 
There is, in the literature, an argument against Frankfurt-type counterexamples that I 
find decisive: it was put forward by Peter van Inwagen in An Essay on Free Will (1983). 
Van Inwagen’s counterargument is quite simple (1983, p. 170): in the alternative 
scenario, where Black intervenes, Black’s intervention is in the causal history of what 
Jones brings about, while in the actual scenario it isn’t. If we think that this difference in 
causal history is sufficient for a difference between the two kinds of action-events, then 
the action-event in the actual story is different from the one in the alternative scenario. 
Therefore, van Inwagen says, what Jones brings about in the actual scenario is different 
from what Jones would have brought about in the alternative scenario. But if that is true, 
then the alternative scenario does not show that Jones could not have avoided bringing 
about what he brings about in the actual scenario – because in the alternative scenario 
Jones brings about something different (or maybe nothing at all, if it’s Black who acts – 
I deal with this point at the end of the section).  
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The controversial aspect of this counterargument is quite clear: it is the idea that the 
difference in the causal history of the alternative scenario is sufficient for saying that, in 
the alternative scenario, Jones would have done something different; and that therefore it 
is not true that Jones did not have alternative possibilities open to him: the alternative 
scenario is a genuine alternative possibility, so that PAP isn’t, after all, refuted by 
Frankfurt-type cases.  
 
This aspect of van Inwagen’s argument is picked at by Fischer (1994): according to him, 
the difference is not robust enough to ground attributions of responsibility (p. 142).  
 
… my basic worry is that this alternative possibility is not sufficiently 
robust to ground the relevant attributions of moral responsibility… it 
needs to be shown that these alternative possibilities ground our 
attributions of moral responsibility. And this is what I find puzzling and 
implausible (Fischer 1994, p. 140).  
 
Even though Fischer says himself “I do not have a decisive argument against it [van 
Inwagen’s strategy]” (1994, p. 140), I think his worries concerning the robustness of the 
alternative possibility should be met and can be met. 
 
There are at least two things that Fischer could mean by robust: Fischer might want an 
alternative possibility to be robust in the sense that it is different enough from the actual 
possibility to ground attributions of responsibility. Alternatively Fischer’s cry for 
robustness might be a cry for actuality. His complaint would then be that the alternative 
possibility is not robust enough simply because it is not actual – and it is on actualities 
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that we should ground attributions of moral responsibility. This latter interpretation can 
be traced back to Fischer’s general compatibilist project. Here I don’t want to enter the 
free will debate more than I need to, nor take a particular stand on it. It is only those who 
have some commitment to compatibilism that need this restriction to actualities. Since I 
don’t have such a commitment, I will concede to Fischer that, if he restricts robustness 
to actuality, not even the alternative possibilities described below will convince him.  
 
Back to the first interpretation of robustness: the idea that the alternative possibility isn’t 
different enough from the actual scenario to ground attributions of responsibility. After 
all, supposing that, for example, what Jones brings about is Fred’s death, van Inwagen is 
not denying that both in the actual scenario and the alternative scenario Fred dies. Van 
Inwagen is only saying that the event of Fred’s death in the actual scenario is different 
from the event of Fred’s death in the alternative scenario. To which Fischer replies that, 
given that Fred dies anyhow, the difference between those two events is not robust 
enough. 
 
But I think that there is something very robust that van Inwagen could say in replying to 
Fischer: pretty simply, that, given the different causal histories, the difference is as 
robust as it can possibly be, because in the actual scenario the event of Fred’s death is an 
action (of Jones); while in the alternative scenario the event of Fred’s death is not an 
action (or if it is, it is not Jones’s, but Black’s). If this is true, then it is true of Jones in 
the alternative scenario that he does not kill Fred; while in the actual scenario he does. 
And therefore Jones, when he kills Fred in the actual scenario, had the alternative of not 
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killing Fred, which is what happens in the alternative scenario. And this is the ground 
for holding Jones responsible: that he could have done otherwise. Yes, Fred still dies in 
the alternative scenario – but it is not Jones that kills him, but Black (if anybody). I 
cannot think of a more robust difference than the one between Jones’s killing Fred and 
Jones’s not killing Fred.  
 
If Fischer insisted that the outside intervention from Black is not robust enough to say 
that Jones did not do it, then he would suddenly be in the implausible position of having 
to claim that agents act even when they are puppets under the complete control of 
someone (or something) else. The implausibility of this appears even stronger if one 
uses Fischer’s own version of Frankfurt-type cases, in which “Jack has secretly installed 
a device in Sam’s brain which allows him to monitor all of Sam’s brain activity and to 
intervene in it, if he desires” (Fischer and Ravizza (1998), p. 29). If this doesn’t count as 
Jack’s controlling Sam, and making him do things, rather than Sam acting, then I don’t 
know what does. Indeed, on my account it is Jack and Black who act, because they can 
both intervene upon Jack’s movements.  
 
Importantly, here I am not just saying that in the alternative scenario Jones’s movements 
do not constitute, on my proposal, an action of his (in fact they don’t because Jones isn’t 
guiding his behaviour, Black is – and therefore it is Black who acts). Here I am also 
saying that on any view that wants to distinguish between mere movements and actions - 
and the causal view wants to do that - Jones’s movements in the alternative scenario 
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cannot be Jones’s actions because they are controlled by Black – and therefore they are, 
on my view, Black’s actions.  
 
It looks as though Black not only acts in the alternative scenario - because he intervenes 
over Jones’s behaviour – but also that Black acts in the actual scenario, given that he has 
the ability to intervene; and that guidance is sufficient for intentional action. This might 
seem counterintuitive: Jones, in the actual scenario, acts of his own will – and Black, in 
the actual scenario, does not do anything: he has the power to intervene, but he does not 
use it. But none the less, Black’s will is being executed through Jones. Also, one might 
want to suppose, the fact that Black can intervene depends on something Black has done 
in the past (installing the device; instructing someone to install the device, etc.).  
 
But accepting that Black is acting in the actual scenario poses the problem of Jones’s 
agency: if it is Black who acts through Jones, then Jones is not acting, it would seem. 
But how can that be, given that Jones is acting of his own will? Here I want to propose 
that in the actual scenario Jones and Black are both acting, but that Black is acting more 
than Jones.  
 
The idea is that guidance is not mutually exclusive: so even if Black is guiding x, Jones 
can be guiding x too, because they can both intervene and make corrections on x. The 
amount of guidance they will have depends on the number and kind of possibilities for 
intervention open to them: Jones has very little guidance, because, given Black’s device, 
there is only one possibility open to him: either Jones φ-s or he does not φ. And if Jones 
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does not φ, then the device will intervene. Black, on the other hand, having installed the 




In the actual scenario, Jones kills of his own will. It was open to him not to kill – and 
then Black would have intervened. So while it was up to Jones whether he killed or not, 
it was not up to him whether the victim died or not. While, in Black’s case, it was both 
up to him whether Jones killed or not, and whether the victim died or not (again, this 
depends on how powerful is the device). That’s why Black’s got more guidance than 
Jones, and that’s why Black is acting more than Jones.  
 
Simester (1996), someone who accepts the core of Frankfurt’s argument for guidance 
and against causalism, thinks that the kinds of cases above call for a refinement to 
Frankfurt’s guidance. 
 
…it is not a sufficient condition of behaviour being action that such 
behaviour is guided, in Frankfurt's terms, by an agent. This is because 
behaviour can be guided by more than one mechanism. Suppose that 
Alice takes Bill's hand and smites Chloe on the head with it. Suppose 
further that Bill is capable of resisting Alice's use of his hand in this way, 
but refrains from doing so; indeed, Bill is prepared to hit Chloe himself, 
were Alice not doing it for him. Then on Frankfurt's analysis, both Alice 
and Bill smite Chloe (with Bill's hand). But this seems wrong. It is Alice 
who guides Bill's hand: Bill merely allows his body to be acted upon. 
Bill's deed is one of not resisting and the movement of his hand is (vis-à-
vis Bill) a consequential event (Simester 1996, p. 170). 
 
                                                 
12
 Admittedly, how much guidance Black has does depend on whether the device has been set to redirect 
Jones’s behaviour only in case he is not about to φ or whether the device can change Jones’s behaviour in 
any kind of circumstance. 
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So Simester proposes to strengthen Frankfurt’s conditions in the following way: “that 
the behaviour is not caused by guiding forces external to the agent who exhibits it” 
(ibid). Simester’s intuition seems to be that it is just plain wrong to say that Bill is 
acting; in a similar way, one might want to say that, when Jones’s behaviour is under 
Black’s guidance, Jones cannot be said to be acting. Simester admits himself that, on 
Frankfurt’s account, the natural interpretation would be the one I have given for the case 
of Black and Jones, such that they are both acting.
13
 And I don’t see any reasons why we 
should reject that kind of reading – apart from Simester’s intuition. Simester himself 
says that “The fact that Bill's behaviour constitutes an omission might not, in such a 
case, prevent his being held legally responsible for his behaviour, qua consequence” 
(ibid). What better way of holding Bill legally responsible, then to suppose that Bill is 
(partially) acting?  
 
4.3 Causalist objection 
There is a causalist objection (Mele 1997) to Frankfurt’s guidance, and therefore to my 
proposal that guidance is necessary and sufficient for intentional action: that guidance 
itself depends, causally, on the agent’s psychological states; and that therefore Frankfurt 
fails to replace the causal view with guidance because the latter depends on the former.  
 
                                                 
13
 The reader might think that Simester’s case and mine are not analogous, because in my Jones&Black 
case Black does not actually intervene, while in Simester’s case Alice does. But that doesn’t matter: what 
matters is guidance. And in both mine and Simester’s case, both agents have guidance over the relevant 
movement.  
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Mele directs his objection to Frankfurt’s already quoted car scenario. The crucial 
passage from that scenario, with regards to Mele’s objection, is the following: 
 
A driver whose automobile is coasting downhill in virtue of gravitational 
forces alone might be satisfied with its speed and direction, and so he 
might never intervene to adjust its movement in any way (Frankfurt 
1978, p. 48). 
 
Mele thinks that this scenario itself depends on the attribution of psychological states: 
 
In the absence of a desire or intention regarding ‘the movement of the 
automobile’, there would be no basis for the driver’s being ‘satisfied’ 
with the speed and direction of his car. So we might safely attribute a 
pertinent desire or intention to the driver, whom I shall call Al. What 
stands in the way of our holding that Al’s acquiring a desire or intention 
to coast down hill is a cause of his action of coasting, and that some such 
cause is required for the purposiveness of the ‘coasting’? … his allowing 
this [the ‘coasting’] to continue to happen, owing to his satisfaction with 
the car’s speed and direction, depends (conceptually) on his having some 
relevant desire or intention regarding the car’s motion (Mele 1997, p. 9). 
 
Here one might think that Mele’s objection might apply to Frankfurt’s guidance in 
general, but that it doesn’t apply to automatic actions, and that therefore I don’t need to 
bother with it. It wouldn’t apply to automatic actions, supposedly, because I have 
already argued, in Chapter 3, against the attribution of psychological states in the 
automatic case. But I think that the causalist would have an easy reply to this move: 
because Mele is arguing that guidance depends on psychological states, in the absence of 
those psychological states, the agent’s movements would not be within the agent’s 
guidance. So what I need to argue contra Mele is, indeed, that guidance does not depend 
on psychological states being the causes of the agent’s movement.  
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One clarification: here Mele is not just arguing that the agent's interventions and 
corrections depend, causally, upon psychological states. He is arguing that the agent's 
movements, even in all those cases in which no corrections or interventions take place, 
depend causally upon psychological states.  
 
Mele thinks, then, that we can “safely attribute” the relevant psychological states, and 
that nothing stands in the way of thinking that those psychological states are causing the 
agent’s behaviour. “Then it is natural to say that Al is coasting in his car because he 
wants to, or intends to, or has decided to – for an identifiable reason. And the ‘because’ 
here is naturally given a causal interpretation. In a normal case, if Al had not desired, or 
intended, or decided to coast, he would not have coasted; and it is no accident that, 
desiring, or intending, or deciding to coast, he coasts” (Mele 1997, p. 9).  
 
But it is not enough for Mele to show that it is possible to attribute the relevant intention 
to the agent – namely, the agent’s intention to coast. What Mele needs to show is that the 
attribution of the intention to coast is necessary in order for the agent to coast. If Mele 
doesn’t show that, then he leaves room for an alternative account, one on which there is 
no intention to coast. It might be, for example, that all the agent intends to do is getting 
home: and that, because coasting doesn’t undermine the satisfaction of that intention, the 
agent doesn’t intervene. The agent’s intention to get home doesn’t imply the agent’s 
intention to coast: it might be that the agent’s intention to get home leaves room for the 
agent’s intention to coast, given that coasting is, admittedly, one of many ways in which 
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the agent can satisfy her intention to get home. But, again, that is not enough: what Mele 
needs is to show that the intention to coast is necessary. That, namely, the agent could 
not have coasted without an intention to coast; rather than just that the agent could have 
been coasting as the result of an intention to coast. Mele has only shown the latter, but 
not the former, and that is why Frankfurt’s account stands.  
 
Mele’s point might show that the agent doesn’t intend not to coast – because if she had 
intended not to coast, presumably, since her behaviour was under her guidance, she 
would not have coasted – but showing that the agent doesn’t intend not to coast falls 
short of attributing any intention to the agent; and, more importantly, it doesn’t show 
that the agent intends to coast. So that too isn’t enough. 
 
Mele is looking for a reason not to attribute psychological states to the agent; and a 
reason not to take them to cause the agent’s movements. But what Mele needs, in order 
to refute Frankfurt, is to show that there cannot be guidance without those psychological 
states causing movement. Frankfurt’s challenge is exactly that guidance doesn’t depend 
on causal antecedents.  
 
Because all that Mele shows is that it is possible to attribute those psychological states, 
Mele does not show that guidance isn't possible without those psychological states. In 
order to show the latter, Mele should have argued that the attribution of those 
psychological states is necessary, and not merely possible. 
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Here Mele might point out that the intervention isn’t possible without the agent being in 
some mental state; and that if the agent is not able to intervene, then she hasn’t got 
guidance over her actions. So guidance does depend on the agent being in some 
psychological state – this reply, importantly, would mean that Mele gives up on trying to 
show that the movements in question are caused by psychological states; and settles for 
just showing that the agent’s capacity for guidance depends on psychological states of 
the agent.  
 
But, again, all that is needed, if anything, for the agent’s intervention is some intention 
to get home. If something happens or is about to happen that might undermine the 
satisfaction of such intention, then the agent might intervene. But her intervention 
doesn’t require an intention to coast, nor does her intervention show that the agent had 
an intention to coast. 
 
But I think that Mele’s objection to Frankfurt doesn’t work even if we grant Mele the 
attribution of the relevant intention – Al’s intention to coast. 
 
Frankfurt might reply that even if Al’s coasting has a suitable mental 
cause, his coasting his purposive ‘not because it results from causes of a 
certain kind, but because it would be affected by certain causes if the 
accomplishment of its course were to be jeopardized’. The idea is that 
what accounts for the purposiveness of the coasting is not any feature of 
how it is caused but rather that Al ‘was prepared to intervene if 
necessary, and that he was in a position to do so more or less effectively’ 
(Mele 1997, p. 10). 
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Mele thinks this would be problematic for Frankfurt, and argues so, funnily enough, 
with a Frankfurt-type case (see section 4.2) in which the driver is under the control of a 
demon, such that if the driver decides to intervene, the demon will prevent him: 
 
Imagine that, throughout the episode, Al was satisfied with how things 
went and did not intervene. He decided to coast and the coasting was 
purposive. Imagine further that although Al intended to intervene if 
necessary, an irresistible mind-reading demon would not have allowed 
him to intervene. If Al had abandoned his intention to coast or had 
decided to intervene, the demon would have paralysed Al until his car 
run its course. The coasting is purposive even though Al was not ‘in a 
position to [intervene] more or less effectively’. And this suggests that 
what accounts for the purposiveness of Al’s coasting in the original case 
does not include his being in a position to intervene effectively (Mele 
1997, p. 10). 
 
There are two problems with Mele’s argument here: he is using the conclusion he wants 
to defend, that Al’s behaviour is purposive, as one of his premises: “He decided to coast 
and the coasting was purposive” (ibid). Therefore his argument is circular. Furthermore, 
he takes having decided to coast as the reason for the purposiveness of coasting, when 
that’s exactly the point he has to prove contra Frankfurt’s argument that the 
purposiveness depends, rather, on the agent’s ability for guidance. Finally, it is open to 
Frankfurt, given what Mele says, to simply reject that the agent’s movements are 
purposive, because the agent is not able to intervene upon them.  
 
There is one last point that Mele makes against Frankfurt: “There are, moreover, 
versions of the case in which Al’s coasting is purposive even though he is not prepared 
to intervene. Suppose Al is a reckless fellow and he decides that, no matter what 
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happens, he will continue coasting. He has no conditional intention to intervene. Even 
then, other things being equal, his coasting is intentional and purposive” (Mele 1997, p. 
10). 
 
Two points: firstly, Mele is misrepresenting Frankfurt’s argument here. Frankfurt’s 
view, and therefore mine, relies on the agent’s ability to intervene, not on their 
willingness.
14
 Secondly, here Mele ends up showing that purposiveness does not even 
depend on a conditional intention to intervene, which would have been one of the ways 
open to causalists to reduce guidance back to psychological states.  
 
There could be a different objection brought against Frankfurt on a similar line as 
Mele’s: that objection might just assume some intuitive idea of purposiveness, and 
therefore that objection would not have the problems just highlighted for Mele’s 
objection. A proponent of that objection would then say that, in the case when the 
demon prevents the driver from intervening, it is intuitive that the driver’s coasting is 
purposive, even though the driver does not have guidance because she isn’t able to 
intervene.  
 
There are various ways of dealing with such an objection: one can, as Simester (1996) 
proposes, slightly modify Frankfurt’s account, eliminating the part in which Frankfurt 
                                                 
14
 It might also rely, in fairness, on the agent’s “readiness” (Frankfurt 1978, pp. 47-48). But readiness need 
not be understood in terms of willingness. That an agent is ready to intervene might just mean that she is 
capable of doing so, that all the necessary arrangements have been made, that she can do so directly. 
Indeed, we can easily conceive of someone who is ready to intervene, even though she is unwilling to do 
so.  
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requires for the intervention to be ‘effective’: “The inability to ensure that behaviour 
occurs in the teeth of interfering forces does not mean that the behaviour is not action 
when no such forces interfere” (Simester 1996, pp. 169-170). Otherwise, as I have 
already mentioned, Frankfurt could just dispute the intuitiveness of the purposive 
character of the case: if, indeed, the agent is not in control, one might be willing to not 
attribute the relevant movements to the agent. Finally, one could argue, alternatively, 
that the sense in which the agent has, nevertheless, guidance, is that, counterfactually, 
had the demon not been there, she would have been in a position to intervene effectively. 
And that therefore, given the agent’s ignorance of the demon’s presence, the movements 
can still be attributed to her.  
 
4.4 Explanation and Reasons 
The final objection against my view that I want to deal with is that my ‘guidance view’ 
is not explanatory. This point actually contains two different objections against my view: 
that my view does not explain φ-ing; that my view does not provide the agent’s reasons 
for φ-ing. 
 
The first objection is that my ‘guidance view’ does not explain, causally or otherwise, 
why φ-ing happened. Causal theories like Davidson’s, on the other hand, do. By 
providing the reasons – pro attitudes, beliefs (intentions in Bratman) – that motivated an 
agent to act, causal theories not only show that the action was intentional, but also 
provide a causal explanation of the action in question. And on Davidson’s thesis, as we 
saw in Chapter 3, the causal explanation of φ-ing just is its rationalization. So Davidson 
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gives us all three in one: the intentionality of φ-ing; the explanation of φ-ing; and its 
rationalization. All my view has to offer, on the other hand, is an account of the 
intentionality of φ-ing. It says nothing about why φ-ing happened, nor does it offer the 
agent’s reasons for φ-ing. 
 
But this should come as no surprise if we remember Frankfurt’s original complaint 
against the causal view: that it focused on the antecedents of actions, rather than on the 
relationship between the agent and her action at the time of action. Focusing on the 
antecedents of action, the agent’s psychological states, the causal view can offer, on top 
of an account of intentional action, a causal explanation and a rationalization of action. 
But, as we have seen, it is exactly because it focuses on the antecedents that its account 
comprises only of necessary conditions, renouncing to offer sufficient conditions – so 
that it can avoid the problem of deviant causal chains. And also, as I have argued 
throughout this thesis, it is because of its requirement on particular mental states causing 
action that it fails to account for the intentionality of automatic actions.  
 
So offering an account of intentional action alongside a causal explanation comes at a 
high price for the causal view. My view, I have shown in this chapter, pays no such 
price: it accounts for automatic actions, and it offers necessary and sufficient conditions 
for intentionality. Also, I have only argued that the causal view fails with automatic 
actions; not with all kinds of actions. So it is possible that the causal view will 
successfully account for the intentionality of non-automatic actions. And it would then 
FRANKFURT AND THE ‘GUIDANCE VIEW’ 
   214
be possible to use the causal view to explain and rationalize non-automatic actions. But 
how do we explain and rationalize automatic actions? Let me start with explanation.  
 
When it comes to automatic actions, I want to propose, the explanation of why an agent 
did something can be found in facts about the agent and/or facts about the agent’s 
environment. For example the fact that the agent is very tall counts in favour of her 
bending when she walks through doors; and whenever she automatically bends, she 
bends because she is very tall. Her being very tall makes her bend. If the agent just 
bends, without actually intending to bend, then the explanation of why the agent bent 
might be that, since she has always been very tall, she was brought up to bend when 
walking through doors – and now she just bends every time she walks through a door. 
 
This idea is inspired by Dancy’s concept of reasons why (2000)15: 
 
What explains why so many people buy expensive perfume at Christmas 
is the barrage of advertising on the television. What explains why he 
didn't come to the party is that he is shy. In none of these cases are we 
specifying considerations in the light of which these things were done. 
But in all of them we are explaining why they were done. It seems, 
therefore, as if there is a wide range of things we think of as capable of 
giving answers to the question 'Why did he do that?' These answers 
range from specifying the things in the light of which the agent chose to 
do what he did, which we have sometimes called the agent's reasons for 
doing what he did, to something that is not a reason at all, really, but 
rather a cause. So we need to keep the notion of a motivating reason 
separate in our minds from the more general notion of 'the reason why 
the agent did what he did' (Dancy 2000, pp. 5-6). 
 
                                                 
15
 See also Hume’s natural instincts. See Treatise Part III, Book III, Section IV 'Of natural abilities'. And 
Campbell (2006) for a discussion of how Hume's natural instincts (or natural abilities) can be reasons.  
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A reason why can explain why an agent did something without appealing to any mental 
state of the agent – facts about the agent and its environment are enough. The idea is 
that, when the chap in the example was asked whether he wanted to go to the party, he 
automatically said he wouldn't go; or anyway that, whatever his answer was, when it 
came to actually going to the party there was no question of going; it came naturally to 
him not to go. He didn't have to deliberate whether to go and make any decision about it; 
his shyness did that for him. 
 
This kind of explanation can consist both of natural talents like being tall, or acquired 
talents (skills, like playing the piano), or character traits, habits, social conventions and 
rules. I take it that a particular talent or social convention might explain why an agent 
did one thing rather than another. I went to mass because I was raised as a Catholic; I 
didn’t go to the party because I’m shy. I took that turn out of habit. One can employ 
both the agent’s nature (being tall, say) and the agent’s second nature (playing the piano 
wonderfully, say) to explain action. Habits, I take it, belong to this latter kind: my 
smoking habit explains why I couldn’t resist another cigarette. My habit of listening to 




The fact that the guy is shy explains why he didn't go to the party, and that is 
independent from whether he is actually aware that he is shy or not. He needn't have any 
cognitive relationship with his being shy for his shyness to make him not go to the party. 
Clearly, agents will be aware of some facts about themselves that can count as reasons 
                                                 
16
 On explaining action by appealing to habits, see Pollard (2006b). 
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why; a tall person will normally know that they are tall (but how often will they know 
whether they are tall enough to bang against a door-frame? That kind of exact 
knowledge is rare and time-consuming, and that might very well be why tall people 
bend a lot of the time anyway. Bending automatically all the time might result in, 
sometimes, bending when it isn’t necessary. But, on balance, that is probably a more 
effective strategy than measuring out every single doorframe). But the idea is that, 
anyhow, what explains their bending in going through the door is not that they know that 
they are tall, but the simple fact that they are tall.  
 
So automatic actions could be explained by appealing to those facts about agents and 
their environments. But, it will be replied, if we appeal to those facts, we might be able 
to explain automatic actions, but we won’t be able to rationalize them, because we are 
not explaining those actions from the point of view of the agent. If we make no mention 
of the considerations in the light of which the agent acted, then we are not in the business 
of rationalizing. And this is just the second objection against my view: that it does not 
provide the agent’s reasons for φ-ing.  
 
This point, again, I must accept. In the statement of my view there is no trace of the 
agent’s reasons for φ-ing. But, again, it is not obvious that this should count against my 
view. On the other hand, here I want to show that not appealing to reasons is an 
advantage of my view.  
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The causal view, in offering the agent’s reasons for φ-ing in its account of the 
intentionality of φ-ing, commits itself to the following, problematic, claim: that an agent 
acts intentionally only if she acts for a reason. This claim is at the root of the causal 
view’s problem with automatic actions, because, as we have seen, we are not always 
warranted in constructing the primary reason that we need in order to claim that the 
automatic action in question is intentional. And this claim is also challenged by 
Hursthouse’s (1991) arational actions: actions that are intuitively intentional but that 
cannot be rationalized by a belief-desire pair. Here are some examples given by 
Hursthouse: rumpling someone’s hair, “throwing an ‘uncooperative’ tin opener on the 
ground” (ibid, p. 58), jumping up and down in excitement, “covering one’s face in the 
dark [out of shame]” (ibid), “covering one’s eyes [in horror] when they are already shut” 
(ibid). 
 
So there are at least two kinds of actions, automatic actions and arational actions, that 
my view, differently from the causal view, can account for: and that is exactly because 
my view does not appeal to reasons. But while we could easily conclude that arational 
actions are not done for a reason, we don’t want to say that all automatic actions are like 
that too. When I automatically flip the switch, or when I bend in walking through a door 
- differently from when I jump up and down in excitement - my behavior is goal-
directed and rational; and I normally have a reason for doing it.  
 
All I have been questioning in this thesis is, after all, that I need have, in every case, a 
psychological state in the shape of an unconscious belief that flipping the switch will 
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satisfy my pro attitude; because without such belief my flipping the switch would not be 
intentional. This does not mean, evidently, that I could not have had a reason for flipping 
the switch.  
 
But what kind of account can I offer of the agent’s reasons in automatic cases? I can’t 
appeal to psychological states. Take again the turning off the light example. If I said that 
I turned off the light because I want to reduce my carbon footprint, and took my desire 
to ‘reduce my carbon footprint’ as the reason for my turning off the light, that would 
seem a perfectly sensible rationalization of my behavior. The problem is that the 
Davidsonian would reply that ‘reducing my carbon footprint’ can rationalize my ‘turning 
off the light’ only if I believed that ‘turning off the light’ had the property of ‘reducing 
my carbon footprint’. So I need, after all, the belief against which I have been arguing in 
Chapter 3.  
 
One could then try and say that the facts about the agent and her environment might be 
her reasons. So that the fact that I am very tall will be the reason for my bending when I 
walked through my office door. But, it will be objected, this is no rationalization because 
I am not including the point of view of the agent; the fact that I am very tall makes no 
mention of the considerations in the light of which I acted. 
 
But, it might be replied, facts can’t be reasons only if one accepts Davidson’s 
internalism, according to which reasons must be psychological states of the agent. 
According to externalists (such as Stout 1996, Collins 1997, Dancy 2000), on the other 
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hand, facts can rationalize an agent’s behavior. So that if I bend because I am very tall, 
what rationalizes my bending isn’t my belief that I am very tall, but the fact (“objective 
circumstance” Collins 1997, p. 109) that I am very tall.  
 
Externalists admit, on the other hand, that the fact that I am very tall can rationalize my 
action of bending only if I have some grasp of the fact that I am very tall (see Dancy 
2000, Ch. 1; also Stout: “So my denial of the Internalist Shift does not involve me in 
denying that an agent must have mental access to the immediate reasons for their 
actions” (1996, p. 38)). So in order to construct an externalist rationalization for 
automatic actions, one mustn’t end up cashing out this “mental access” requirement so 
as to violate my lack of attention and awareness condition on automatic action.  
 
The alternative is giving up on the assumption that my pro attitude towards ‘reducing 
my carbon footprint’ can rationalize my turning off the light only if I also have the belief 
that ‘turning off the light’ has the property of ‘reducing my carbon footprint’. Gert 
(1998) offers one such solution: for an action to be rational, it suffices that it is not 
irrational. “Defining a rational action simply as an action that is not irrational does not 
impose a fictitious and misleading uniformity on all rational actions” (1998, p. 61). So if 
our agent doesn’t have any reasons against bending, then her bending is rational just in 
virtue of the fact that the agent has no reason not to bend. Here, what rationalizes the 
action is the absence of reasons rather than their presence. But since we, differently from 
the causalist, are not committed to reasons being causes, this is not necessarily a 
problem for us. 
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Gert’s proposal appears to fit automatic actions particularly well. In Chapters 3 and 4 I 
have not argued that agents, when acting automatically, have no intentions, beliefs, or 
desires at all. I have only argued against the attribution of particular intentions or beliefs. 
Suppose I am walking to work: I will take most of my steps automatically. Now what I 
have been arguing is that, in order for an individual step to be an intentional action of 
mine, I don’t need to have a belief that that particular step has the property of taking me 
to work.  
 
Here Gert offers us the opportunity to say a similar thing about rationality: I don’t need a 
belief with the relevant content in order to make my taking that step rational, as long as 
there is nothing that makes it irrational for me to take that step (as in, for example, 
nothing that is inconsistent with my taking that step). So that ‘going to work’ can be the 
reason for my taking that particular step independently from my having the relevant 
belief, as long as I don’t believe that taking that particular step will interfere with my 
‘going to work’ That is, as long as some automatic action does not interfere with my 
overall plans, I let myself do it. And it is perfectly rational to do so.
17
 At least for 
rationality, then, there might be a solution to the gap between ψ-ing (walking to work) 
and φ-ing (taking that individual step) that Bratman failed to fill with motivational 
potential: leaving it blank. 
 
                                                 
17
 This proposal, then, would not only offer a way to rationalize automatic actions, but also a way to justify 
them. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented an account of intentional action according to which 
automatic actions are intentional, the 'guidance view'. This account is a development on 
Frankfurt’s idea that guidance is sufficient in order to distinguish between actions and 
mere bodily movements. I argue that guidance is also sufficient for intentional action. I 
show that this elaboration on Frankfurt still enables me to distinguish between when 
agents act intentionally and when they don’t – and so I can still allow for what the causal 
view calls unintentional actions. Also, I have shown that my proposal has a major 
advantage over the causal view: I can give necessary and sufficient conditions for 
intentional action, while the causal view can only give necessary conditions. This is 
because my view can account for deviant cases as cases of mere bodily movements. In 
the rest of the chapter, I have dealt with four potential objections: that my view is subject 
to regress; that my view is subject to a version of Frankfurt’s own counterexample 
against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities; that guidance can be reduced back to 






I have already stated my conclusions: I have said why I don’t think that the causal 
views which I have analysed – Davidson’s, Bratman’s, and the Simple View – work 
in the case of automatic actions. And I have proposed an alternative account, my 
‘guidance view’. Therefore I consider my argument complete, and I don’t see the 
need to summarize it here.   
 
So what I want to do in this Conclusion is only to highlight a particularly interesting 
consequence of my account: the simplification of the relationship between 
intentionality and responsibility, so that agents are responsible for all and only their 
intentional actions.  
 
Someone who accepted the causal view would have to concede that at least some of 
the actions that the causal view would consider unintentional actions are actions for 
which agents are responsible. Take Davidson’s (1978) famous Bismarck scenario, 
where the officer in charge of the torpedoes mistakenly sinks the Bismarck thinking 
that it is the Tirpitz.
1
 The idea is that the officer sinks the Bismarck unintentionally; 
because his
2
 actions, under the description ‘sinking the Bismarck’, are not 
rationalized: he does not have a pro attitude towards ‘sinking the Bismarck’, nor does 
he have a relevant belief that, together with his pro attitude towards ‘sinking the 
                                                 
1
 Interestingly enough, Davidson’s scenario is historically inaccurate. When the Royal Navy sank the 
Bismarck, the Tirpitz was nowhere near.  
2
 I don’t think there were any female officers aboard Royal Navy battleships during World War II; 
that’s my reason for choosing to use the male pronoun.  
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Tirpitz’, would rationalize ‘sinking the Bismarck’: something like the belief that his 
action, under description ‘sinking the Bismarck’, would have the property of ‘sinking 
the Tirpitz’. So ‘sinking the Bismarck’ is, under that description, an unintentional 
action of the agent. The officer has, in short, made a mistake.  
 
Whether the officer ought to be held responsible for his mistake is a different matter, 
and one that Davidson does not discuss. But it is a matter of interest to us: so let us 
suppose that the officer is, indeed, responsible. We could suppose that there is a 
standard procedure to identify enemy battleships, and that had the officer followed 
such procedure, he would have easily identified the battleship as the Bismarck rather 
than the Tirpitz, thereby avoiding the mistake. So the officer is responsible for his 
mistake because he did not follow standard Navy procedures; and because, we are 




So the officer is responsible for ‘sinking the Bismarck’ even though he did so 
unintentionally. Therefore some unintentional actions are still actions for which 
agents are responsible. This is a quite familiar idea: cases of ignorance and 
negligence (see, for example, Rosen 2001 and 2003) are, for example, cases of 
unintentional actions for which the agent is nevertheless responsible. Those are cases 
in which the classic reply “I didn’t do it intentionally” (or: “I didn’t mean to do it”) is 
no excuse from responsibility. The Bismarck scenario would then be a case of 
negligence, because the agent failed to follow standard procedures.  
                                                 
3
 One might think that the truth of the counterfactual “had the officer followed procedures, the mistake 
would have been avoided” is not necessary for the officer’s responsibility, because the simple fact that 
he did not follow procedures is sufficient. This point is unsubstantial just now: what matters is that we 




On my view, on the other hand, there are no cases of unintentional actions for which 
the agent is nevertheless responsible: if the agent acts intentionally, then she is 
responsible for what she has done. If she does not act intentionally, then she is not 
responsible for what she has done. This is because on my view intentionality depends 
on whether the agent had guidance over her movements, and on whether the agent 
can be expected to know or find out some description of her movements at no 
unreasonable costs (which I have called ‘guidance over her actions’ as opposed to 
‘guidance over her movements’). If the agent doesn’t have guidance over her 
movements, or if the agent does have guidance but can’t be expected to know or find 
out some description of her movements at no unreasonable cost, then she does not 
act, under that description, intentionally. This means that I, differently from the 
causal view, don’t need to allow for the possibility of the agent being responsible for 
something that she doesn’t do intentionally. 
 
Let us look at the Bismarck scenario again. On my view, the agent sinks the 
Bismarck intentionally. Not only did the agent have guidance over her movements, 
because she could have at any time directly intervened to either stop or redirect the 
launch of the torpedo. But also the agent can be expected to know or find out at no 
unreasonable cost that the battleship at which he is firing is not the Tirpitz. Indeed, 
what it will take the officer to find out is only following standard procedures – which 
is his duty anyway. Therefore it is not unreasonable to expect that he follow such 





What this difference between the ‘guidance view’ and causal views means is, in 
short, that my view offers grounds for holding agents responsible for their actions, 
while the causal view doesn’t. On my view, the agent is responsible because she 
acted intentionally – acting intentionally is, on my view, both necessary and 
sufficient to being responsible for your actions. On the causal view, on the other 
hand, the agent does not need to act intentionally to be responsible, as in the 
Bismarck scenario. But then what is it, on the causal view, that makes an agent 
responsible?  
 
It is not that she acted unintentionally either, because obviously we would not want 
to say that an agent was responsible for all her unintentional actions. Suppose you are 
passing me a cup of coffee, and an earthquake causes you to spill the coffee on my 
skirt. Now, you have spilled the coffee unintentionally, but it would be unreasonable 
to hold you responsible for it, given that you could not have resisted, we are 
supposing, the earthquake. So not all unintentional actions are actions for which the 
agent is responsible; and not all intentional actions are actions for which the agent is 
responsible either. Acting intentionally is therefore not necessary for responsibility 
(it might be that it is sufficient, but I won’t go into that). So the causal view does not 
offer grounds for responsibility.  
 
There is a possible reply that the causalist could offer to the earthquake scenario. The 
causalist could argue that, at the very moment in which the earthquake causes you to 
spill the coffee, there is no description under which your action is intentional, and 
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that therefore spilling coffee is not an unintentional action, because it isn’t an action 
at all – it’s just a way in which your body has been caused to move by the 
earthquake. So it’s not that you spilled coffee, but that the coffee has been spilled 
because of the earthquake (you are just a proximal cause of the ‘coffee spilling’ 
event, but not its agent).  
 
The disagreement here is about whether, once the earthquake’s causal influence on 
you has initiated, it is still the case that your movements are intentional under the 
description ‘offering coffee’. And to my proposal that they are, the causalist replies 
that they aren’t: that you are no longer offering me coffee once your movements are 
being influenced by the earthquake. This appears counterintuitive: if an observer 
were to describe the scene, she would probably say that, while you were passing me 
the coffee, you spilled some. Also, because the causalist’s criterion is whether some 
movement was caused by a particular mental state, ‘spilling coffee’ meets such 
criterion even in the earthquake scenario, because the relevant mental state is, despite 
the earthquake, one of its causes.  
 
Here it looks as though a causalist who is committed to Davidson’s understanding of 
action individuation will have to concede that ‘offering coffee’ and ‘spilling coffee’ 
are two different descriptions of the same action. If, indeed, the causalist were 
willing to give up on such commitment, then they might have a way of saying that all 
unintentional actions are actions for which agents are responsible, because those for 




But then the causalists would have come a long way towards the side of guidance, in 
that they would have recognized, crucially, that what distinguishes actions from mere 
movements is not their preceding mental states, but rather whether the agent has 
appropriate control over the way in which her body moves: the appropriate control 
that Frankfurt and I call guidance.   
 
Let me clarify my claim here: that the causal view does not offer grounds for 
responsibility is no objection against the causal view, because it could be replied, 
quite fairly, that responsibility is outside the scope of such a view. My claim here is 
only that my view, which should be preferred to the causal view for reasons already 
stated in this thesis, has a further advantage over the causal view: it offers necessary 
and sufficient grounds for holding an agent responsible for some action: E is 
responsible for ϕ-ing iff E ϕ-ed intentionally.  
 
Obviously this is no more than a sketch of what a full account of responsibility 
should look like. To complete it, it will take specifying what it is reasonable to 
expect of an agent in each particular situation; and what, in each particular situation, 
is an unreasonable cost. Also my view, it must be emphasized, does not offer 
necessary and sufficient conditions for when an agent is responsible for something 
(some event, say); but only necessary and sufficient conditions for when an agent is 
responsible for some action. And I have said nothing about whether her own actions 




Here a difficult case is represented by the drunken driver scenario (see, for example, 
Fisher and Ravizza 1998). Suppose I go out drinking and get very drunk. Suppose 
that, notwithstanding my being very drunk, I drive back home. And suppose that I 
run over a pedestrian on my way back home. It appears quite obvious that I must be, 
at some level, responsible for running over the pedestrian. On the other hand, it will 
be difficult to argue that I intentionally run over the pedestrian. It will be difficult not 
only for the causal view, since I quite obviously, we can suppose, didn’t intend nor 
had any reason to run over the pedestrian. But it will also be difficult on the 
‘guidance view’ to claim that ‘running over the pedestrian’ was an intentional action 
of mine; because it looks as though my running over the pedestrian was a 
consequence of my lack of control over the car: the fact, in short, is that my being 
very drunk made it more difficult, if not impossible, for me, to guide the car.  
 
So it seems that at least some of those cases of drunkenness are cases in which the 
drunken agent does not have guidance over her movements; she cannot, therefore, be 
acting intentionally. Here there are therefore two possibilities in arguing for the 
drunken agent’s responsibility over what she does when drunk. On the one hand, it 
could be argued that what she does cannot count as her actions, because of lack of 
control or guidance, and that we must therefore admit that there are events other than 
the agent’s own intentional actions for which an agent will be held responsible – so 
that the case of ‘running over the pedestrian’ will be one such event.  
 
But I think that we don’t necessarily need to go down that route: guidance might still 
provide us with a way to argue for the agent’s responsibility for ‘running over the 
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pedestrian’. The idea is that the agent did have guidance over whether to go to the 
pub; she did have guidance over whether to drive to the pub (rather than taking the 
bus, say); she did have guidance over whether to drive back home; and so on. In 
short, we can find a lot of previous actions of the agent which are intentional. Those 
actions, as it happens, lead to the agent’s running over the pedestrian.  
 
Furthermore, it looks as though it would have been reasonable to expect that the 
agent had known, at the time when she decided to drive to the pub, that getting very 
drunk might have resulted in having to drive home drunk, and that driving home 
drunk might have resulted in an accident – and that the agent would have known or 
could have found out those possible consequences of her actions at no unreasonable 
cost. Those are the kinds of consequences that a person should expect from drinking 
and driving. So it might be that those are sufficient grounds for holding the agent 
responsible for doing something over which, at the time of action, she had no control 
(for an similar account of historical control and responsibility see Wright 1976).  
 
As I already stated, I do not pretend to have given a complete account of 
responsibility. But I hope to have shown that the concept of guidance, and its 







The results of the two surveys reported below show that the intuition that automatic 
actions are intentional is widely shared.  
 
1. First survey 
I interviewed 50 subjects in Edinburgh in June 2007: they were mostly university 
students. The experiment consisted in them reading a short story, and then answering 
four questions about the story they had just read. They were not allowed to look at 
the questions before reading the story; nor were they allowed to look at the next 
question before having answered the previous one. The questions were answered 
always in the same order. Subjects were allowed, though, to look back at the story 
when answering a question.  
 
The story went as follows: 
Sarah was sitting on her bed, desperately hoping for Mark to call. Staring at her 
phone like in the movies, Sarah was thinking how wonderful it would be to hear his 
voice again. She got up and went over to the window, relishing the prospect of one of 
those long conversations with Mark. Then the phone rang, Sarah answered: it was 
him! 
 
The four questions were the following, and had to be answered always in the same 




1) Did Sarah intend to get up? 
2) Did Sarah get up intentionally? 
3) Did Sarah intend to answer the phone? 
4) Did Sarah answer the phone intentionally? 
 
The idea is that Sarah ‘gets up’ automatically, without thinking about it (possibly 
without even noticing that she does so). On the other hand, ‘answering the phone’ is 
something that Sarah has long anticipated, something that she has given a lot of 
thought to: an action, in short, that we could hardly imagine to be automatic.  
 
The answers were as follows: 
 
Question NO YES Don’t know/no answer 
1 20 29 1 
2 11 39 / 
3 5 43 2 
4 6 41 3 
 
 
These answers amount to the following percentages: 
 
Question NO YES 
1 40% 58% 
2 22% 78% 
3 10% 86% 








I have picked a spontaneous automatic action, such as ‘getting up’ absentmindedly, 
and a deliberated non-automatic action, such as ‘answering the phone’ for a much 
awaited phone call.  
 
I wanted to test two things: whether subjects were as willing to attribute an intention 
to the agent for the automatic action as for the non-automatic action. And, more 
importantly, whether subjects’ intuitions about the intentionality of the two actions 
were different.  
 
It emerges that subjects, in their attributions of intentions, acknowledge the 
difference between the automatic action of ‘getting up’ and the non-automatic action 
of ‘answering the phone’: while only 10% are unwilling to attribute an intention in 
the latter case, as much as 40% answered that the subject did not intend to get up.  
 
On the other hand, subjects don’t appear to distinguish between the two actions in 
terms of intentionality: 78% considered ‘getting up’ intentional, and a very similar 
82% considered ‘answering the phone’ intentional.  
 
I think that those results lend the support of people’s intuitions to my claim that there 
is a relevant difference between automatic actions and non-automatic actions in 
terms of their preceding mental states: I have argued that causal views, because they 
rely on the attribution of mental states in every case, fail to account for automatic 
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actions. Also these results, most importantly, confirm the intuition behind my thesis, 
that automatic actions are intentional.  
 
1.2 Philosophers vs laypeople 
Since the survey was about philosophical intuitions, I have also recorded whether the 
subject was a philosopher or a layperson; where ‘philosopher’ was defined as 
someone who was at least doing a postgraduate (Masters/PhD) course in philosophy. 
17 respondents were philosophers, 33 were laypeople.  
 




Question NO YES Don’t know/no answer 
1 12 21 / 
2 7 26 / 
3 4 29 / 





Question NO YES Don’t know/no answer 
1 8 8 1 
2 4 13 / 
3 1 14 2 


















Question NO YES 
1 36.36% 63.64% 
2 21.21% 78.79% 
3 12.12% 87.88% 





Question NO YES 
1 47.06% 47.06% 
2 23.53% 76.47% 
3 5.88% 82.35% 
4 17.65% 76.47% 
  
The most striking difference between the general results and the specific results of 
the two categories is certainly the philosophers’ answer to question 1, which was 
evenly split: 47% did not attribute an intention to ‘get up’, and another 47% did. This 
shows that philosophers are apparently less willing than average to attribute an 
intention in the case of automatic actions: 47% against the general 58% and the 
laypeople’s 64%.  
 
2. Second survey 
The second survey pursued the same two hypotheses through different stories, and 
with a different methodology. 
 
This time, the automatic action and the non-automatic action did not feature in the 
same story, but in two distinct sketches. Also, this time the automatic action and the 
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non-automatic action were of the same kind, ‘boiling the kettle’; while in the first 
survey they were of different kinds, ‘getting up’ and ‘answering the phone’.  
 
Below are the two stories. In #1, ‘boiling the kettle’ is supposed to be an automatic 
action, as part of the agent’s morning routine; something that she habitually does 
every morning.  
 
#1: 
Today Karen woke up with the unpleasant consciousness that she had an interview. 
She had taken ages to fall asleep the night before, and still now she could think of 
nothing else: should I wear a skirt or trousers? Should I walk or get a taxi? All the 
same, she got on with her usual morning routine: she opened the shutters, then went 
to the kitchen, boiled the kettle, turned on the radio, and sat down for her breakfast. 
 
On the other hand, in #2 ‘boiling the kettle’ is something that the agent does after 
having resolved a dilemma over whether to do it or not; therefore she doesn’t do it 
automatically. She has actually had to think about it. 
 
#2 
Karen couldn't decide whether to have espresso or instant coffee. Espresso, she 
thought, tastes nicer. But with instant you get more, much more. As always with her, 
quantity prevailed over quality, and she decided to put on the kettle for a big cup of 




For both stories the same pair of questions were asked: 
1) Did Karen intend to boil the kettle? 
2) Did Karen boil the kettle intentionally? 
 
The methodology, for this second survey, was very different. No subject was shown 
both stories, and no subject was asked more than one question about either story. So 
there were four sets of subjects, each answering only one question. This was done in 
case, in the first survey, answers to later questions had been influenced by answers 
already given by the same subject to earlier questions. On the other hand, while the 
methodology of the first survey tested a person’s contrastive intuitions about 
intention and intentionality, this second methodology does not, because each subject 
answers only one question.  
 
For this second survey, conducted over the internet, I have interviewed 357 people: 
one hundred each for each question of story #2; one hundred for question 1 of story 
#1; and 57 for question 2 of story #1.  
 
The results were as follows: 
Story #1:  
Question NO YES 
1 29 71 




Question NO YES 
1 42 58 




These results amount to the following percentages 
Story#1: 
Question NO YES 
1 29% 71% 




Question NO YES 
1 42% 58% 
2 6% 94% 
 
2.1 Discussion 
The results of the second survey confirm, importantly, that the intuition that 
automatic actions are intentional is widely shared: an overwhelming majority of 81% 
of the respondents said that, in the automatic case, Karen intentionally boiled the 
kettle. Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 94% said that Karen boiled the kettle 
intentionally in the non-automatic case in which she does it as the result of a 
dilemma.  
 
On the other end, the results of this second survey do not confirm the first survey as 
to people’s unwillingness to attribute intentions in the automatic case as opposed to 
the non-automatic case: 58% of respondents attribute an intention in the non-
automatic case, and even more, 71%, in the automatic case. 
 
There is an obvious way to explain the diverse findings of the two surveys on the 
attribution of intention: while in the first survey ‘getting up’ was presented as a 
spontaneous automatic action, in the second survey ‘boiling the kettle’ is presented 
as an habitual automatic action which is part of a routine: it is therefore obviously 
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goal-directed. And, crucially, the goal is presented to the respondent in the story in a 
way in which the first survey didn’t do: there, the explanation of why Sarah had 
gotten up was somehow left to the respondent. While here a respondent can be in no 
doubt over what are Karen’s goals.  
 
There is another important consideration to make about those results on the 
attribution of intention. There is a crucial difference, as long as the philosophy of 
action is concerned, between not intending to ‘boil the kettle’ and intending to ‘not 
boil the kettle’ – where, crucially, the negation is part of the content of the intention 
only in the latter case. The difference is that in the former case no intention is 
attributed to the agent. And so the former case could not be cited as part of a causal 
explanation as those of Bratman and Davidson, because the mental state that is 
supposed to have caused action is missing: to say that the agent does not intend to 
boil the kettle does not attribute any intention to the agent. 
 
But it is not obvious that this difference is picked up on by non-philosophers: after 
all, it isn’t obvious that non-philosophers are committed to Davidson’s and 
Bratman’s causalism. Indeed, it might be that, in these surveys, the attribution of 
intention is explained by the fact that respondents are mostly concerned with not 
saying that the agent’s intentions are against ‘getting up’ or ‘boiling the kettle’. That 
much appears obvious from the stories: that the agents are not against ‘getting up’ 
and ‘boiling the kettle’. But that does not mean, yet, that they actually intend to do 




It might be that respondents shy away from not attributing the intention to make sure 
that they do not end up saying (or anyway being taken to say) that the agent’s 
intentions and attitudes were against ‘getting up’ and ‘boiling the kettle’, which 
would be an obvious mistake.  
 
But here I am only speculating: the only thing we can conclude, from the data, is that 
the second survey confirms only one of the two hypotheses supported by the first 
survey: that intuition tells us, overwhelmingly, that automatic actions are intentional. 
The second hypothesis - that people distinguish between automatic actions and non-
automatic actions in terms of the attribution of mental states - is not supported by this 
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